An important concept in Jung's theory is the existence of two basically different types of personality, mental attitude, and function. When the libido and the individual's general interest are turned outward toward people and objects of the external world, he or she is said to be extroverted. When the reverse is true, and libido and interest are entered on the individual, he or she is said to be introverted. In a completely normal individual these two tendencies alternate, neither dominating, but usually the libido is directed mainly in one direction nor the other; as a result, two personality types are recognizable.
Jung rejected Freud's distinction between the ego and superego and recognized a portion of the personality, somewhat similar to the superego, that he called the persona. The persona consists of what a person appears to be to others, in contrast to what he or she actually is. The persona is the role the individual chooses to play in life, the total impression he or she wishes to make on the outside world.
The Austrian psychologist and psychiatrist Alfred Adler studied under Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, before developing his own theories about human behaviour. Adler’s best-known theories stress that individuals are mainly motivated by feelings of inferiority, which he called an inferiority complex.
Alfred Adler, another of Freud's pupils, differed from both Freud and Jung in stressing that the motivating force in human life is the sense of inferiority, which begins as soon as an infant is able to comprehend the existence of other people who are better able to care for themselves and cope with their environment. From the moment the feeling of inferiority is established, the child strives to overcome it. Because inferiority is intolerable, the compensatory mechanisms set up by the mind may get out of hand, resulting in self-entered neurotic attitudes, overcompensations, and a retreat from the real world and its problems.
Adler laid particular stress on inferiority feelings arising from what he regarded as the three most important relationships: those between the individual and work, friends, and loved ones. The avoidance of inferiority feelings in these relationships leads the individual to adopt a life goal that is often not realistic and is frequently expressed as an unreasoning will to power and dominance, leading to every type of antisocial behaviour from bullying and boasting to political tyranny. Adler believed that analysis can foster a sane and rational ‘community feeling’ that is constructive rather than destructive.
Also the Austrian psychologist and psychotherapist Otto Rank worked with Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, before developing his own theories about mental and emotional disorders. Rank believed that an individual’s neurotic tendencies could be linked to the traumatic experience of birth.
Another student of Freud, Otto Rank, introduced a new theory of neurosis, attributing all neurotic disturbances to the primary trauma of birth. In his later writings he described individual development as a progression from complete dependence on the mother and family, to a physical independence coupled with intellectual dependence on society, and finally to complete intellectual and psychological emancipation. Rank also laid great importance on the will, defined as ‘a positive guiding organization and integration of self, which utilizes’ creatively as well as inhibits and controls the instinctual drives.’
The American psychoanalyst and social philosopher Erich Fromm stressed the importance of social and economic factors on human behaviour. His focus was a departure from traditional psychoanalysis, which emphasized the role of the subconscious. In this 1969 essay for Collier’s Year Book, Fromm presents various explanations for human violence. He argues that violence cannot be controlled by imposing stronger legal penalties, but rather by creating a more just society in which people connect with each other as humans and are able to control their own lives.
Later noteworthy modifications of psychoanalytic theory include those of the American psychoanalysts’ Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and Harry Stack Sullivan. The theories of Fromm lay particular emphasis on the concept that society and the individual is not separate and opposing forces, that the nature of society is determined by its historic background, and that the needs and desires of individuals are largely formed by their society. As a result, Fromm believed, the fundamental problem of psychoanalysis and psychology is not to resolve conflicts between fixed and unchanging instinctive drives in the individual and the fixed demands and laws of society, but to bring about harmony and an understanding of the relationship between the individual and society. Fromm also stressed the importance to the individual of developing the ability to fully use his or her mental, emotional, and sensory powers.
Horney worked primarily in the field of therapy and the nature of neuroses, which she defined as of two types: Situation neuroses and character neuroses. Situation neuroses arise from the anxiety attendant on a single conflict, such for being faced with a difficult decision. Although they may paralyse the individual temporarily, making it impossible to think or act efficiently, such neuroses are not deeply rooted. Character neuroses are characterized by a basic anxiety and a basic hostility resulting from a lack of love and affection in childhood.
Sullivan believed that all development can be described exclusively in terms of interpersonal relations. Character types as well as neurotic symptoms are explained as results of the struggle against anxiety arising from the individual's relations with others and are a security system, maintained for the purpose of allaying anxiety.
An important school of thought is based on the teachings of the British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein. Because most of Klein's followers worked with her in England, this has come to be known as the English school. Its influence, nevertheless, is very strong throughout the European continent and in South America. Its principal theories were derived from observations made in the psychoanalysis of children. Klein posited the existence of complex unconscious fantasies in children under the age of six months. The principal source of anxiety arises from the threat to existence posed by the death instinct. Depending on how concrete representations of the destructive forces are dealt with in the unconscious fantasy life of the child, two basic early mental attitudes result that Klein characterized as a ‘depressive position’ and a ‘paranoid position.’ In the paranoid position, the ego's defence consists of projecting the dangerous internal object onto some external representative, which is treated as a genuine threat emanating from the external world. In the depressive position, the threatening object is introjected and treated in fantasy as concretely retained within the person. Depressive and hypochondriacal symptoms result. Although considerable doubt exists that such complex unconscious fantasies operate in the minds of infants, these observations have been of the utmost importance to the psychology of unconscious fantasies, paranoid delusions, and theory concerning early object relations.
FROM A MIND THAT FOUND ITSELF
After suffering a mental breakdown in 1900, Clifford Beers, an aspiring American businessman, spent the next three years in treatment at various mental hospitals. Upon his recovery, Beers wrote A Mind That Found Itself (1908), which chronicled the hardships he endured and revealed the callousness of many hospital attendants to the suffering of patients. The book aroused public concern about the care of people with mental illnesses and launched a worldwide movement for mental health. In the following excerpt, Beers describes his experiences in the violent ward of a state hospital. The passage also reveals the delusions brought about by his state of ‘elation,’ or mania.
Even for a violent ward my entrance was spectacular—if not dramatic. The three attendants regularly in charge naturally jumped to the conclusion that, in me, a troublesome patient had been foisted upon them. They noted my arrival with an unpleasant curiosity, which in turn aroused my curiosity, for it took but a glance to convince me that my burly keepers were typical attendants of the brute-force type. Acting on the order of the doctor in charge, one of them stripped me of my outer garments; and, clad in nothing but underclothes, I was thrust into a cell.
Few, if any, prisons in this country contain worse holes than this cell proved to be. It was one of five, situated in a short corridor adjoining the main ward. It was about six feet wide by ten long and of a good height. A heavily screened and barred window admitted light and a negligible quantity of air, for the ventilation scarcely deserved the name. The walls and floor were bare, and there was no furniture. A patient confined here must lie on the floor with no substitute for a bed but one or two felt druggets [floor coverings]. Sleeping under such conditions becomes tolerable after a time, but not until one has become accustomed to lying on a surface nearly as hard as a stone. Here (as well, indeed, as in other parts of the ward) for a period of three weeks I was again forced to breathe and re-breathe air so vitiated that even when I occupied a larger room in the same ward, doctors and attendants seldom entered without remarking its quality.
My first meal increased my distaste for my semi-sociological experiment. For over a month I was kept in a half-starved condition. At each meal, to be sure, I was given as much food as was served to other patients, but an average portion was not adequate to the needs of a patient as active as I was at this time.
Worst of all, winter was approaching and these, my first quarters, were without heat. As my olfactory nerves soon became uncommunicative, the breathing of foul air was not a hardship. On the other hand, to be famished the greater part of the time was a very conscious hardship. But to be half-frozen, day in and day out for a long period, was exquisite torture. Of all the suffering I endured, that occasioned by confinement in cold cells seems to have made the most lasting impression. Hunger is a local disturbance, but when one is cold, every nerve in the body registers its call for help. Long before reading a certain passage of De Quincey's I had decided that cold could cause greater suffering than hunger; consequently, it was with great satisfaction that I read the following sentences from his ‘Confessions’: ‘O ancient women, daughters of toil and suffering, among all the hardships and bitter inheritances of flesh that ye are called upon to face, not one—not even hunger—seems in my eyes comparable to that of nightly cold. . . . A more killing curse there does not exist for man or woman than the bitter combat between the weariness that prompts sleep and the keen, searching cold that forces you from that first access of sleep to start up horror-stricken, and to seek warmth vainly in renewed exercise, though long since fainting under fatigue.’
The hardness of the bed and the coldness of the room were not all that interfered with sleep. The short corridor in which I was placed was known as the ‘Bull Pen’—a phrase eschewed by the doctors. It was usually in an uproar, especially during the dark hours of the early morning. Patients in a state of excitement may sleep during the first hours of the night, but seldom all night; and even should one have the capacity to do so, his companions in durance would wake him with a shout or a song or a curse or the kicking of a door. A noisy and chaotic medley frequently continued without interruption for hours at a time. Noise, unearthly noise, was the poetic license allowed the occupants of these cells. I spent several days and nights in one or another of them, and I question whether I averaged more than two or three hours' sleep a night during that time. Seldom did the regular attendants pay any attention to the noise, though even they must at times have been disturbed by it. In fact the only person likely to attempt to stop it was the night watch, who, when he did enter a cell for that purpose, almost invariably kicked or choked the noisy patient into a state of temporary quiet. I noted this and scented trouble.
Drawing and writing materials having been again taken from me, I cast about for some new occupation. I found one in the problem of warmth. Though I gave repeated expression to the benumbed messages of my tortured nerves, the doctor refused to return my clothes. For a semblance of warmth I was forced to depend upon ordinary undergarments and an extraordinary imagination. The heavy felt druggets were about as plastic as blotting paper and I derived little comfort from them until I hit upon the idea of rending them into strips. These strips I would weave into a crude Rip Van Winkle kind of suit; and so intricate was the warp and woof that on several occasions an attendant had to cut me out of these sartorial improvisations. At first, until I acquired the destructive knack, the tearing of one drugget into strips was a task of four or five hours. But in time I became so proficient that I could completely destroy more than one of these six-by-eight-foot druggets in a single night. During the following weeks of my close confinement I destroyed at least twenty of them, each worth, as I found out later, about four dollars; and I confess I found a peculiar satisfaction in the destruction of property belonging to a State that had deprived me of all my effects except underclothes. But my destructiveness was due to a variety of causes. It was occasioned primarily by a ‘pressure of activity,’ for which the tearing of druggets served as a vent. I was in a state of mind aptly described in a letter written during my first month of elation, in which I said, ‘I'm as busy as a nest of ants.’
Though the habit of tearing druggets was the outgrowth of an abnormal impulse, the habit itself lasted longer than it could have done had I not, for so long a time, been deprived of suitable clothes and been held a prisoner in cold cells. But another motive soon asserted itself. Being deprived of all the luxuries of life and most of the necessities, my mother wit, always conspiring with a wild imagination for something to occupy my time, led me at last to invade the field of invention. With appropriate contrariety, an unfamiliar and hitherto almost detested line of investigation now attracted me. Abstruse mathematical problems that had defied solution for centuries began to appear easy. To defy the State and its puny representatives had become mere child's play. So I forthwith decided to overcome no less a force than gravity itself.
My conquering imagination soon tricked me into believing that I could lift myself by my boot-straps—or rather that I could do so when my laboratory should contain footgear that lent itself to the experiment. But what of the strips of felt torn from the druggets? Why, these I used as the straps of my missing boots; and having no boots to stand in, I used my bed as boots. I reasoned that for my scientific purpose a man in bed was as favourably situated as a man in boots. Therefore, attaching a sufficient number of my felt strips to the head and foot of the bed (which happened not to be screwed to the floor), and, in turn, attaching the free ends to the transom and the window guard, I found the problem very simple. For I next joined these cloth cables in such manner that by pulling downward I effected a readjustment of stress and strain, and my bed, with me in it, was soon dangling in space. My sensations at this momentous instant must have been much like those that thrilled Newton when he solved one of the riddles of the universe. Indeed, they must have been more intense, for Newton, knowing, had his doubts; I, not knowing, had no doubts at all. So epoch-making did this discovery appear to me that I noted the exact position of the bed so that a wondering posterity might ever afterward view and revere the exact spot on the earth's surface from where one of man's greatest thoughts had winged its way to immortality.
For weeks I believed I had uncovered a mechanical principle that would enable man to defy gravity. And I talked freely and confidently about it. That is, I proclaimed the impending results. The intermediate steps in the solution of my problem I ignored, for good reasons. A blind man may harness a horse. So long as the horse is harnessed, one need not know the office of each strap and buckle. Gravity was harnessed—that was all. Meanwhile I felt sure that another sublime moment of inspiration would intervene and clear the atmosphere, thus rendering flight of the body as easy as a flight of imagination.
While my inventive operations were in progress, I was chafing under the unjust and certainly unscientific treatment to which I was being subjected. In spite of my close confinement in vile cells, for a period of more than three weeks I was denied a bath. I do not regret this deprivation, for the attendants, who at the beginning were unfriendly, might have forced me to bathe in water that had first served for several other patients. Though such an unsanitary and disgusting practice was contrary to rules, it was often indulged in by the lazy brutes who controlled the ward.
I continued to object to the inadequate portions of food served me. On Thanksgiving Day (for I had not succeeded in escaping and joining in the celebration at home) an attendant, in the unaccustomed role of a ministering angel, brought me the usual turkey and cranberry dinner that, on two days a year, is provided by an intermittently generous State. Turkey being the rara avis of the imprisoned, it was but natural that I should desire to gratify a palate long insulted. I wished not only to satisfy my appetite, but to impress indelibly a memory that for months had not responded to so agreeable a stimulus. While lingering over the delights of this experience I forgot all about the ministering angel. But not for long. He soon returned. Observing that I had scarcely touched my feast, he said, ‘If you don't eat that dinner in a hurry, I'll take it from you.’
‘I don't see what difference it makes to you whether I eat it in a hurry or take my time about it,’ I said. ‘It's the best I've had in many a day, and I have a right to get as much pleasure out of it as I can.’
‘We'll see about that,’ he replied, and, snatching it away, he stalked out of the room, leaving me to satisfy my hunger on the memory of vanished luxuries. Thus did a feast become a fast.
Under this treatment I soon learned to be more noisy than my neighbours. I was never without a certain humour in contemplating not only my surroundings, but myself; and the demonstrations in which I began to indulge were partly in fun and partly by way of protest. In these outbursts I was assisted, and at times inspired, by a young man in the room next mine. He was about my own age and was enjoying the same phase of exuberance as myself. We talked and sang at all hours of the night. At the time we believed that the other patients enjoyed the spice that we added to the restricted variety of their lives, but later I learned that a majority of them looked upon us as the worst of nuisances.
We gave the doctors and attendants no rest—at least not intentionally. Whenever the assistant physician appeared, we upbraided him for the neglect that was then our portion. At one time or another we were banished to the Bull Pen for these indiscretions. And had there been a viler place of confinement still, our performances in the Bull Pen undoubtedly would have brought us to it. At last the doctor hit upon the expedient of transferring me to a room more remote from my inspiring, and, I may say, conspiring, companion. Talking to each other ceased to be the easy pastime it had been; so we gradually lapsed into a comparative silence that must have proved a boon to our ward-mates. The megaphonic Bull Pen, however, continued with irregularity, but annoying certainty to furnish its quota of noise.
On several occasions I concocted plans to escape, and not only that, but also to liberate others. That I did not make the attempt was the fault—or merit, perhaps—of a certain night watch, whose timidity, rather than sagacity, impelled him to refuse to unlock my door early one morning, although I gave him a plausible reason for the request. This night watch, I learned later, admitted that he feared to encounter me single-handed. And on this particular occasion well might he, for, during the night, I had woven a spider-web net in which I intended to enmesh him. Had I succeeded, there would have been a lively hour for him in the violent ward—had I failed, there would have been a lively hour for me. There were several comparatively sane patients (especially my elated neighbour) whose willing assistance I could have secured. Then the regular attendants could have been held prisoners in their own room, if, indeed, we had not in turn overpowered them and transferred them to the Bull Pen, where the several victims of their abuse might have given them a deserved dose of their own medicine. This scheme of mine was a prank rather than a plot. I had an inordinate desire to prove that one could escape if he had a mind to do so. Later I boasted to the assistant physician of my unsuccessful attempt. This boast he evidently tucked away in his memory.
My punishment for harmless antics of this sort was prompt in coming. The attendants seemed to think their whole duty to their closely confined charges consisted in delivering three meals a day. Between meals he was a rash patient who interfered with their leisure. Now one of my greatest crosses was their continued refusal to give me a drink when I asked for it. Except at meal time, or on those rare occasions when I was permitted to go to the wash room, I had to get along as best I might with no water to drink, and that too at a time when I was in a fever of excitement. My polite requests were ignored; impolite demands were answered with threats and curses. And this war of requests, demands, threats, and curses continued until the night of the fourth day of my banishment. Then the attendants made good their threats of assault. That they had been trying to goad me into a fighting mood I well knew, and often accused them of their mean purpose. They brazenly admitted that they were simply waiting for a chance to ‘slug’ me, and promised to punish me well as soon as I should give them a slight excuse for doing so.
On the night of November 25th, 1902, the head attendant and one of his assistants passed my door. They were returning from one of the dances that, at intervals during the winter, the management provides for the nurses and attendants. While they were within hearing, I asked for a drink of water. It was a carefully worded request. But they were in a hurry to get to bed, and refused me with curses. Then I replied in kind.
‘If I come there I'll kill you,’ one of them said.
‘Well, you won't get in if I can help it,’ I replied, as I braced my iron bedstead against the door.
My defiance and defences gave the attendants the excuse for which they had said they were waiting; and my success in keeping them out for two or three minutes only served to enrage them. By the time they had gained entrance they had become furies. One was a young man of twenty-seven. Physically he was a fine specimen of manhood; morally he was deficient - thanks to the dehumanizing effect of several years in the employ of different institutions whose officials countenanced improper methods of care and treatment. It was he who now attacked me in the dark of my prison room. The head attendant stood by, holding a lantern that shed a dim light.
The door once open, I offered no further resistance. First I was knocked down. Then for several minutes I was kicked about the room - struck, kneed and choked. My assailant even attempted to grind his heel into my cheek. In this he failed, for I was there protected by a heavy beard that I wore at that time. But my shins, elbows, and back were cut by his heavy shoes; and had I not instinctively drawn up my knees to my elbows for the protection of my body, I might have been seriously, perhaps fatally, injured. As it was, I was severely cut and bruised. When my strength was nearly gone, I feigned unconsciousness. This ruse alone saved me from further punishment, for usually a premeditated assault is not ended until the patient is mute and helpless. When they had accomplished their purpose, they left me huddled in a corner to wear out the night as best I might—to live or die for all they cared.
Strange as it may seem, I slept well. But not at once. Within five minutes I was busily engaged writing an account of the assault. A trained war correspondent could not have pulled himself together in less time. As usual I had recourse to my bit of contraband lead pencil, this time a pencil that had been smuggled to me the very first day of my confinement in the Bull Pen by a sympathetic fellow-patient. When he had pushed under my cell door that little implement of war, it had loomed as large in my mind as a battering-ram. Paper I had none; but I had previously found walls to be a fair substitute. I therefore now selected and wrote upon a rectangular spot—about three feet by two - which marked the reflection of a light in the corridor just outside my transom.
The next morning, when the assistant physician appeared, he was accompanied as usual by the guilty head attendant who, on the previous night, had held the lantern.
‘Doctor,’ I said, ‘I have something to tell you,’—and I glanced significantly at the attendant. ‘Last night I had a most unusual experience. I have had many imaginary experiences during the past two years and a half, and it may be that last night's was not real. Perhaps the whole thing was phantasmagoric—like what I used to see during the first months of my illness. Whether it was so or not I shall leave you to judge. It just happens to be my impression that I was brutally assaulted last night. If it was a dream, it is the first thing of the kind that ever left visible evidence on my body.’
With that I uncovered to the doctor a score of bruises and lacerations. I knew these would be more impressive than any other words of mine. The doctor put on a knowing look, but said nothing and soon left the room. His guilty subordinate tried to appear unconcerned, and I really believe he thought me not absolutely sure of the events of the previous night, or at least unaware of his share in them.
In most types of psychotherapy, a person discusses his or her problems one-on-one with a therapist. The therapist tries to understand the person’s problems and to help the individual change distressing thoughts, feelings, or behaviours.
A psychologist listens to her client during a psychotherapy session. Psychotherapy can be an effective treatment for many mental disorders. Some forms of psychotherapy try to help people resolve their internal, unconscious conflicts, and other forms teach people skills to correct their abnormal behaviour.
People often seek psychotherapy when they have tried other approaches to solving a personal problem. For example, people who are depressed, anxious, or have drug or alcohol problems may find that talking to friends or family members is not enough to resolve their problems. Sometimes people may want to talk to a therapist about problems they would feel uncomfortable discussing with friends or family, such as being sexually abused as a child. Finding a therapist to talk to who is knowledgeable about emotional problems, has patients’ best interests at heart, and is relatively objective can be extremely helpful.
Psychotherapy differs in two ways from the informal help or advice that one person may give another. First, psychotherapy is conducted by a trained, certified, or licensed therapist. In addition, treatment methods in psychotherapy are guided by well-developed theories about the sources of personal problems.
At one time the term psychotherapy referred to a form of psychiatric treatment used with severely disturbed individuals, whereas counselling referred to the treatment of people with milder psychological problems or to advice given on vocational and educational matters. Today the distinction between psychotherapy and counselling is quite blurred, and many mental health professionals use the terms interchangeably. Psychotherapists and counsellors often treat the same kinds of problems and use the same set of techniques.
Psychotherapy is an important form of treatment for many kinds of psychological problems. Two of the most common problems for which people seek help from a therapist are depression and persistent anxiety. People with depression may have low self-esteem, a sense of hopelessness about the future, and a lack of interest in people and activities once found pleasurable. People with anxiety disorders may feel anxious all the time or suffer from phobias, a fear of specific objects or situations. Psychotherapy, by itself or in combination with drug treatment, can often help people overcome or manage these problems.
People experiencing an emotional crisis due to marital problems, family disputes, problems at work, loneliness, or troubled social relationships may benefit from psychotherapy. Other problems often treated with psychotherapy include obsessive-compulsive disorder, personality disorders, alcoholism and other forms of drug dependence, problems stemming from child abuse, and behavioural problems, such as eating disorders and juvenile delinquency.
Mental health professionals do not rely on psychotherapy to treat schizophrenia, a severe mental illness. Drugs are used to treat this disorder. However, some psychotherapeutic techniques may help people with schizophrenia learn appropriate social skills and skills for managing anxiety. Another severe mental illness, bipolar disorder (popularly called manic depression), is treated with drugs or a combination of drugs and psychotherapy.
Before 1950 psychoanalysis was virtually the only form of psychotherapy available. In traditional psychoanalysis, patients met with a therapist several times a week. Patients would lie on a couch and talk about their childhood, their dreams, or whatever came to mind. The psychoanalyst interpreted these thoughts and helped patients resolve unconscious conflicts. This type of therapy often took years and was very expensive.
Over the next several decades the field of psychotherapy and counselling expanded enormously, both in the number of approaches available and in the number of people choosing to enter the profession. Variants of psychoanalysis emerged that focussed more on the patient’s current level of functioning and required less time in therapy. In the 1950s and 1960s therapists began using behavioural and cognitive therapies that focussed less on the inner world of the client and more on the client’s problem behaviours or thoughts.
As the number of approaches to therapy grew throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the practice of psychotherapy and counselling spread from hospitals and private psychiatric offices to new settings—elementary schools, high schools, colleges, prisons, mental health clinics, military bases, businesses, and churches and synagogues. With more opportunities for individuals to receive help for their problems, and with more affordable treatments, psychotherapy has become increasingly popular. Although a reliable count of the number of people who receive psychotherapy is difficult to obtain, researchers estimate that 3.5 percent of women and 2.5 percent of men in the United States receive psychotherapy in any given year.
The increased availability and use of psychotherapy has led to more positive attitudes toward mental health care among the general public. Before the 1960s, people often viewed the need for psychotherapy as a sign of personal weakness or a sign that the person was abnormal. Those who received therapy seldom told others about their treatment. Since then the stigma attached to psychotherapy has decreased significantly. It is now common for people to consider seeing a therapist for an emotional problem, and recipients of therapy are more willing to disclose their therapy to friends. Today psychotherapy is a topic of immense public interest. In the scientific community and in the media, people assess methods of therapy and debate which approaches are best for particular problems and disorders.
One of the strongest trends in psychotherapy in recent years has been the shift toward short-term treatment, or brief therapy. Rather than spending years in therapy, clients receive treatment over the course of several weeks or months. Brief therapies usually focus on the client’s specific problems and may make use of techniques from a variety of theoretical orientations. Brief approaches to therapy evolved in part from consumer dissatisfaction with the length, scope, and cost of psychoanalysis and similar approaches. With extensive publicity about short-term therapies, many consumers have come to expect faster treatment for mental health problems than in the past has further driven the movement toward shorter therapies. To provide mental health care at lower costs, managed-care firms, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs), limit the number of therapy sessions that they will pay for during a year for each insured person. Typical managed-care firms allow up to 20 sessions per year, but some allow as few as 8 sessions per year. Case reviewers for the managed-care company decide how many sessions of therapy each person should receive. Usually a case reviewer will authorize only a small number of sessions at first. If the therapist and client wish to continue beyond this number, the therapist must get approval from the case reviewer for additional sessions. If the client wishes to continue after reaching the maximum, he or she must pay the full cost of therapy.
Other managed-care companies pay therapists a set fee to meet with a client for up to a specified maximum number of sessions depending on the nature of the problem, free of interference from case reviewers. For example, a managed-care firm may pay a therapist $200 to hold up to eight sessions with a person. If the client uses all eight sessions, the therapist normally loses money. But if treatment stops after two or three sessions, the therapist makes a profit. This relatively new system is controversial because it creates a financial incentive for the therapist to shorten the length of treatment.
Managed care has affected the practice of psychotherapy in other important ways. Rather than selecting a therapist based on personal referrals, people enrolled in managed-care plans must select from a list of therapists provided by their managed-care organization. Clients cannot be assured of complete confidentiality because therapists must provide case reviewers with treatment plans and details of progress. Increasingly, managed-care companies are reluctant to authorize more than several sessions of psychotherapy, favouring drug treatment instead.
Critics argue that managed-care companies have embraced a ‘quick fix’ mentality that pushes short-term therapy even when long-term therapy may be more appropriate. Others note that managed care has brought greater accountability to the profession of psychotherapy, forcing therapists to justify the effectiveness of their treatment approach. In the late 1990s most Americans with health insurance were enrolled in plans with managed mental health care.
Psychotherapists and counsellors come principally from the fields of psychiatry, psychology, social work, and psychiatric nursing. Their training is quite different, considering that their actual therapeutic techniques may be quite similar.
Psychiatrists are physicians who specialize in the treatment of psychological disorders. They attend medical school for four years to earn an MD. (doctor of medicine) degree. Then they receive training in psychiatry during a residency of three or four years. They differ from other therapists in that they can prescribe medications, such as antidepressants and antianxiety drugs.
Clinical psychologists and counselling psychologists have a PhD (doctor of philosophy) or Psy.D. (doctor of psychology) degree that requires four to six years of graduate study. They work in settings such as businesses, schools, mental health centres, and hospitals. Licensing requirements vary in the United States, but most states require psychologists to have postdoctoral training.
Psychiatric social workers have a master’s degree in social work (M.S.W.), usually requiring two years of graduate study. They may work in mental health agencies or medical settings practicing individual therapy or family and marital therapy. Psychiatric social workers make up the single largest group of mental health professionals. Licensing requirements vary in the United States.
Psychiatric nurses are registered nurses who usually have a master’s degree in psychiatric nursing. They often work in a hospital setting conducting individual or group therapy with patients under the supervision of a psychiatrist.
Psychoanalysts specialize in psychoanalysis. Although anyone may use the title of psychoanalyst, those accredited by the International Psychoanalytic Association are usually psychiatrists, psychologists, or social workers who have completed six to ten years of psychoanalytic training. They are also required to undergo a personal analysis themselves.
All but a few states license professional counsellors, usually under the title of licensed professional counsellor or licensed mental health counsellor. The National Board for Certified Counsellors offers certification for counsellors who have a minimum of a master’s degree and who meet the organization’s professional standards.
Members of the clergy—priests, ministers, and rabbis—usually take courses in counselling and psychology as part of their seminary training. Some ministers specialize in pastoral counselling, working with members of a congregation who are in distress.
Any person, even one with no training, can legally use the title of therapist, psychotherapist, or other titles not covered under licensing and certification laws. Therefore, clients should ask therapists who practice under such titles about their academic and professional training.
Psychotherapy encompasses a large number of treatment methods, each developed from different theories about the causes of psychological problems and mental illnesses. There are more than 250 kinds of psychotherapy, but only a fraction of these have found mainstream acceptance. Many kinds of psychotherapy are offshoots of well-known approaches or build upon the work of earlier theorists.
In individual therapy, a patient or client meets regularly with a therapist, typically over a period of weeks or months. The methods of therapists vary depending on their theory of personality, or way of understanding another individual. Most therapies can be classified as (1) psychodynamic, (2) humanistic, (3) behavioural, (4) cognitive, or (5) eclectic. In the United States, about 40 percent of therapists consider their approach eclectic, which means they combine techniques from a number of theoretical approaches and often tailor their treatment to the particular psychological problem of a client.
Forms of therapy that treat more than one person at a time include group therapy, family therapy, and couples therapy. These therapies may use techniques from any theoretical approach. Other forms of therapy specialize in treating children or adolescents with psychological problems.
People seeking help for their problems most often select individual therapy over group therapy and other forms of therapy. People may prefer individual therapy because it allows the therapist to focus exclusively on their problems, without distractions from others. Also, individuals may desire more privacy and confidentiality than is possible in a group setting. Sometimes people combine individual therapy and group therapy.
In the late 19th century Viennese neurologist Sigmund Freud developed a theory of personality and a system of psychotherapy known as psychoanalysis. According to this theory, people are strongly influenced by unconscious forces, including innate sexual and aggressive drives. In this 1938 British Broadcasting Corporation interview, Freud recounts the early resistance to his ideas and later acceptance of his work. Freud’s speech is slurred because he was suffering from cancer of the jaw. He died the following year.
Psychodynamic therapies are those therapies in some way derived from the work of Austrian physician Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. In general, psychodynamic therapists emphasize the importance of discovering and resolving internal, unconscious conflicts, often through an exploration of one’s childhood and past experiences. Although psychoanalysis is the best-known form of psychodynamic therapy, theorists have developed many other psychodynamic therapies, some very different from Freud’s original techniques.
Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, compared the human mind with an iceberg. The tip above the water represents consciousness, and the vast region below the surface symbolizes the unconscious mind. Of Freud’s three basic personality structures—id, ego, and superego—only the id is totally unconscious.
Freud developed the theory and techniques of psychoanalysis in the 1890s. He believed that much of an individual's personality develops before the age of six. He also proposed that children pass through a series of psychosexual stages, during which they express sexual energy in different ways. For example, during the phallic stage, from about age three to age five, children focus on feelings of pleasure in their genital organs. At this time, according to Freud, boys become sexually attracted to their mothers and feel hostility and jealousy toward their fathers. Similarly, girls develop sexual feelings toward their fathers and feel rage toward their mothers. In Freud’s view, such innate sexual and aggressive drives cause feelings and thoughts that the person regards as unacceptable. In response, the individual represses these feelings, driving them into the unconscious mind. In the process, three basic personality structures are formed: the id, the ego, and the superego. The id represents unchecked, instinctual drives; the superego is the voice of social conscience; and the ego is the rational thinking that mediates between the id and superego and deals with reality. These three systems function as a whole, not separately. Id forces are unconscious and often emerge without an individual’s awareness, causing fear, anxiety, depression, or other distressing symptoms. Freud used the term neurosis to refer to such symptoms.
In psychoanalysis, Freud sought to eliminate neurotic symptoms by bringing the individual’s repressed fantasies, memories, and emotions into consciousness. He placed particular emphasis on helping patients uncover memories about early childhood trauma and conflict, which he regarded as the source of emotional problems in adults. At first, he used hypnosis as a way to gain access to a person’s unconscious. Later he developed free association, a method in which patients say whatever thoughts come to their minds about dreams, fantasies, and memories. The analyst’s interpretations of this material, Freud believed, could provide patients with insight into their unconscious - insight that would help them become less anxious, less depressed, or better in other ways.
Freud also placed great value on what could be learned from transference, the patient’s emotional response to the therapist. Freud believed that during therapy, patients transfer repressed feelings toward their family members to their relationship with the therapist. Transference exposes these repressed feelings and allows the patient to work through them. Free association and transference are still central features of Freudian psychoanalysis.
In traditional or classical psychoanalysis, the patient lies on a couch and the therapist sits out of sight of the patient. This practice is intended to minimize the presence of the therapist and allow the patient to engage in free association more easily. Classical psychoanalysis requires three to four sessions of therapy each week for several years. At a rate of $100 or more per session, three sessions per week costs more than $15,000 per year. Classical psychoanalysis is not typically covered by insurance plans with managed mental health care. Therefore, relatively few individuals choose this intensive and long-term therapy.
In contemporary forms of psychoanalysis, the duration of therapy is often shorter-between one and four years-and meetings may take place one or two times a week. Other psychoanalytically oriented therapists work in a brief format of 30 sessions or less. The patient sits on a chair across from the therapist rather than lying on a couch. Modern psychoanalysts tend to focus more on current functioning and make less use of free association techniques.
American psychoanalyst and social philosopher Erich Fromm stressed the importance of social and economic factors on human behaviour. His focus was a departure from traditional psychoanalysis, which emphasized the role of the subconscious. In this 1969 essay for Collier’s Year Book, Fromm presents various explanations for human violence. He argues that violence cannot be controlled by imposing stronger legal penalties, but rather by creating a more just society in which people connect with each other as humans and are able to control their own lives.
Several of Freud's followers developed new theories about the causes of psychological disorders. Three important neo-Freudians were Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and Erik Erikson, who emphasized the role of social and cultural influences in the formation of personality. All three emigrated from Germany to the United States in the 1930s. Their theories have influenced modern psychodynamic therapists.
Fromm believed that the fundamental problem people confront is a sense of isolation deriving from their own separateness. According to Fromm, the goal of therapy is to orient oneself, establish roots, and find security by uniting with other people while remaining a separate individual.
Horney departed from Freud in her belief in the importance of social forces in personality formation. She asserted that people develop anxiety and other psychological problems because of feelings of isolation during childhood and unmet needs for love and respect from their parents. The goal of therapy, in her view, is to help patients overcome anxiety-driven neurotic needs and move toward a more realistic image of themselves.
Erikson extended Freud's emphasis on childhood development to cover the entire lifespan. Referred to as an ego psychologist, he emphasized the importance of the ego in helping individuals develop healthy ways to deal with their environment. Often working with children, Erikson helped individuals develop the basic trust and confidence needed for the development of a healthy ego.
Other psychoanalytic therapists focussed on how relationships develop between the child and others, especially the mother. British pediatrician Donald Winnicott and Austrian-American pediatrician Margaret Mahler were known as object-relations analysts because of their emphasis on the child’s love object (such as the mother or father). They and other object-relations therapists, such as Austrian-born British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, helped patients deal with problems that arose from being separated inappropriately or at too early an age or from their mothers.
Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung began his studies of human motivation in the early 1900s and created the school of psychoanalysis known as analytical psychology. A contemporary of Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, Jung at first collaborated closely with Freud but eventually moved on to pursue his own theories, including the exploration of personality types. According to Jung, there are two basic personality types, extroverted and introverted, which alternate equally in the completely normal individual. Jung also believed that the unconscious mind is formed by the personal unconscious (the repressed feelings and thoughts developed during an individual’s life) and the collective unconscious (those inherited feelings, thoughts, and memories shared by all humanity).
Unlike the psychoanalytic therapists, Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung developed a very different system of therapy. He had worked closely with Freud, but broke away totally from Freud in his own work.
Jung created a school of psychology that he called analytical psychology. He felt that Freud focussed too much on sexual drives and not enough on all of the creative instincts and impulses that motivate individuals. Whereas Freud had described the personal unconscious, which reflected the sum of one person’s experience, Jung added the concept of the collective unconscious, which he defined as the reservoir of the experience of the entire human race. The collective unconscious contains images called archetypes that are common to all individuals. They are often expressed in mythological concepts such as good and evil spirits, fairies, dragons, and gods.
In general, Jungian therapists see psychological problems as arising from unconscious conflicts that create disturbances in psychic energy. They treat psychological problems by helping their patients bring material from their personal and collective unconscious into conscious awareness. The therapists do this through a knowledge of symbolism - not only symbols from mythology and folk culture, but also current cultural symbols. By interpreting dreams and other materials, Jungian therapists help their patients become more aware of unconscious processes and become stronger individuals.
Austrian psychologist and psychiatrist Alfred Adler studied under Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, before developing his own theories about human behaviour. Adler’s best-known theories stress that individuals are mainly motivated by feelings of inferiority, which he called an inferiority complex.
Like Jung, Austrian physician Alfred Adler believed that Freud overemphasized the importance of sexual and aggressive drives. Adler was particularly interested in sibling relationships, birth order, and relationships with parents. He would ask patients about their early memories and use this information to analyze their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours. He helped his patients by encouraging them to meet important life goals: love, work, and friendship.
For Adler and modern therapists who draw from his work, interest in others and participation in society are important goals of therapy. Adlerian therapists see therapy in part as educational, and they use a number of innovative action techniques to help patients change mistaken beliefs and interact more fully with family members and others.
Humanistic therapies focus on the client's present rather than past experiences, and on conscious feelings rather than unconscious thoughts. Therapists try to create a caring, supportive atmosphere and to guide clients toward personal realizations and insights. Clients are encouraged to take responsibility for their lives, to accept themselves, and to recognize their own potential for growth and change.
The length of therapy depends on the severity of the problem and on a client's ability to change and try new behaviours. Because humanistic therapies emphasize the relationship between client and therapist and a gradual development of increased responsibility by the client, these therapies typically take a year or two of weekly sessions.
Three of the most influential forms of humanistic therapy are existential therapy, person-entered therapy, and Gestalt therapy. 1. Existential Therapy, is based on a philosophical approach to people and their existence, existential therapy deals with important life themes. These themes include living and dying, freedom, responsibility to self and others, finding meaning in life, and dealing with a sense of meaninglessness. More than other kinds of therapists, existential therapists examine individuals' awareness of themselves and their ability to look beyond their immediate problems and daily events to problems of human existence.
The first existential therapists were European psychiatrists trained in psychoanalysis who were dissatisfied with Freud's emphasis on biological drives and unconscious processes. Existential therapists help their clients confront and explore anxiety, loneliness, despair, fear of death, and the feeling that life is meaningless. There are few techniques specific to existential therapy. Therapists normally draw on techniques from a variety of therapies. One well-known existential therapy is logotherapy, developed by Austrian psychiatrist Viktor E. Frankl in the 1940s (logos is Greek for meaning).
2. Person-Entered Therapy, whereby Carl Rogers in the 1940s and 1950s American psychologist Carl Rogers developed a form of psychotherapy known as person-entered therapy. This approach emphasizes that each person has the capacity for self-understanding and self-healing. The therapist tries to demonstrate empathy and true caring for clients, allowing them to reveal their true feelings without fear of being judged.
Person-entered therapy, originally called client-entered therapy, is perhaps the best-known form of humanistic therapy. American psychologist Carl Rogers developed this type of therapy in the 1940s and 1950s. Rogers believed that people, like other living organisms, are driven by an innate tendency to maintain and enhance themselves, which in turn moves them toward growth, maturity, and life enrichment. Within each person, Rogers believed, is the capacity for self-understanding and constructive change.
Person-entered therapy emphasizes understanding and caring rather than diagnosis, advice, and persuasion. Rogers strongly believed that the quality of the therapist-client relationship influences the success of therapy. He felt that effective therapists must be genuine, accepting, and empathic. A genuine therapist expresses true interest in the client and is open and honest. An accepting therapist cares for the client unconditionally, even if the therapist does not always agree with him or her. An empathic therapist demonstrates a deep understanding of the client's thoughts, ideas, experiences, and feelings and communicates this empathic understanding to the client. Rogers believed that when clients feel unconditional positive regard from a genuine therapist and feel empathically understood, they will be less anxious and more willing to reveal themselves and their weaknesses. By doing so, clients gain a better understanding of their own lives, move toward self-acceptance, and can make progress in resolving a wide variety of personal problems.
Person-entered therapists use an approach called active listening to demonstrate empathy - letting clients know that they are being fully listened to and understood. First, therapists must show through their body position and facial expression that they are paying attention—for example, by directly facing the client and making good eye contact. During the therapy session, the therapist tries to restate what the client has said and seeks clarification of the client’s feelings. The therapist may use such phrases as ‘What I hear you saying is . . . ‘ and ‘You’re feeling like . . . ‘ The therapist seeks mainly to reflect the client’s statements back to the client accurately, and does not try to analyze, judge, or lead the direction of discussion. For example:
Client: I always felt my husband loved me. I just don’t understand why this happened.
Therapist: You feel surprised by the fact that he left you, because you thought he loved you. It comes as a real surprise.
Client: M-hm. I guess I haven’t really accepted that he could do this to me. A big part of me still loves him.
Therapist: You seem to still be hurting from what he did. The love you have for him is so strong.
Many therapists, not just those of humanistic orientation, have adopted elements of Rogers’s approach. Gestalt Therapy is a German word referring to wholeness and the concept that a whole unit is more than the sum of its parts. Gestalt therapy was developed in the 1940s and 1950s by Frederick (Fritz) Perls, a German-born psychiatrist who immigrated to the United States. Like person-entered therapy, Gestalt therapy tries to make individuals take responsibility for their own lives and personal growth and to recognize their capacity for healing themselves. However, Gestalt therapists are willing to use confrontational questions and techniques to help clients express their true feelings. In the following example, the therapist helps the client become more aware of her own behaviour and her responsibility for it:
Client: You know, you just can't do anything right in today's world.
Therapist: Please repeat that phrase using the word I instead of you.
Client: I can't do anything right, it seems.
Therapist: Would you change the word can't to won't?
Client: I won't do anything right.
Therapist: What won't you do that you want to do?
The general goal of Gestalt therapy is awareness of self, others, and the environment that brings about growth, wholeness, and integration of one’s thoughts, feelings, and actions. Gestalt therapists use a wide variety of techniques to make clients more aware of themselves, and they often invent or experiment with techniques that might help to accomplish this goal. One of the best-known Gestalt techniques is the empty-chair technique, in which an empty chair represents another person or another part of the client’s self. For example, if a client is angry with herself for not being kinder to her mother, the client may pretend her mother is sitting in an empty chair. The client may then express her feelings by speaking in the direction of the chair. Alternatively, the client might play the role of the understanding daughter while sitting in one chair and the angry daughter while sitting in another. As she talks to different parts of herself, differences may be resolved. The empty-chair technique reflects Gestalt therapy’s strong emphasis on dealing with problems in the present.
Behavioural therapies differ dramatically from psychodynamic and humanistic therapies. Behavioural therapists do not explore an individual’s thoughts, feelings, dreams, or past experiences. Rather, they focus on the behaviour that is causing distress for their clients. They believe that behaviour of all kinds, both normal and abnormal, is the product of learning. By applying the principles of learning, they help individuals replace distressing behaviours with more appropriate ones.
Typical problems treated with behavioural therapy include alcohol or drug addiction, phobias (such as a fear of heights), and anxiety. Modern behavioural therapists work with other problems, such as depression, by having clients develop specific behavioural goals—such as returning to work, talking with others, or cooking a meal. Because behavioural therapy can work through nonverbal means, it can also help people who would not respond to other forms of therapy. For example, behavioural therapists can teach social and self-care skills to children with severe learning disabilities and to individuals with schizophrenia who are out of touch with reality.
Behavioural therapists begin treatment by finding out as much as they can about the client's problem and the circumstances surrounding it. They do not infer causes or look for hidden meanings, but rather focus on observable and measurable behaviours. Therapists may use a number of specific techniques to alter behaviour. These techniques include relaxation training, systematic desensitization, exposure and response prevention, aversive conditioning, and social skills training.
Relaxation training is a method of helping people with high levels of anxiety and stress. It also serves as an important component of some other behavioural treatments.
In one type of relaxation exercise, people learn to tighten and then relax one muscle group at a time. This method, called progressive relaxation, was developed in the 1930s by American physiologist and psychologist Edmund Jacobson. At first, the therapist gives spoken instructions to the client. Later the client can practice relaxation exercises at home using a tape recording of the therapist’s voice. The following example, adapted from Jacobson’s work, illustrates a brief relaxation procedure:
Just settle back as comfortably as you can, close your eyes, and let yourself relax to the best of your ability. Now clench up both fists tighter and tighter and study the tension as you do so. Keep them clenched and feel the tension in your fists, hands, forearms … Now relax. Let the fingers of your hands become loose and observe the contrast in your feelings … Now let yourself go and try to become more relaxed all over. Take a deep breath. Just let your whole body become more and more relaxed.
Another relaxation technique is meditation. In meditation, people try to relax both the mind and the body. In many forms of meditation, people begin by sitting comfortably on a cushion or chair. Then they gradually relax their body, begin to breathe slowly, and concentrate on a sensation—such as the inhaling and exhaling of breath—or on an image or object. In Transcendental Meditation, a person does not try to concentrate on anything, but merely sits in a quiet atmosphere and repeats a mantra (a specially chosen word) to try to achieve a state of restful alertness.
Participants in a program to overcome a phobia (fear) of flying on aeroplanes get ready to ‘graduate’ by taking a short flight. The program uses a type of behavioural therapy called systematic desensitization, which teaches people to relax in a situation that would normally produce anxiety.
Systematic desensitization, a procedure developed by South African psychiatrist Joseph Wolpe in the 1950s, gradually teaches people to be relaxed in a situation that would otherwise frighten them. It is often used to treat phobias and other anxiety disorders. The word desensitization refers to making people less sensitive to or frightened of certain situations.
In the first step of desensitization, the therapist and client establish an anxiety hierarchy—a list of fear-provoking situations arranged in order of how much fear they provoke in the client. For a man afraid of spiders, for example, holding a spider may rank at the top of his anxiety hierarchy, whereas seeing a small picture of a spider may rank at the bottom. In the second step, the therapist has the client relax using one of the relaxation techniques described above. Then the therapist asks the client to imagine each situation on the anxiety hierarchy, beginning with the least-feared situation and moving upward. For example, the man may first imagine seeing a picture of a spider, then imagine seeing a real spider from far away, then from a short distance, and so forth. If the client feels anxiety at any stage, he or she is instructed to stop thinking about the situation and to return to a state of deep relaxation. The relaxation and the imagined scene are paired until the client feels no further anxiety. Eventually the client can remain free of anxiety while imagining the most-feared situation.
Asking a client to encounter the feared situation is a technique called in vivo exposure. For the man who is afraid of spiders, a therapist might arrange to go to a park or zoo where visitors can touch large spiders. The therapist would model for the client how to approach a spider and how to handle it. The therapist may also encourage the man to walk gradually closer to the spider, reinforcing his progress with praise and reassurance as he does so. The goal for the therapist and patient would be for the man to pick up the spider.
Problems are rarely as clear and simple as fear of spiders. Therapists may spend considerable time deciding on appropriate goals, which ones to pursue first, and then reevaluating or changing goals as therapy progresses. Systematic desensitization typically takes from 10 to 30 sessions, depending on the severity of the problem. In vivo therapies are more direct and may take less time.
Exposure and response prevention is a behavioural technique often used to treat people with obsessive-compulsive disorder. In this technique, the therapist exposes the client to the situation that causes obsessive thoughts, but then prevents the client from acting on these thoughts. For example, to treat people who compulsively wash their hands because they fear contamination from germs, a therapist might have them handle something dirty and then prevent them from washing their hands. Therapists have also experimented with exposure and response prevention to treat people with bulimia nervosa, an eating disorder in which people engage in binge eating and afterward force themselves to vomit or, more occasionally, take laxatives. The therapist feeds the bulimic patients small amounts of food but prevents them from binging, taking laxatives, or vomiting.
Behavioural therapists occasionally use a technique called aversive conditioning or aversion therapy. In this method, clients receive an unpleasant stimulus, such as an electric shock, whenever they perform an undesirable behaviour. For example, therapists treating patients with alcoholism may have them ingest the drug disulfiram (Antabuse). The drug makes the patients violently sick if they drink alcohol. Many therapists have found that aversive conditioning is not as effective as other behavioural techniques, and as a result, they use this technique very infrequently. For some problems, however, aversive conditioning can work when all other techniques have failed. For example, therapists have found that immediate application of an unpleasant stimulus can eliminate self-mutilation and other self-destructive behaviours in children with autism.
Social skills training is a method of helping people who have problems interacting with others. Clients learn basic social skills such as initiating conversations, making eye contact, standing at the appropriate distance, controlling voice volume and pitch, and responding to questions. The therapist first describes and models the behaviour. Then the patient or client practices the behaviour in skits or role-playing exercises. The therapist watches the exercises and provides constructive criticism and further modelling. Therapists often conduct this kind of training with groups of people with similar problems. Social skills training can often help people with schizophrenia function more easily in public situations and reduce their risk of relapse or re-hospitalization.
One popular form of social skills training is assertiveness training, another technique pioneered by Joseph Wolpe. This technique teaches people, often those who are shy, to make appropriate responses when someone does something to them that seems inappropriate or offensive or violates their rights. For example, if a woman has trouble saying no to a coworker who inappropriately asks her to handle some of his job responsibilities, she may benefit from learning how to become more assertive. In this example, the therapist would model assertive behaviour for the client, who would then role-play and rehearse appropriate responses to her coworker.
Cognitive therapies are similar to behavioural therapies in that they focus on specific problems. However, they emphasize changing beliefs and thoughts, rather than observable behaviours. Cognitive therapists believe that irrational beliefs or distorted thinking patterns can cause a variety of serious problems, including depression and chronic anxiety. They try to teach people to think in more rational, constructive ways.
In the mid-1950s American psychologist Albert Ellis developed one of the first cognitive approaches to therapy, rational-emotive therapy, now commonly called rational-emotive behaviour therapy. Trained in psychoanalysis in the 1940s, Ellis quickly became disillusioned with psychoanalytic methods, viewing them as slow and inefficient. Influenced by Alfred Adler’s work, Ellis came to regard irrational beliefs and illogical thinking as the major cause of most emotional disturbances. In his view, negative events such as losing a job or breaking up with a lover do not by themselves cause depression or anxiety. Rather, emotional disorders result when a person perceives the events in an irrational way, such as by thinking, ‘I’m a worthless human being.’
Although rational-emotive behaviour therapists use many techniques, the most common technique is that of disputing irrational thoughts. First the therapist identifies irrational beliefs by talking with the client about his or her problems. Examples of irrational beliefs, according to Ellis, include the idea that unhappiness is caused by external events, the idea that one must be accepted and loved by everyone, and the idea that one must always be competent and successful to be a worthwhile person.
To dispute the client’s irrational beliefs and longstanding assumptions, rational-emotive behaviour therapists often use confrontational techniques. For example, if a student tells the therapist, ‘I must get an A on this test or I will be a failure in life,’ the therapist might say, ‘Why must you? Do you think your entire career as a student will be through if you get a B?’ The therapist helps the client replace irrational thoughts with more reasonable ones, such as ‘I would like to get an A on the test, but if I don't, I have strategies I can use to do better next time.’
Like Ellis before him, American psychiatrist Aaron T. Beck became disenchanted with psychoanalysis, finding that it often did not help relieve depression for his patients. In the 1960s Beck developed his own form of cognitive therapy for treating depression, and later applied it to other disorders. In Beck’s view, depressed people tend to have negative views of themselves, interpret their experiences negatively, and feel hopeless about their future. He sees these tendencies as a problem of faulty thinking. Like rational-emotive behaviour therapists, practitioners of Beck’s technique challenge the client's absolute, extreme statements. They try to help the client identify distorted thinking, such as thinking about negative events in catastrophic terms, and then suggest ways to change this thinking. The following example illustrates how a cognitive therapist might challenge a client’s absolute statement.
Client: Everyone at work is smarter than me.
Therapist: Everyone? Every single person at work is smarter than you?
Client: Well, maybe not. There are a lot of people at work I don't know well at all. But my boss seems smarter; she seems to really know what's going on.
Therapist: Notice how we went from everyone at work being smarter than you to just your boss.
Cognitive therapists often give their clients homework assignments designed to help them identify their own irrational patterns of thinking and to reinforce what they learn in therapy. For example, clients often keep a daily log in which they write down distressing emotions, the situation that caused the emotions, their thoughts at the time, whether the thoughts were distorted or not, and alternative ways of thinking about the situation.
Helping individuals change problematic behaviours, thoughts, or feelings is not an easy task. Therapists have tried many creative approaches to help patients, some of which do not fall neatly into the major categories of psychodynamic, humanistic, behavioural, or cognitive. Two such therapies still in use today are transactional analysis and reality therapy.
In the 1950s and 1960s Canadian-American psychiatrist Eric Berne developed a form of therapy he called transactional analysis. Although trained in psychoanalysis, Berne felt that the complexity of psychoanalytic terminology excluded patients from full participation in their own treatment. He developed a theory of personality based on the view that when people interact with each other, they function as either a parent, adult, or child. For example, he would characterize social interactions between two people as parent-adult, parent-child, adult-child, adult-adult, and so forth depending on the situation. He referred to social interactions as transactions and to analysis of these interactions as transactional analysis.
In therapy, which is often conducted in groups, patients learn to recognize when they are assuming one of these roles and to understand when being an authoritarian parent or an impulsive child is appropriate or inappropriate. In addition to identifying these roles, clients learn how to change roles in order to behave in more desirable ways.
American psychiatrist William Glasser developed reality therapy in the 1960s, after working with teenage girls in a correctional institution and observing work with severely disturbed schizophrenic patients in a mental hospital. He observed that psychoanalysis did not help many of his patients change their behaviour, even when they understood the sources of it. Glasser felt it was important to help individuals take responsibility for their own lives and to blame others less. Largely because of this emphasis on personal responsibility, his approach has found widespread acceptance among drug- and alcohol-abuse counsellors, corrections workers, school counsellors, and those working with clients who may be disruptive to others.
Reality therapy is based on the premise that all human behaviour is motivated by fundamental needs and specific wants. The reality therapist first seeks to establish a friendly, trusting relationship with clients in which they can express their needs and wants. Then the therapist helps clients explore the behaviours that created problems for them. Clients are encouraged to examine the consequences of their behaviour and to evaluate how well their behaviour helped them fulfill their wants. The therapist does not accept excuses from clients. Finally, the therapist helps the client formulate a concrete plan of action to change certain behaviours, based on the client’s own goals and ability to make choices.
Currently, many therapists describe their approach as eclectic or integrative, meaning that they use ideas and techniques from a variety of therapies. Many therapists like the opportunity to draw from many theories and not limit themselves to one or two. Most therapists who adopt an eclectic approach have a rationale for which techniques they use with specific clients, rather than just choosing an approach randomly or because it suits them at the time.
One of the most influential eclectic approaches is cognitive-behavioural therapy. Other eclectic approaches use other combinations of therapies.
There are almost no pure cognitive or behavioural therapists. Usually therapists combine cognitive and behavioural techniques in an approach known as cognitive-behavioural therapy. For example, to treat a woman with depression, a therapist may help her identify irrational thinking patterns that cause the distressing feelings and to replace these irrational thoughts with new ways of thinking. The therapist may also train her in relaxation techniques and have her try new behaviours that help her become more active and less depressed. The client then reports the results back to the therapist.
Cognitive-behavioural therapy has rapidly become one of the most popular and influential forms of psychotherapy, in part because it takes a relatively short period of time compared with humanistic and psychoanalytic therapies, and also because of its ability to treat a wide range of problems. Sometimes cognitive-behavioural therapy takes only a few sessions, but more often it extends for 20 or 30 sessions over four to six months. The length of therapy usually depends on the severity and number of the client’s problems.
Some therapists have one particular way of understanding clients—that is, they adhere to one theory of personality - but use many techniques from a variety of theories. Other therapists may understand clients using two or three theories of personality and only use techniques to bring about change that are consistent with those theories. Some therapists have combined psychodynamic and behavioural therapies in ways to help their clients deal with fears and anxieties but also understand their causes.
Therapists may use different approaches to treat different problems. For example, a therapist might find that clients who are grieving over the loss of a spouse may respond best to a humanistic approach, in which they can share their grieving and their hurts with the therapist. However, the same therapist may use a cognitive-behavioural approach with a person who reports being anxious most of the time.
Teenage girls talk with a therapist, top right, during a group therapy session. Group therapy allows people to see how others deal with problems and to receive support and encouragement from group members.
All of the individual therapies can also be used with groups. People may choose group therapy for several reasons. First, group therapy is usually less expensive than individual therapy, because group members share the cost. Group therapy also allows a therapist to provide treatment to more people than would be possible otherwise. Aside from cost and efficiency advantages, group therapy allows people to hear and see how others deal with their problems. In addition, group members receive vital support and encouragement from others in the group. They can try out new ways of behaving in a safe, supportive environment and learn how others perceive them.
Groups also have disadvantages. Individuals spend less time talking about their own problems than they would in one-on-one therapy. Also, certain group members may interact with other group members in hurtful ways, such as by yelling at them or criticizing them harshly. Generally, therapists try to intercede when group members act in destructive ways. Another disadvantage of group therapy involves confidentiality. Although group members usually promise to treat all therapy discussions as confidential, some group members may worry that other members will share their secrets outside of the group. Group members who believe this may be less willing to disclose all of their problems, lessening the effectiveness of therapy for them.
Groups vary widely in how they work. The typical group size is from six to ten people with one or two therapists. Often two therapists prefer to work together in a group so that they can respond not only to one person’s issues, but also to discussions between group members that may be occurring quickly. Some groups are open or drop-in groups - new clients may join at any time and members may attend or skip whatever sessions they desire. Other groups are closed and admit new members only when all members agree. Regular attendance is usually required in these groups. In closed groups, both the therapist and group members will ask a member to provide an explanation for missing a meeting.
When forming a group, therapists try to make clear to potential participants the goals of the group and for whom it is appropriate. Therapists will often screen potential participants to learn about their problems and decide whether the group is right for them. Sometimes therapists prefer diversity among group members in terms of age, gender, and problem. In other cases, therapists may limit membership in a group to individuals with similar problems and backgrounds. For example, some groups may form specifically for individuals who are grieving the loss of a loved one, individuals who abuse drugs or alcohol, people with eating disorders, people suffering from depression, or troubled elderly individuals.
The techniques used in group therapy depend largely on the theoretical orientation of the therapist. Humanistic therapists tend to respond to the feelings and experiences of other members. They may also interpret or comment on social interactions between group members. In cognitive-behavioural groups, group members try to change their own thoughts and behaviours and support and encourage other members to do the same. Psychoanalytic groups focus on childhood experiences and their impact on participants’ current behaviours, thoughts, and feelings.
Psychodrama, the first form of group therapy, was developed in the 1920s by Jacob L. Moreno, an Austrian psychiatrist. Moreno brought his method to the United States in 1925, and its use spread to other parts of the world. Participants in psychodrama act out their problems—often on a real stage and with props—as a means of heightening their awareness of them. The therapist serves as the director, suggesting how participants might act out problems and assigning roles to other group members. For example, a woman might reenact a scene from her childhood with other group members playing her father, mother, brother, or sister. Groups who use psychodrama may do so weekly or simply as a one-time demonstration.
A self-help group or support group involves people with a common problem who meet regularly to share their experiences, support each other emotionally, and encourage change or recovery. They are usually free of charge to interested participants. Self-help groups are not strictly considered psychotherapy because they are not led by a licensed mental health professional. However, they can serve as an important source of help for people in emotional distress.
There are thousands of self-help and support groups in the United States and Canada. The oldest and best known is Alcoholics Anonymous, which uses a 12-step program to treat alcoholism. Other groups have formed for cancer patients, parents whose children have been murdered, compulsive gamblers, battered women, obese people, and many other types of people.
Family therapy involves the participation of one or more members of the same family who seek help for troubled family relationships or the problems of individual family members. Typical problems that bring families into family therapy are delinquent behaviour by a child or adolescent, a child’s poor performance in school, hostilities between a parent and child or between siblings, and severe psychological disturbance or mental illness in a parent or child.
One of the most influential forms of family therapy, family systems therapy, views the family as a single, complex system or unit. Individual members are interdependent parts of the system. Rather than treating one person’s symptoms in isolation, therapists try to understand the symptoms in the larger context of the family. For example, a boy who begins picking fights with classmates might do so to get more attention from his busy parents. Therapists work from the rationale that current family relationships profoundly affect, and are affected by, an individual family member’s psychological problems. For this reason, most family therapists prefer to work with the entire family during a session, rather than meeting with family members individually.
In most family therapy sessions, the therapist encourages family members to air their feelings, frustrations, and hostilities. By observing how they interact, the therapist can help them recognize their roles and relationships with each other. The therapist tries to avoid assigning blame to any particular family member. Instead, the therapist makes suggestions about how family members might adjust their roles and prevent future conflict.
Couples therapy, also called marital therapy or marriage counselling, is designed to help intimate partners improve their relationship. Therapists treat married couples as well as unmarried couples of the opposite or same sex. Therapists normally hold sessions with both partners present. At certain times during therapy, however, the therapist may choose to see the partners individually.
Couples may seek therapy for a variety of problems, many of which concern a breakdown of communication or trust between the partners. For example, an extramarital affair by one partner may cause the other partner to feel emotional pain, anger, and distrust. Some partners may feel distant from one another or experience sexual problems. In other cases, one or both partners may have psychological problems or alcohol or drug problems that negatively affect their relationship.
The techniques used in therapy vary depending on the theoretical orientation of the therapist and the nature of the couple’s problem. Most often, therapists focus on improving communication between partners and on helping them learn to manage conflict. By observing the partners as they talk to each other, the therapist can learn about their communication patterns and the roles they assume in their relationship. The therapist may then teach the partners new ways of expressing their feelings verbally, how to listen to each other, and how to work together to solve problems. The therapist may also suggest that they try out new roles. For example, if one partner makes all of the decisions in the relationship, the therapist may encourage the couple to try sharing decision-making power.
Because most couples therapists also have training in family therapy, they often examine the influence of the couple’s relationships with parents, children, and siblings. Psychoanalytically oriented therapists may focus on how the partners’ childhood experiences affect their current relationship with each other. For couples who cannot work through their differences or reestablish trust and intimacy, separation or divorce may be the best choice. Therapists can help such partners separate in constructive ways.
Some psychotherapists specialize in working with children. Therapists deal with children who are anxious, depressed, or have difficulty getting along with others at home or school. Some children have psychological problems resulting from family issues such as divorce, new stepparents, single-parent homes, death of a parent or sibling, being homeless, or being raised in an alcoholic family. Other children have emotional problems related to physical disabilities, learning disabilities, or attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder.
Play therapy is a special technique that therapists often use with children aged 2 to 12. For children, play is a natural way of learning and relating to others. Play therapy can help therapists both to understand children's problems and to help children deal with their feelings, behaviours, and thoughts. Therapists may use playhouses, puppets, a toy telephone, dolls, sandboxes, food, finger paints, and other toys or objects to help children express their thoughts and feelings. In addition to projecting a caring and gentle manner, therapists who work with children are trained to understand and interpret children’s nonverbal and verbal expressions.
For most people, psychotherapy involves a common sequence of events: finding a therapist, assessing the problem, exploring the problem, resolving the problem, and terminating therapy. Sometimes therapy will end prematurely, before the problem is resolved. For example, the therapist or client may move to a new city.
When someone has a personal problem and seeks help from a therapist, the individual may turn to a variety of people to get a referral—a friend, a pastor or rabbi, or a family physician. Phone books list associations of psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers that can also provide referrals to therapists. As noted earlier, however, some health insurance plans may restrict a person’s choice of therapist.
When prospective clients call a therapist for an appointment, they may discuss several aspects of therapy. One concern is availability—is the therapist taking on new patients? Are there hours when both patient and therapist can meet? Another issue is fees. Both therapists in private practice and those in community mental health agencies have to negotiate fees depending in part on the client’s health insurance plan. Some agencies do not require health insurance and have very low fees or a sliding scale that sets fees depending on the ability of the client to pay.
During the first meeting, clients try to explain their problems to the therapist. The therapist usually asks about the nature of the problems, what may make the problems better or worse, and how long the problems have existed. For many therapists, hearing details, even small ones, helps them to assess the problems and to decide the best form of treatment. Some therapists collaborate with clients in deciding the goals of therapy and what treatment methods will be used. Assessment does not stop with the first session, but continues through therapy. Occasionally, goals of therapy change upon assessment of new issues or problems.
During therapy, the client sits across from the therapist—except in classical psychoanalysis, in which the client lies on a couch. The specific nature of the discussions between therapist and client differs greatly depending on the therapist’s theoretical orientation. Some therapists are interested in unconscious forces and the early childhood years of the client (psychodynamic therapy), others in actions of the client (behavioural therapy), others in the client’s thinking patterns (cognitive therapy), and yet others in all or some of these aspects. Therapists often take notes during a session or make notes after the session has ended. Sessions typically last from 45 to 50 minutes, although therapists may hold longer sessions during the initial stages of treatment. Clients typically meet weekly with the therapist, although some may meet twice a week or more.
When does therapy end? Clients and therapists discuss this issue together and determine when it is best to stop. Ideally their decision depends on their judgments about the client’s degree of progress and improvement. Some clients may find that therapy does not seem to be making progress, and may decide to change therapists. However, the cost of therapy may also factor in the decision to end therapy. Managed-care companies generally limit the number of sessions they will subsidize to between 15 and 20. Some therapists, especially those in private practice, may arrange to go beyond these limits by negotiating a fee that the client will pay for services. In other cases, the therapist may refer the client to other mental health agencies that have lower fees and do not require insurance. At the end of therapy, the therapist may schedule a follow-up session several months later to check the client’s progress. Also, the therapist and client agree on what to do if the client’s problems recur.
Almost since the inception of psychotherapy, therapists and their clients have asked, ‘Does it work? Does psychotherapy help people resolve their problems, feel better, and change the way they deal with other people?’ Therapists and clients are not the only ones asking these questions. In recent years, the agencies that fund mental health services—health insurance companies, health maintenance organizations, and government organizations—have increased their scrutiny of the effectiveness of various psychotherapies in an effort to contain costs.
Measuring the effectiveness of psychotherapy is an extremely complex task. Asking psychotherapists or their clients, ‘How helpful has therapy been?’ is only a start? The answer does provide some information about how therapists and their clients perceive therapy. However, it does not answer the question of whether psychotherapy is effective because both therapists and clients have vested interests in believing that therapy succeeded. Therapists want to uphold their professional reputation and sense of competence, and clients want to feel that their investment of time and money has been worthwhile. Because of these biases, most studies of effectiveness rely on other evaluations of a client’s improvement: psychological tests given before and after treatment, reports from the client’s friends and family, and reports from impartial interviewers who do not know the client or whether the client received any therapy.
In 1952 British psychologist Hans Eysenck reviewed the results of 24 studies of psychotherapy and came to a controversial conclusion: Although two-thirds of patients who received psychotherapy showed improvement, a roughly equal proportion of patients who had been on a waiting list for therapy improved with no treatment. According to Eysenck, the patients on the waiting list showed spontaneous remission—recovery without treatment. Although researchers soon exposed flaws in his analysis and problems with the original studies, Eysenck’s findings touched off hundreds of new studies on the effectiveness of psychotherapy.
In 1980 American researchers statistically combined the results of 475 studies on psychotherapy outcomes using a technique known as meta-analysis. Their study found that the average psychotherapy recipient showed more improvement than 80 percent of untreated individuals. Later studies have confirmed that overall, psychotherapy is better than no therapy at all. Furthermore, it appears at least as effective as drug treatment for most psychological problems. However, psychotherapy is not effective for everyone. About 10 percent of people who receive psychotherapy show no improvement or actually get worse.
Researchers have also studied how quickly people improve with psychotherapy. One analysis, which reviewed data from more than 2400 psychotherapy patients, found that 50 percent of people receiving once-a-week psychotherapy showed significant improvement after eight sessions, or two months. After six months, or 26 sessions, about 75 percent of people show improvement. However, most people required about a year of psychotherapy for relief from severe symptoms, such as feelings of worthlessness.
Are some types of psychotherapy more effective than others? This question has been hotly debated for decades, and research on this issue presents many difficulties. In conducting studies that compare different therapies, researchers seek to make sure that each treatment group is as similar as possible. For example, researchers may limit the groups to people with the same severity of depression. In addition, within each treatment group, researchers try to make sure that therapists are using the same techniques and are trained similarly. However, patients do not come to therapy with simple problems that fit easily into studies. Furthermore, therapists of the same theoretical orientation may vary in their techniques and in the skillfulness with which they apply them.
Because of these problems, there is no conclusive answer about which type of therapy is best. Most studies have failed to demonstrate that any one approach is superior to another. The meta-analysis of 475 studies mentioned earlier, for example, found that psychodynamic, humanistic, behavioural, and cognitive approaches were all about equally effective. In the 1990s a major study by the National Institute of Mental Health compared the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural therapy, interpersonal psychotherapy (a form of short-term psychodynamic therapy that focuses on social relations), and drug therapy for people with depression. The study found that all three types of treatment helped individuals become less depressed. Furthermore, no one method was significantly more effective than the others.
Some researchers suggest that all therapies share certain qualities, and that these qualities account for the similar effectiveness of therapies despite quite different techniques. For instance, all therapies offer people hope for recovery. People who begin therapy often expect that therapy will help them, and this expectation alone may lead to some improvement (a phenomenon known as the placebo effect). Also, people in psychotherapy may find that simply being able to talk freely and openly about their problems helps them to feel better. Finally, the support, encouragement, and warmth that clients feel from their therapist lets them know they are cared about and respected, which may positively affect their mental health.
Although different therapeutic approaches may be equally effective on average, mental health researchers agree that some types of therapy are best for particular problems. For panic disorder and phobias, behavioural and cognitive-behavioural therapies seem most effective. Behavioural techniques, often in combination with medication, are also an effective treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and sexual dysfunction. Cognitive-behavioural, psychodynamic, and humanistic approaches all provide moderate relief from depression.
Mental health professionals agree that the effectiveness of therapy depends to a large extent on the quality of the relationship between the client and therapist. In general, the better the rapport is between therapist and client, the better the outcome of therapy. If a person does not trust a therapist enough to describe deeply personal problems, the therapist will have trouble helping the person change and improve. For clients, trusting that the therapist can provide help for their problems is essential for making progress.
The founder of person-entered therapy, Carl Rogers, believed that the most important qualities in a therapist are being genuine, accepting, and empathic. Almost all therapists today would agree that these qualities are important. Being genuine means that therapists care for the client and behave toward the client as they really feel. Being accepting means that therapists should appreciate clients for who they are, despite the things that they may have done. Therapists do not have to agree with clients, but they must accept them. Being empathic means that therapists understand the client’s feelings and experiences and convey this understanding back to the client.
In helping their clients, all therapists follow a code of ethics. First, all therapy is confidential. Therapists notify others of a client’s disclosures only in exceptional cases, such as when children disclose abuse by parents, parents disclose abuse of children, or clients disclose an intention to harm themselves or others. Also, therapists avoid dual relationships with clients—that is, being friends outside of therapy or maintaining a business relationship. Such relationships may reduce the therapist’s objectivity and ability to work with the client. Ethical therapists also do not engage in sexual relationships with clients, and do not accept as clients people with whom they have been sexually intimate.
As more immigrants to the United States and Canada have entered therapy, psychotherapists and counsellors have learned the importance of taking a client’s cultural background into account when assessing the problem and determining treatment. Scholars recognize that most psychotherapies are based on Western systems of psychology, which stress the desirability of individualism and independence. However, cultures of Asia and other regions commonly emphasize different values, such as conformity, dependency on others, and obeying one’s parents. Thus, techniques that might be effective for someone from North America, Europe, or Australia might be inappropriate for a recent immigrant from Vietnam, Japan, or India. In order to provide effective treatment, therapists must be aware of their own cultural biases and become familiar with their client’s ethnic and cultural background.
Viktor Frankl (1905-1997), the Austrian psychiatrist who developed a form of existential psychotherapy known as logotherapy. Logotherapy is based on Frankl’s theory that the underlying need of human existence is to find meaning in life (logos is a Greek word for ‘meaning’).
Born in Vienna, Austria, Frankl was educated at the University of Vienna, where he earned a medical degree in 1930. In 1942 Frankl and his family, who were Jewish, were arrested by the Nazis and imprisoned in concentration camps. Frankl’s mother, father, brother, and pregnant wife were all killed in the camps. Frankl spent the next three years at Auschwitz, Dachau, and other concentration camps. During his imprisonment, Frankl helped despairing prisoners maintain their psychological health. He also recorded, on stolen bits of paper, his theories and experiences, which he later made use of in his books. After his release, Frankl returned to Vienna and became professor of neurology and psychiatry at the University of Vienna Medical School, a position he retained for the rest of his career.
In his best-known book, Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy (1962; translated into English, 1970), Frankl described how he and other prisoners in the concentration camps found meaning in their lives and summoned the will to survive. The remainder of the book outlines the theory and practice of logotherapy. In addition to its influence on the field of psychotherapy, Man’s Search for Meaning found an enormous readership among the general public. By the time of Frankl’s death, it had sold more than 10 million copies in 24 languages. Frankl published 31 other books on his psychological theories.
The estranged assimilation that gives reason to displace of itself into what is called a Bipolar disorder, categorize mental illness in which a person’s mood alternates between extreme mania and depression. Bipolar disorder is also called manic-depressive illness. When manic, people with bipolar disorder feel intensely elated, self-important, energetic, and irritable. When depressed, they experience painful sadness, negative thinking, and indifference to things that used to bring them happiness.
American psychiatrist Kay Redfield Jamison is regarded as one of the world’s leading authorities on bipolar disorder, also known as manic-depressive illness. In her book An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness (1995), Jamison reveals her own struggle against the illness, which caused her to experience violent mood swings. In this excerpt, she describes her initial resistance to taking medication that, while necessary to prevent debilitating depression, extinguished the exhilarating highs of mania.
These positron emission tomography scans of the brain of a person with bipolar disorder show the individual shifting from depression, top row, to mania, middle row, and back to depression, bottom row, over the course of 10 days. Blue and green indicate low levels of brain activity, while red, orange, and yellow indicate high levels of brain activity.
American author Ernest Hemingway suffered from bipolar disorder (manic-depressive illness) and committed suicide at the age of 61, during a period of depression. The author’s father, brother, and a sister all committed suicide, and in 1996 Hemingway’s granddaughter, American actor and model Margaux Hemingway, also committed suicide. Scientific research on suicide suggests that genetic and biological factors play a role in suicidal behaviour.
English novelist Virginia Woolf, who suffered from bipolar disorder, recognized that her extremes of mood contributed to her creativity. She wrote of her disorder: ‘As an experience, madness is terrific . . . and in its lava I still find most of the things I write about.’ In 1941, feeling that she could no longer fight the disease, Woolf drowned herself in the Ouse River.
Bipolar disorder is much less common than depression. In North America and Europe, about 1 percent of people experience bipolar disorder during their lives. Rates of bipolar disorder are similar throughout the world. In comparison, at least 8 percent of people experience serious depression during their lives. Bipolar disorder affects men and women about equally and is somewhat more common in higher socioeconomic classes. At least 15 percent of people with bipolar disorder commit suicide. This rate roughly equals the rate for people with major depression, the most severe form of depression.
Bipolar disorder is a mental illness that causes mood swings. In the manic phase, a person might feel ecstatic, self-important, and energetic. But when the person becomes depressed, the mood shifts to extreme sadness, negative thinking, and apathy. Some studies indicate that the disease occurs at unusually high rates in creative people, such as artists, writers, and musicians. But some researchers contend that the methodology of these studies was flawed and their results were misleading. In this October 1996 Discover magazine article, anthropologist Jo Ann C. Gutin presents the results of several studies that explore the link between creativity and mental illness.
Some research suggests that highly creative people—such as artists, composers, writers, and poets—show unusually high rates of bipolar disorder, and that periods of mania fuel their creativity. Famous artists and writers who probably suffered from bipolar disorder include poets Lord Byron and Anne Sexton, novelists Virginia Woolf and Ernest Hemingway, composers Peter Ilyich Tchaikovsky and Sergey Rachmaninoff, and painters Amedeo Modigliani and Jackson Pollock. Critics of this research note that many creative people do not suffer from bipolar disorder, and that most people with bipolar disorder are not especially creative.
Bipolar disorder usually begins in a person’s late teens or 20s. Men usually experience mania as the first mood episode, whereas women typically experience depression first. Episodes of mania and depression usually last from several weeks to several months. On average, people with untreated bipolar disorder experience four episodes of mania or depression over any ten-year period. Many people with bipolar disorder function normally between episodes. In ‘rapid-cycling’ bipolar disorder, however, which represents 5 to 15 percent of all cases, a person experiences four or more mood episodes within a year and may have little or no normal functioning in between episodes. In rare cases, swings between mania and depression occur over a period of days.
In another type of bipolar disorder, a person experiences major depression and hypomanic episodes, or episodes of milder mania. In a related disorder called cyclothymic disorder, a person’s mood alternates between mild depression and mild mania. Some people with cyclothymic disorder later develop full-blown bipolar disorder. Bipolar disorder may also follow a seasonal pattern, with a person typically experiencing depression in the fall and winter and mania in the spring or summer (see Seasonal Affective Disorder).
People in the depressive phase of bipolar disorder feel intensely sad or profoundly indifferent to work, activities, and people that once brought them pleasure. They think slowly, concentrate poorly, feel tired, and experience changes - usually an increase - in their appetite and sleep. They often feel a sense of worthlessness or helplessness. In addition, they may feel pessimistic or hopeless about the future and may think about or attempt suicide. In some cases of severe depression, people may experience psychotic symptoms, such as delusions (false beliefs) or hallucinations (false sensory perceptions). See Psychosis.
In the manic phase of bipolar disorder, people feel intensely and inappropriately happy, self-important, and irritable. In this highly energized state they sleep less, have racing thoughts, and talk in rapid-fire speech that goes off in many directions. They have inflated self-esteem and confidence and may even have delusions of grandeur. Mania may make people impatient and abrasive, and when frustrated, physically abusive. They often behave in socially inappropriate ways, think irrationally, and show impaired judgment. For example, they may take aeroplane trips all over the country, make indecent sexual advances, and formulate grandiose plans involving indiscriminate investments of money. The self-destructive behaviour of mania includes excessive gambling, buying outrageously expensive gifts, abusing alcohol or other drugs, and provoking confrontations with obnoxious or combative behaviour.
Clinical depression is one of the most common forms of mental illness. Although depression can be treated with psychotherapy, many scientists believe there are biological causes for the disease. In this June 1998 Scientific American article, neurobiologist Charles B. Nemeroff discusses the connection between biochemical changes in the brain and depression.
The genes that a person inherits seem to have a strong influence on whether the person will develop bipolar disorder. Studies of twins provide evidence for this genetic influence. Among genetically identical twins where one twin has bipolar disorder, the other twin has the disorder in more than 70 percent of cases. But among pairs of fraternal twins, who have about half their genes in common, both twins have bipolar disorder in less than 15 percent of cases in which one twin has the disorder. The degree of genetic similarity seems to account for the difference between identical and fraternal twins. Further evidence for a genetic influence comes from studies of adopted children with bipolar disorder. These studies show that biological relatives of the children have a higher incidence of bipolar disorder than do people in the general population. Thus, bipolar disorder seems to run in families for genetic reasons.
Personal or work-related stress can trigger a manic episode, but this usually occurs in people with a genetic vulnerability. Other factors - such as prenatal development, childhood experiences, and social conditions—seem to have relatively little influence in causing bipolar disorder. One study examined the children of identical twins in which only one member of each pair of twins had bipolar disorder. The study found that regardless of whether the parent had bipolar disorder or not, all of the children had the same high 10-percent rate of bipolar disorder. This observation clearly suggests that risk for bipolar illness comes from genetic influence, not from exposure to a parent’s bipolar illness or from family problems caused by that illness.
Different therapies may shorten, delay, or even prevent the extreme moods caused by bipolar disorder. Lithium carbonate, a natural mineral salt, can help control both mania and depression in bipolar disorder. The drug generally takes two to three weeks to become effective. People with bipolar disorder may take lithium during periods of relatively normal mood to delay or prevent subsequent episodes of mania or depression. Common side effects of lithium include nausea, increased thirst and urination, vertigo, loss of appetite, and muscle weakness. In addition, long-term use can impair functioning of the kidneys. For this reason, doctors do not prescribe lithium to bipolar patients with kidney disease. Many people find the side effects so unpleasant that they stop taking the medication, which often results in relapse. See Lithium.
From 20 to 40 percent of people do not respond to lithium therapy. For these people, two anticonvulsant drugs may help dampen severe manic episodes: carbamazepine (Tegretol) and valproate (Depakene). The use of traditional antidepressants to treat bipolar disorder carries risks of triggering a manic episode or a rapid-cycling pattern.
Psychiatry is the branch of medicine specializing in mental illnesses. Psychiatrists not only diagnose and treat these disorders but also conduct research directed at understanding and preventing them.
A psychiatrist is a doctor of medicine who has had four years of postgraduate training in psychiatry. Many psychiatrists take further training in psychoanalysis, child psychiatry, or other subspecialties. Psychiatrists treat patients in private practice, in general hospitals, or in specialized facilities for the mentally ill (psychiatric hospitals, outpatient clinics, or community mental health centres). Some spend part or all of their time doing research or administering mental health programs. By contrast, psychologists, who often work closely with psychiatrists and treat many of the same kinds of patients, are not trained in medicine; consequently, they neither diagnose physical illness nor administer drugs.
The province of psychiatry is unusually broad for a medical specialty. Mental disorders may affect most aspects of a patient's life, including physical functioning, behaviour, emotions, thought, perception, interpersonal relationships, sexuality, work, and play. These disorders are caused by a poorly understood combination of biological, psychological, and social determinants. Psychiatry's task is to account for the diverse sources and manifestations of mental illness.
Physicians in the 18th and 19th centuries used crude devices to treat mental illness, none of which offered any real relief. The circulating swing, top left, was used to spin depressed patients at high speed. American physician Benjamin Rush devised the tranquillizing chair, top right, to calm people with mania. The crib, bottom, was widely used to restrain violent patients.
Physicians in the Western world began specializing in the treatment of the mentally ill in the 19th century. Known as alienists, psychiatrists of that era worked in large asylums, practicing what was then called moral treatment, a humane approach aimed at quieting mental turmoil and restoring reason. During the second half of the century, psychiatrists abandoned this mode of treatment and, with it, the tacit recognition that mental illness is caused by both psychological and social influences. For a while, their attention focussed almost exclusively on biological factors. Drugs and other forms of somatic (physical) treatment were common. The German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin identified and classified mental disorders into a system that is the foundation for modern diagnostic practices. Another important figure was the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler, who coined the word schizophrenia and described its characteristics.
The discovery of unconscious sources of behaviour—an insight dominated by the psychoanalytic writings of Sigmund Freud in the early 20th century—enriched psychiatric thought and changed the direction of its practice. Attention shifted to processes within the individual psyche, and psychoanalysis came to be regarded as the preferred mode of treatment for most mental disorders. In the 1940s and 1950s emphasis shifted again: this time to the social and physical environment. Many psychiatrists had all but ignored biological influences, but others were studying those involved in mental illness and were using somatic forms of treatment such as electroconvulsive therapy (electric shock) and psychosurgery.
Dramatic changes in the treatment of the mentally ill in the United States began in the mid-1950s with the introduction of the first effective drugs for treating psychotic symptoms. Along with drug treatment, new, more liberal and humane policies and treatment strategies were introduced into mental hospitals. More and more patients were treated in community settings in the 1960s and 1970s. Support for mental health research led to significant new discoveries, especially in the understanding of genetic and biochemical determinants in mental illness and the functioning of the brain. Thus, by the 1980s, psychiatry had once again shifted in emphasis to the biological, to the relative neglect of psychosocial influences in mental health and illness.
Psychiatrists use a variety of methods to detect specific disorders in their patients. The most fundamental is the psychiatric interview, during which the patient's psychiatric history is taken and mental status is evaluated. The psychiatric history is a picture of the patient's personality characteristics, relationships with others, and past and present experience with psychiatric problems—all told in the patient's words (sometimes supplemented by comments from other family members). Psychiatrists use mental-status examinations much as internists use physical examinations. They elicit and classify aspects of the patient's mental functioning.
Some diagnostic methods rely on testing by other specialists. Psychologists administer intelligence and personality tests, as well as tests designed to detect damage to the brain or other parts of the central nervous system. Neurologists also test psychiatric patients for evidence of impairment of the nervous system. Other physicians sometimes examine patients who complain of physical symptoms. Psychiatric social workers explore family and community problems. The psychiatrist integrates all this information in making a diagnosis according to criteria established by the psychiatric profession.
Psychiatric treatments fall into two classes: organic and nonorganic forms. Organic treatments, such as drugs, are those that affect the body directly. Nonorganic types of treatment improve the patient's functioning by psychological means, such as psychotherapy, or by altering the social environment.
Psychotropic drugs (see Psychoactive Drugs) are by far the most commonly used organic treatment. The first to be discovered were the antipsychotics, used primarily to treat schizophrenia. The phenothiazines are the most frequently prescribed class of antipsychotic drugs. Others are the thioxanthenes, butyrophenones, and indoles. All antipsychotic drugs diminish such symptoms as delusions, hallucinations, and thought disorder. Because they can reduce agitation, they are sometimes used to control manic excitement in manic-depressive patients and to calm geriatric patients. Some childhood behaviour disorders respond to these drugs.
Despite their value, the antipsychotic drugs have drawbacks. The most serious is the neurological condition tardive dyskinesia, which occurs in patients who have taken the drugs over extended periods. The condition is characterized by abnormal movements of the tongue, mouth, and body. It is especially serious because its symptoms do not always disappear when the drug is stopped, and no known treatment for it has been developed.
Most psychotropic drugs are chemically synthesized. Lithium carbonate, however, is a naturally occurring element used to prevent, or at least reduce, the severity of shifts of mood in manic-depression (see Depression). It is especially effective in controlling mania. Psychiatrists must monitor lithium dosages carefully, because only a small margin exists between an effective dose and a toxic one.
Three major classes of antidepressant drugs are used. The tricyclic and tetracyclic antidepressants, the most frequently prescribed, are used for the most common form of serious depression. Monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors are used for so-called atypical depressions. Serotonin-selective reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are effective against both typical and atypical depressions. Although all three classes are quite effective in relieving depression in correctly matched patients, they also have disadvantages. The tricyclics and tetracyclics can take two to five weeks to become effective and can cause such side effects as oversedation and cardiac problems. MAO inhibitors can cause severe hypertension in patients who ingest certain types of food (such as cheese, beer, and wine) or drugs (such as cold medicines). SSRI drugs, such as fluoxetine (Prozac), take 2 to 12 weeks to become effective and can cause headaches, nausea, insomnia, and nervousness.
Anxiety, tension (see Stress-Related Disorders), and insomnia are often treated with drugs that are commonly called minor tranquillizers. Barbiturates have been used for the longest time, but they produce more severe side effects and are more often abused than the newer classes of antianxiety drugs (see Drug Dependence). Of the new drugs, the benzodiazepines are the most frequently prescribed, very often in nonpsychiatric settings.
The stimulant drugs, such as amphetamine—a drug that is often abused—have legitimate uses in psychiatry. They help to control overactivity and lack of concentration in hyperactive children (see Hyperactivity) and to stimulate the victims of narcolepsy, a disorder characterized by sudden, uncontrollable episodes of sleep.
Another organic treatment is electroconvulsive therapy, or ECT, in which seizures similar to those of epilepsy are produced by a current of electricity passed through the forehead. ECT is most commonly used to treat severe depressions that have not responded to drug treatment. It is also sometimes used to treat schizophrenia. Other forms of organic treatment are much less frequently used than drugs and ETC. They include the controversial technique psychosurgery, in which fibres in the brain are severed; this technique is now used very rarely (see Lobotomy).
A psychologist listens to her client during a psychotherapy session. Psychotherapy can be an effective treatment for many mental disorders. Some forms of psychotherapy try to help people resolve their internal, unconscious conflicts, and other forms teach people skills to correct their abnormal behaviour.
The most common nonorganic treatment is psychotherapy. Most psychotherapies conducted by psychiatrists are psychodynamic in orientation—that is, they focus on internal psychic conflict and its resolution as a means of restoring mental health. The prototypical psychodynamic therapy is psychoanalysis, which is aimed at untangling the sources of unconscious conflict in the past and restructuring the patient's personality. Psychoanalysis is the treatment in which the patient lies on a couch, with the psychoanalyst out of sight, and says whatever comes to mind. The patient relates dreams, fantasies, and memories, along with thoughts and feelings associated with them. The analyst helps the patient interpret these associations and the meaning of the patient's relationship to the analyst. Because it is lengthy and expensive, often several years in duration, that classical psychoanalysis is now infrequently used.
More common are shorter forms of psychotherapy that supplement psychoanalytic principles with other theoretical ideas and scientifically derived information. In these types of therapy, psychiatrists are more likely to give the patient advice and try to influence behaviour. Some use techniques derived from behaviour therapy, which is based on learning theory (although these methods are more commonly used by psychologists).
Besides psychotherapy, the other major form of nonorganic treatment used in psychiatry is milieu therapy. Usually carried out in psychiatric wards, milieu therapy directs social relations among patients and staff toward therapeutic ends. Ward activities, too, are planned to serve specific therapeutic goals.
In general, psychotherapy is relied on more heavily for the treatment of neuroses and other nonpsychotic conditions than it is for psychoses. In psychotic patients, who usually receive psychoactive drugs, psychotherapy is used to improve social and vocational functioning. Milieu therapy is limited to hospitalized patients. Increasingly, psychiatrists use a combination of organic and nonorganic techniques for all patients, depending on their diagnosis and response to treatment.
Depression is an unfortunate aspect that is dealt within the realms of mental illness under which a person experiences deep, unshakable sadness and diminished interest in nearly all activities. People also use the term depression to describe the temporary sadness, loneliness, or blues that everyone feels from time to time. In contrast to normal sadness, severe depression, also called major depression, can dramatically impair a person’s ability to function in social situations and at work. People with major depression often have feelings of despair, hopelessness, and worthlessness, as well as thoughts of committing suicide.
These positron emission tomography scans of the brain of a person with bipolar disorder show the individual shifting from depression, top row, to mania, middle row, and back to depression, bottom row, over the course of 10 days. Blue and green indicate low levels of brain activity, while red, orange, and yellow indicate high levels of brain activity.
Depression can take several other forms. In bipolar disorder, sometimes called manic-depressive illness, a person’s mood swings back and forth between depression and mania. People with seasonal affective disorder typically suffer from depression only during autumn and winter, when there are fewer hours of daylight. In dysthymia (pronounced dis-THI-mee-uh), people feel depressed, have low self-esteem, and concentrate poorly most of the time—often for a period of years—but their symptoms are milder than in major depression. Some people with dysthymia experience occasional episodes of major depression. Mental health professionals use the term clinical depression to refer to any of the above forms of depression.
Bipolar disorder is a mental illness that causes mood swings. In the manic phase, a person might feel ecstatic, self-important, and energetic. But when the person becomes depressed, the mood shifts to extreme sadness, negative thinking, and apathy. Some studies indicate that the disease occurs at unusually high rates in creative people, such as artists, writers, and musicians. But some researchers contend that the methodology of these studies was flawed and their results were misleading. In this October 1996 Discover magazine article, anthropologist Jo Ann C. Gutin presents the results of several studies that explore the link between creativity and mental illness.
Surveys indicate that people commonly view depression as a sign of personal weakness, but psychiatrists and psychologists view it as a real illness. In the United States, the National Institute of Mental Health has estimated that depression costs society many billions of dollars each year, mostly in lost work time.
Depression is one of the most common mental illnesses. At least 8 percent of adults in the United States experience serious depression at some point during their lives, and estimates range as high as 17 percent. The illness affects all people, regardless of sex, race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic standing. However, women are two to three times more likely than men to suffer from depression. Experts disagree on the reason for this difference. Some cite differences in hormones, and others point to the stress caused by society’s expectations of women.
Studies indicate that depression is more prevalent among women than it is among men. Genetics and environment seem to be the keys to unlocking this gender-gap mystery, although the complexity of the puzzle makes progress slow. In this article for Scientific American Presents, physician Ellen Leibenluft explores the physiology of depression and explains how scientific research may make it possible to develop better treatments for both sexes.
Depression occurs in all parts of the world, although the pattern of symptoms can vary. The prevalence of depression in other countries varies widely, from 1.5 percent of people in Taiwan to 19 percent of people in Lebanon. Some researchers believe methods of gathering data on depression account for different rates.
A number of large-scale studies indicate that depression rates have increased worldwide over the past several decades. Furthermore, younger generations are experiencing depression at an earlier age than did previous generations. Social scientists have proposed many explanations, including changes in family structure, urbanization, and reduced cultural and religious influences.
Although it may appear anytime from childhood to old age, depression usually begins during a person’s 20s or 30s. The illness may come on slowly, then deepen gradually over months or years. On the other hand, it may erupt suddenly in a few weeks or days. A person who develops severe depression may appear so confused, frightened, and unbalanced that observers speak of a ‘nervous breakdown.’ However it begins, depression causes serious changes in a person’s feelings and outlook. A person with major depression feels sad nearly every day and may cry often. People, work, and activities that used to bring them pleasure no longer do.
Symptoms of depression can vary by age. In younger children, depression may include physical complaints, such as stomachaches and headaches, as well as irritability, ‘moping around,’ social withdrawal, and changes in eating habits. They may feel unenthusiastic about school and other activities. In adolescents, common symptoms include sad mood, sleep disturbances, and lack of energy. Elderly people with depression usually complain of physical rather than emotional problems, which sometimes leads doctors to misdiagnose the illness.
Symptoms of depression can also vary by culture. In some cultures, depressed people may not experience sadness or guilt but may complain of physical problems. In Mediterranean cultures, for example, depressed people may complain of headaches or nerves. In Asian cultures they may complain of weakness, fatigue, or imbalance.
If left untreated, an episode of major depression typically lasts eight or nine months. About 85 percent of people who experience one bout of depression will experience future episodes.
Depression usually alters a person’s appetite, sometimes increasing it, but usually reducing it. Sleep habits often change as well. People with depression may oversleep or, more commonly, sleep for fewer hours. A depressed person might go to sleep at midnight, sleep restlessly, then wake up at 5 am feeling tired and blue. For many depressed people, early morning is the saddest time of the day.
Depression also changes one’s energy level. Some depressed people may be restless and agitated, engaging in fidgety movements and pacing. Others may feel sluggish and inactive, experiencing great fatigue, lack of energy, and a feeling of being worn out or carrying a heavy burden. Depressed people may also have difficulty thinking, poor concentration, and problems with memory.
People with depression often experience feelings of worthlessness, helplessness, guilt, and self-blame. They may interpret a minor failing on their part as a sign of incompetence or interpret minor criticism as condemnation. Some depressed people complain of being spiritually or morally dead. The mirror seems to reflect someone ugly and repulsive. Even a competent and decent person may feel deficient, cruel, stupid, phony, or guilty of having deceived others. People with major depression may experience such extreme emotional pain that they consider or attempt suicide. At least 15 percent of seriously depressed people commit suicide, and many more attempt it.
In some cases, people with depression may experience psychotic symptoms, such as delusions (false beliefs) and hallucinations (false sensory perceptions). Psychotic symptoms indicate an especially severe illness. Compared with other depressed people, those with psychotic symptoms have longer hospital stays, and after leaving, they are more likely to be moody and unhappy. They are also more likely to commit suicide. See Psychosis.
Some depressions seem to come out of the blue, even when things are going well. Others seem to have an obvious cause: a marital conflict, financial difficulty, or some personal failure. Yet many people with these problems do not become deeply depressed. Most psychologists believe depression results from an interaction between stressful life events and a person’s biological and psychological vulnerabilities.
Clinical depression is one of the most common forms of mental illness. Although depression can be treated with psychotherapy, many scientists believe there are biological causes for the disease. In this June 1998 Scientific American article, neurobiologist Charles B. Nemeroff discusses the connection between biochemical changes in the brain and depression.
Depression runs in families. By studying twins, researchers have found evidence of a strong genetic influence in depression. Genetically identical twins raised in the same environment are three times more likely to have depression in common than fraternal twins, who have only about half of their genes in common. In addition, identical twins are five times more likely to have bipolar disorder in common. These findings suggest that vulnerability to depression and bipolar disorder can be inherited. Adoption studies have provided more evidence of a genetic role in depression. These studies show that children of depressed people are vulnerable to depression even when raised by adoptive parents.
Genes may influence depression by causing abnormal activity in the brain. Studies have shown that certain brain chemicals called neurotransmitters play an important role in regulating moods and emotions. Neurotransmitters involved in depression include norepinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin. Research in the 1960s suggested that depression results from lower than normal levels of these neurotransmitters in parts of the brain. Support for this theory came from the effects of antidepressant drugs, which work by increasing the levels of neurotransmitters involved in depression. However, later studies have discredited this simple explanation and have suggested a more complex relationship between neurotransmitter levels and depression.
An imbalance of hormones may also play a role in depression. Many depressed people have higher than normal levels of hydrocortisone (cortisol), a hormone secreted by the adrenal gland in response to stress. In addition, an underactive or overactive thyroid gland can lead to depression.
A variety of medical conditions can cause depression. These include dietary deficiences in vitamin B6, vitamin B12, and folic acid (see Vitamin); degenerative neurological disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease and Huntington’s disease (see Chorea); strokes in the frontal part of the brain; and certain viral infections, such as hepatitis and mononucleosis. Certain medications, such as steroids, may also cause depression.
Psychological theories of depression focus on the way people think and behave. In a 1917 essay, Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud explained melancholia, or major depression, as a response to loss—either real loss, such as the death of a spouse, or symbolic loss, such as the failure to achieve an important goal. Freud believed that a person’s unconscious anger over loss weakens the ego, resulting in self-hate and self-destructive behaviour.
Cognitive theories of depression emphasize the role of irrational thought processes. American psychiatrist Aaron Beck proposed that depressed people tend to view themselves, their environment, and the future in a negative light because of errors in thinking. These errors include focussing on the negative aspects of any situation, misinterpreting facts in negative ways, and blaming themselves for any misfortune. In Beck’s view, people learn these self-defeating ways of looking at the world during early childhood. This negative thinking makes situations seem much worse than they really are and increases the risk of depression, especially in stressful situations.
In support of this cognitive view, people with ‘depressive’ personality traits appear to be more vulnerable than others to actual depression. Examples of depressive personality traits include gloominess, pessimism, introversion, self-criticism, excessive skepticism and criticism of others, deep feelings of inadequacy, and excessive brooding and worrying. In addition, people who regularly behave in dependent, hostile, and impulsive ways appear at greater risk for depression.
American psychologist Martin Seligman proposed that depression stems from ‘learned helplessness,’ an acquired belief that one cannot control the outcome of events. In this view, prolonged exposure to uncontrollable and inescapable events leads to apathy, pessimism, and loss of motivation. An adaptation of this theory by American psychologist Lynn Abramson and her colleagues argues that depression results not only from helplessness, but also from hopelessness. The hopelessness theory attributes depression to a pattern of negative thinking in which people blame themselves for negative life events, view the causes of those events as permanent, and overgeneralize specific weaknesses as applying to many areas of their life.
Psychologists agree that stressful experiences can trigger depression in people who are predisposed to the illness. For example, the death of a loved one may trigger depression. Psychologists usually distinguish true depression from grief, a normal process of mourning a loved one who has died. Other stressful experiences may include divorce, pregnancy, the loss of a job, and even childbirth. About 20 percent of women experience an episode of depression, known as postpartum depression, after having a baby. In addition, people with serious physical illnesses or disabilities often develop depression.
People who experience child abuse appear more vulnerable to depression than others. So, too, do people living under chronically stressful conditions, such as single mothers with many children and little or no support from friends or relatives.
Depression typically cannot be shaken or willed away. An episode must therefore run its course until it weakens either on its own or with treatment. Depression can be treated effectively with antidepressant drugs, psychotherapy, or a combination of both.
Despite the availability of effective treatment, most depressive disorders go untreated and undiagnosed. Studies indicate that general physicians fail to recognize depression in their patients at least half of the time. In addition, many doctors and patients view depression in elderly people as a normal part of aging, even though treatment for depression in older people is usually very effective.
Up to 70 percent of people with depression respond to antidepressant drugs. These medications appear to work by altering the levels of serotonin, norepinephrine, and other neurotransmitters in the brain. They generally take at least two to three weeks to become effective. Doctors cannot predict which type of antidepressant drug will work best for any particular person, so depressed people may need to try several types. Antidepressant drugs are not addictive, but they may produce unwanted side effects. To avoid relapse, people must usually continue taking the medication for several months after their symptoms improve.
Commonly used antidepressant drugs fall into three major classes: tricyclics, monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAO inhibitors), and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). Tricyclics, named for their three-ring chemical structure, include amitriptyline (Elavil), imipramine (Tofanil), desipramine (Norpramin), doxepin (Sinequan), and nortriptyline (Pamelor). Side effects of tricyclics may include drowsiness, dizziness upon standing, blurred vision, nausea, insomnia, constipation, and dry mouth.
MAO inhibitors include isocarboxazid (Marplan), phenelzine (Nardil), and tranylcypromine (Parnate). People who take MAO inhibitors must follow a diet that excludes tyramine - a substance found in wine, beer, some cheeses, and many fermented foods - to avoid a dangerous rise in blood pressure. In addition, MAO inhibitors have many of the same side effects as tricyclics.
Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors include fluoxetine (Prozac), sertraline (Zoloft), and paroxetine (Paxil). These drugs generally produce fewer and milder side effects than do other types of antidepressants, although SSRIs may cause anxiety, insomnia, drowsiness, headaches, and sexual dysfunction. Some patients have alleged that Prozac causes violent or suicidal behaviour in a small number of cases, but the US Food and Drug Administration has failed to substantiate this claim.
Prozac became the most widely used antidepressant in the world soon after its introduction in the late 1980s by drug manufacturer Eli Lilly and Company. Many people find Prozac extremely effective in lifting depression. In addition, some people have reported that Prozac actually transform their personality by increasing their self-confidence, optimism, and energy level. However, mental health professionals have expressed serious ethical concerns over Prozac’s use as a ‘personality enhancer,’ especially among people without clinical depression.
Doctors often prescribe lithium carbonate, a natural mineral salt, to treat people with bipolar disorder (see Lithium). People often take lithium during periods of relatively normal mood to delay or even prevent subsequent mood swings. Side effects of lithium include nausea, stomach upset, vertigo, and frequent urination.
Studies have shown that short-term psychotherapy can relieve mild to moderate depression as effectively as antidepressant drugs. Unlike medication, psychotherapy produces no physiological side effects. In addition, depressed people treated with psychotherapy appear less likely to experience a relapse than those treated only with antidepressant medication. However, psychotherapy usually takes longer to produce benefits.
There are many kinds of psychotherapy. Cognitive-behavioural therapy assumes that depression stems from negative, often irrational thinking about oneself and one’s future. In this type of therapy, a person learns to understand and eventually eliminate those habits of negative thinking. In interpersonal therapy, the therapist helps a person resolve problems in relationships with others that may have caused the depression. The subsequent improvement in social relationships and support helps alleviate the depression. Psychodynamic therapy views depression as the result of internal, unconscious conflicts. Psychodynamic therapists focus on a person’s past experiences and the resolution of childhood conflicts. Psychoanalysis is an example of this type of therapy. Critics of long-term psychodynamic therapy argue that its effectiveness is scientifically unproven.
A woman sits in front of a high-intensity light box as part of treatment for seasonal affective disorder. People with this disorder experience episodes of depression that usually begin during the winter months. Daily exposure that bright light helps prevent or lift depression for many people with the disorder.
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) can often relieve severe depression in people who fail to respond to antidepressant medication and psychotherapy. In this type of therapy, a low-voltage electric current is passed through the brain for one to two seconds to produce a controlled seizure. Patients usually receive six to ten ECT treatments over several weeks. ECT remains controversial because it can cause disorientation and memory loss. Nevertheless, research has found it highly effective in alleviating severe depression.
For milder cases of depression, regular aerobic exercise may improve mood as effectively as psychotherapy or medication. In addition, some research indicates that dietary modifications can influence one’s mood by changing the level of serotonin in the brain.
Antidepressant, medication used to treat depression, a mood disorder characterized by such symptoms as sadness, decreased appetite, difficulty sleeping, fatigue, and a lack of enjoyment of activities previously found pleasurable. While everyone experiences episodes of sadness at some point in their lives, depression is distinguished from this sadness when symptoms are present most days for a period of at least two weeks. Antidepressants are often the first choice of treatment for depression.
Although the cause of depression is unknown, researchers have found that some depressed people have altered levels of chemicals called neurotransmitters, chemicals made and released by nerve cells, or neurons. One neuron, referred to as the presynaptic neuron, releases a neurotransmitter into the synapse, or space, between the neuron and a neighbouring cell. The neurotransmitter then attaches, or binds, to a neighbouring cell - the postsynaptic cell - to trigger a specific activity. Antidepressants work by interacting with neurotransmitters at three different points: they can change the rate at which the neurotransmitters are either created or broken down by the body; they can block the process in which a spent neurotransmitter is recycled by a presynaptic neuron and used again, called reuptake; or they can interfere with the binding of a neurotransmitter to neighbouring cells.
The first antidepressants, developed in the 1950s, are the tricyclic antidepressants (TCA) and the monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors. TCAs block the reuptake of neurotransmitters into the presynaptic neurons, keeping the neurotransmitter in the synapse longer, and making more of the neurotransmitter available to the postsynaptic cell. TCAs include amitriptyline, doxepin, imipramine, nortriptyline, and desipramine.
MAO inhibitors decrease the rate at which neurotransmitters are broken down by the body so they are more available to interact with neurons. MAO inhibitors currently available in the United States include phenelzine and tranylcypromine.
Another group of antidepressants, known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI), became available in 1987. SSRIs block the reuptake of the neurotransmitter serotonin into presynaptic neurons, thereby prolonging its activity. There are currently four SSRIs available for use in the United States: fluoxetine, sertraline, paroxetine, and fluvoxamine. Of this group, the best known is fluoxetine, commonly known by its brand name, Prozac.
Another antidepressant is venlafaxine, which works like TCAs but does not share their chemical structure, and it also causes different side effects. The antidepressant nefazodone prevents serotonin from binding to neighbouring neurons at one specific binding site (serotonin can bind to neurons on many sites). It also weakly blocks the reuptake of serotonin.
All antidepressants decrease symptoms of depression in about 70 percent of depressed people who take them. Most antidepressants take about two to three weeks of treatment before beneficial effects occur. Because no antidepressant is more effective than the others, doctors determine which antidepressant to prescribe according to the type of side effects an individual can tolerate. For instance, a person who takes TCAs and MAO inhibitors may notice dizziness and fainting when standing up, mouth dryness, difficulty urinating, constipation, and drowsiness. If people who take MAO inhibitors eat certain foods, such as aged cheese or some aged meats, they can experience severe headaches and raised blood pressure. SSRIs can cause side effects such as restlessness, difficulty sleeping, and interference with sexual function.
Schizophrenia is a severe form that finds its home within the mental illness that is characterized by a variety of symptoms, including loss of contact with reality, bizarre behaviour, disorganized thinking and speech, decreased emotional expressiveness, and social withdrawal. Usually only some of these symptoms occur in any one person. The term schizophrenia comes from Greek words meaning ‘split mind.’ However, contrary to common belief, schizophrenia does not refer to a person with a split personality or multiple personality. (For a description of a mental illness in which a person has multiple personalities, see disassociative Identity Disorder.) To observers, schizophrenia may seem like madness or insanity.
People with schizophrenia have disturbing, frightening thoughts and may have trouble telling the difference between real and unreal experiences. A 25-year-old woman with schizophrenia drew this picture, which was displayed as part of a 1968 exhibition of works by psychiatric patients.
Perhaps more than any other mental illness, schizophrenia has a debilitating effect on the lives of the people who suffer from it. A person with schizophrenia may have difficulty telling the difference between real and unreal experiences, logical and illogical thoughts, or appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. Schizophrenia seriously impairs a person’s ability to work, go to school, enjoy relationships with others, or take care of oneself. In addition, people with schizophrenia frequently require hospitalization because they pose a danger to themselves. About 10 percent of people with schizophrenia commit suicide, and many others attempt suicide. Once people develop schizophrenia, they usually suffer from the illness for the rest of their lives. Although there is no cure, treatment can help many people with schizophrenia lead productive lives.
Schizophrenia also carries an enormous cost to society. People with schizophrenia occupy about one-third of all beds in psychiatric hospitals in the United States. In addition, people with schizophrenia account for at least 10 percent of the homeless population in the United States (see Homelessness). The National Institute of Mental Health has estimated that schizophrenia costs the United States tens of billions of dollars each year in direct treatment, social services, and lost productivity.
Approximately 1 percent of people develop schizophrenia at some time during their lives. Experts estimate that about 1.8 million people in the United States have schizophrenia. The prevalence of schizophrenia is the same regardless of sex, race, and culture. Although women are just as likely as men to develop schizophrenia, women tend to experience the illness less severely, with fewer hospitalizations and better social functioning in the community.
Schizophrenia usually develops in late adolescence or early adulthood, between the ages of 15 and 30. Much less commonly, schizophrenia develops later in life. The illness may begin abruptly, but it usually develops slowly over months or years. Mental health professionals diagnose schizophrenia based on an interview with the patient in which they determine whether the person has experienced specific symptoms of the illness.
Symptoms and functioning in people with schizophrenia tend to vary over time, sometimes worsening and other times improving. For many patients the symptoms gradually become less severe as they grow older. About 25 percent of people with schizophrenia become symptom-free later in their lives.
A variety of symptoms characterize schizophrenia. The most prominent include symptoms of psychosis—such as delusions and hallucinations—as well as bizarre behaviour, strange movements, and disorganized thinking and speech. Many people with schizophrenia do not recognize that their mental functioning is disturbed.
Some people with schizophrenia experience delusions of persecution—false beliefs that other people are plotting against them. This interview between a patient with schizophrenia and his therapist illustrates the paranoia that can affect people with this illness.
Delusions are false beliefs that appear obviously untrue to other people. For example, a person with schizophrenia may believe that he is the king of England when he is not. People with schizophrenia may have delusions that others, such as the police or the FBI, are plotting against them or spying on them. They may believe that aliens are controlling their thoughts or that their own thoughts are being broadcast to the world so that other people can hear them.
People with schizophrenia may also experience hallucinations (false sensory perceptions). People with hallucinations see, hear, smell, feel, or taste things that are not really there. Auditory hallucinations, such as hearing voices when no one else is around, are especially common in schizophrenia. These hallucinations may include two or more voices conversing with each other, voices that continually comment on the person’s life, or voices that command the person to do something.
People with schizophrenia often behave bizarrely. They may talk to themselves, walk backward, laugh suddenly without explanation, make funny faces, or masturbate in public. In rare cases, they maintain a rigid, bizarre pose for hours on end. Alternately, they may engage in constant random or repetitive movements.
People with schizophrenia sometimes talk in incoherent or nonsensical ways, which suggests confused or disorganized thinking. In conversation they may jump from topic to topic or string together loosely associated phrases. They may combine words and phrases in meaningless ways or make up new words. In addition, they may show poverty of speech, in which they talk less and more slowly than other people, fail to answer questions or reply only briefly, or suddenly stop talking in the middle of speech.
Another common characteristic of schizophrenia is social withdrawal. People with schizophrenia may avoid others or act as though others do not exist. They often show decreased emotional expressiveness. For example, they may talk in a low, monotonous voice, avoid eye contact with others, and display a blank facial expression. They may also have difficulties experiencing pleasure and may lack interest in participating in activities.
Other symptoms of schizophrenia include difficulties with memory, attention span, abstract thinking, and planning ahead. People with schizophrenia commonly have problems with anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts. In addition, people with schizophrenia are much more likely to abuse or become dependent upon drugs or alcohol than other people. The use of alcohol and drugs often worsens the symptoms of schizophrenia, resulting in relapses and hospitalizations.
Schizophrenia appears to result not from a single cause, but from a variety of factors. Most scientists believe that schizophrenia is a biological disease caused by genetic factors, an imbalance of chemicals in the brain, structural brain abnormalities, or abnormalities in the prenatal environment. In addition, stressful life events may contribute to the development of schizophrenia in those who are predisposed to the illness.
Research shows that the more genetically related a person is to someone with schizophrenia, the greater the risk that person has of developing the illness. For example, children of one parent with schizophrenia have a 13 percent chance of developing the illness, whereas children of two parents with schizophrenia have a 46 percent chance of developing the disorder.
Research suggests that the genes one inherits strongly influence one’s risk of developing schizophrenia. Studies of families have shown that the more closely one is related to someone with schizophrenia, the greater the risk one has of developing the illness. For example, the children of one parent with schizophrenia have about a 13 percent chance of developing the illness, and children of two parents with schizophrenia have about a 46 percent chance of eventually developing schizophrenia. This increased risk occurs even when such children are adopted and raised by mentally healthy parents. In comparison, children in the general population have only about a 1 percent chance of developing schizophrenia.
Some evidence suggests that schizophrenia may result from an imbalance of chemicals in the brain called neurotransmitters. These chemicals enable neurons (brain cells) to communicate with each other. Some scientists suggest that schizophrenia result from the excessive activities of the neurotransmitter dopamine in certain parts of the brain or from an abnormal sensitivity to dopamine. Support for this hypothesis comes from antipsychotic drugs, which reduce psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia by blocking brain receptors for dopamine. In addition, amphetamines, which increase dopamine activity, intensify psychotic symptoms in people with schizophrenia. Despite these findings, many experts believe that excess dopamine activity alone cannot account for schizophrenia. Other neurotransmitters, such as serotonin and norepinephrine, may play important roles as well.
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) reveals structural differences between a normal adult brain, left, and the brain of a person with schizophrenia, right. The schizophrenic brain has enlarged ventricles (fluid-filled cavities), shown in light gray. However, not all people with schizophrenia show this abnormality.
Brain imaging techniques, such as magnetic resonance imaging and positron-emission tomography, have led researchers to discover specific structural abnormalities in the brains of people with schizophrenia. For example, people with chronic schizophrenia tend to have enlarged brain ventricles (cavities in the brain that contain cerebrospinal fluid). They also have a smaller overall volume of brain tissue compared to mentally healthy people. Other people with schizophrenia show abnormally low activity in the frontal lobe of the brain, which governs abstract thought, planning, and judgment. Research has identified possible abnormalities in many other parts of the brain, including the temporal lobes, basal ganglia, thalamus, hippocampus, and superior temporal gyrus. These defects may partially explain the abnormal thoughts, perceptions, and behaviours that characterize schizophrenia.
Evidence suggests that factors in the prenatal environment and during birth can increase the risk of a person later developing schizophrenia. These events are believed to affect the brain development of the fetus during a critical period. For example, pregnant women who have been exposed to the influenza virus or who have poor nutrition have a slightly increased chance of giving birth to a child who later develops schizophrenia. In addition, obstetric complications during the birth of a child - for example, delivery with forceps - can slightly increase the chances of the child later developing schizophrenia.
Although scientists favour a biological cause of schizophrenia, stress in the environment may affect the onset and course of the illness. Stressful life circumstances - such as growing up and living in poverty, the death of a loved one, an important change in jobs or relationships, or chronic tension and hostility at home - can increase the chances of schizophrenia in a person biologically predisposed to the disease. In addition, stressful events can trigger a relapse of symptoms in a person who already has the illness. Individuals who have effective skills for managing stress may be less susceptible to its negative effects. Psychological and social rehabilitation can help patients develop more effective skills for dealing with stress.
Although there is no cure for schizophrenia, effective treatment exists that can improve the long-term course of the illness. With many years of treatment and rehabilitation, significant numbers of people with schizophrenia experience partial or full remission of their symptoms.
Treatment of schizophrenia usually involves a combination of medication, rehabilitation, and treatment of other problems the person may have. Antipsychotic drugs (also called neuroleptics) are the most frequently used medications for treatment of schizophrenia. Psychological and social rehabilitation programs may help people with schizophrenia function in the community and reduce stress related to their symptoms. Treatment of secondary problems, such as substance abuse and infectious diseases, is also an important part of an overall treatment program.
Antipsychotic medications, developed in the mid-1950s, can dramatically improve the quality of life for people with schizophrenia. The drugs reduce or eliminate psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions. The medications can also help prevent these symptoms from returning. Common antipsychotic drugs include risperidone (Risperdal), olanzapine (Zyprexa), clozapine (Clozaril), quetiapine (Seroquel), haloperidol (Haldol), thioridazine (Mellaril), chlorpromazine (Thorazine), fluphenazine (Prolixin), and trifluoperazine (Stelazine). People with schizophrenia must usually take medication for the rest of their lives to control psychotic symptoms. Antipsychotic medications appear to be less effective at treating other symptoms of schizophrenia, such as social withdrawal and apathy.
Antipsychotic drugs help reduce symptoms in 80 to 90 percent of people with schizophrenia. However, those who benefit often stop taking medication because they do not understand that they are ill or because of unpleasant side effects. Minor side effects include weight gain, dry mouth, blurred vision, restlessness, constipation, dizziness, and drowsiness. Other side effects are more serious and debilitating. These may include muscle spasms or cramps, tremors, and tardive dyskinesia, an irreversible condition marked by uncontrollable movements of the lips, mouth, and tongue. Newer drugs, such as clozapine, olanzapine, risperidone, and quetiapine, tend to produce fewer of these side effects. However, clozapine can cause agranulocytosis, a significant reduction in white blood cells necessary to fight infections. This condition can be fatal if not detected early enough. For this reason, people taking clozapine must have weekly tests to monitor their blood.
Because many patients with schizophrenia continue to experience difficulties despite taking medication, psychological and social rehabilitation is often necessary. A variety of methods can be effective. Social skills training helps people with schizophrenia learn specific behaviours for functioning in society, such as making friends, purchasing items at a store, or initiating conversations. Behavioural training methods can also help them learn self-care skills such as personal hygiene, money management, and proper nutrition. In addition, cognitive-behavioural therapy, a type of psychotherapy, can help reduce persistent symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, and social withdrawal.
Family intervention programs can also benefit people with schizophrenia. These programs focus on helping family members understand the nature and treatment of schizophrenia, how to monitor the illness, and how to help the patient make progress toward personal goals and greater independence. They can also lower the stress experienced by everyone in the family and help prevent the patient from relapsing or being re-hospitalized.
Because many patients have difficulty obtaining or keeping jobs, supported employment programs that help patients find and maintain jobs are a helpful part of rehabilitation. In these programs, the patient works alongside people without disabilities and earns competitive wages. An employment specialist (or vocational specialist) helps the person maintain their job by, for example, training the person in specific skills, helping the employer accommodate the person, arranging transportation, and monitoring performance. These programs are most effective when the supported employment is closely integrated with other aspects of treatment, such as medication and monitoring of symptoms.
Some people with schizophrenia are vulnerable to frequent crises because they do not regularly go to mental health centres to receive the treatment they need. These individuals often relapse and face re-hospitalization. To ensure that such patients take their medication and receive appropriate psychological and social rehabilitation, assertive community treatment (ACT) programs have been developed that deliver treatment to patients in natural settings, such as in their homes, in restaurants, or on the street.
People with schizophrenia often have other medical problems, so an effective treatment program must attend to these as well. One of the most common associated problems is substance abuse. Successful treatment of substance abuse in patients with schizophrenia requires careful coordination with their mental health care, so that the same clinicians are treating both disorders at the same time.
The high rate of substance abuse in patients with schizophrenia contributes to a high prevalence of infectious diseases, including hepatitis B and C and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Assessment, education, and treatment or management of these illnesses is critical for the long-term health of patients.
Other problems frequently associated with schizophrenia include housing instability and homelessness, legal problems, violence, trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, and suicide attempts. Close monitoring and psychotherapeutic interventions are often helpful in addressing these problems.
Several other psychiatric disorders are closely related to schizophrenia. In schizoaffective disorder, a person shows symptoms of schizophrenia combined with either mania or severe depression. Schizophreniform disorder refers to an illness in which a person experiences schizophrenic symptoms for more than one month but fewer than six months. In schizotypal personality disorder, a person engages in odd thinking, speech, and behaviour, but usually does not lose contact with reality (see Personality Disorders). Sometimes mental health professionals refer to these disorders together as schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.
We now turn to personality disorders, disorders in which one’s personality results in personal distress or significantly impairs social or work functioning. Every person has a personality—that is, a characteristic way of thinking, feeling, behaving, and relating to others. Most people experience at least some difficulties and problems that result from their personality. The specific point at which those problems justify the diagnosis of a personality disorder seems controversial. To some extent the definitions of a personality disorder are arbitrary, reflecting subjective as well as professional judgments about the person’s degree of dysfunction, need for change, and motivation for change.
Personality disorders involve behaviour that deviates from the norms or expectations of one’s culture. However, people who deviate from cultural norms are not necessarily dysfunctional, nor are people who conform to cultural norms necessarily healthy. Many personality disorders represent extreme variants of behaviour patterns that people usually value and encourage. For example, most people value confidence but not arrogance, agreeableness but not submissiveness, and conscientiousness but not perfectionism.
Because no clear line exists between healthy and unhealthy functioning, critics question the reliability of personality disorder diagnoses. A behaviour that seems deviant to one person may seem normal to another depending on one’s gender, ethnicity, and cultural background. The personal and cultural biases of mental health professionals may influence their diagnoses of personality disorders.
An estimated 20 percent of people in the general population have one or more personality disorders. Some people with personality disorders have other mental illnesses as well. About 50 percent of people who are treated for any psychiatric disorder have a personality disorder.
Mental health professionals rarely diagnose personality disorders in children because their manner of thinking, feeling, and relating to others does not usually stabilize until young adulthood. Thereafter, personality traits usually remain stable. Personality disorders often decrease in severity as a person ages.
People with antisocial personality disorder act in a way that disregards the feelings and rights of other people. Antisocial personalities often break the law, and they may use or exploit other people for their own gain. They may lie repeatedly, act impulsively, and get into physical fights. They may mistreat their spouses, neglect or abuse their children, and exploit their employees. They may even kill other people. People with this disorder are also sometimes called sociopaths or psychopaths. Antisocial behaviour in people less than 18 years old is called conduct disorder.
Antisocial personalities usually fail to understand that their behaviour is dysfunctional because their ability to feel guilty, remorseful, and anxious is impaired. Guilt, remorse, shame, and anxiety are unpleasant feelings, but they are also necessary for social functioning and even physical survival. For example, people who lack the ability to feel anxious will often fail to anticipate actual dangers and risks. They may take chances that other people would not take.
Antisocial personality disorder affects about 3 percent of males and 1 percent of females. This is the most heavily researched personality disorder, in part because it costs society the most. People with this disorder are at high risk for premature and violent death, injury, imprisonment, loss of employment, bankruptcy, alcoholism, drug dependence, and failed personal relationships.
People with borderline personality disorder experience intense emotional instability, particularly in relationships with others. They may make frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment by others. They may experience minor problems as major crises. They may also express their anger, frustration, and dismay through suicidal gestures, self-mutilation, and other self-destructive acts. They tend to have an unstable self-image or sense of self.
As children, most people with this disorder were emotionally unstable, impulsive, and often bitter or angry, although their chaotic impulsiveness and intense emotions may have made them popular at school. At first they may impress people as stimulating and exciting, but their relationships tend to be unstable and explosive.
About 2 percent of all people have borderline personality disorder. About 75 percent of people with this disorder are female. Borderline personalities are at high risk for developing depression, alcoholism, drug dependence, bulimia, disassociative disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder. As many as 10 percent of people with this disorder commit suicide by the age of 30. People with borderline personality disorder are among the most difficult to treat with psychotherapy, in part because their relationship with their therapist may become as intense and unstable as their other personal relationships.
Avoidant personality disorder is social withdrawal due to intense, anxious shyness. People with Avoidant personalities are reluctant to interact with others unless they feel certain of being liked. They fear being criticized and rejected. Often they view themselves as socially inept and inferior to others.
Dependent personality disorder involves severe and disabling emotional dependency on others. People with this disorder have difficulty making decisions without a great deal of advice and reassurance from others. They urgently seek out another relationship when a close relationship ends. They feel uncomfortable by themselves.
People with histrionic personality disorder constantly strive to be the centre of attention. They may act overly flirtatious or dress in ways that draw attention. They may also talk in a dramatic or theatrical style and display exaggerated emotional reactions.
People with narcissistic personality disorder have a grandiose sense of self-importance. They seek excessive admiration from others and fantasize about unlimited success or power. They believe they are special, unique, or superior to others. However, they often have very fragile self-esteem.
Obsessive-compulsive personality disorder is characterized by a preoccupation with details, orderliness, perfection, and control. People with this disorder often devote excessive amounts of time to work and productivity and fail to take time for leisure activities and friendships. They tend to be rigid, formal, stubborn, and serious. This disorder differs from obsessive-compulsive disorder, which often includes more bizarre behaviour and rituals.
People with paranoid personality disorder feel constant suspicion and distrust toward other people. They believe that others are against them and constantly look for evidence to support their suspicions. They are hostile toward others and react angrily to perceived insults.
Schizoid personality disorder involves social isolation and a lack of desire for close personal relationships. People with this disorder prefer to be alone and seem withdrawn and emotionally detached. They seem indifferent to praise or criticism from other people.
People with schizotypal personality disorder engage in odd thinking, speech, and behaviour. They may ramble or use words and phrases in unusual ways, and they may believe they have magical control over others. They feel very uncomfortable with close personal relationships and tend to be suspicious of others. Some research suggests this disorder is a less severe form of schizophrenia.
Many psychiatrists and psychologists use two additional diagnoses. Depressive personality disorder is characterized by chronic pessimism, gloominess, and cheerlessness. In passive-aggressive personality disorder, a person passively resists completing tasks and chores, criticizes and scorns authority figures, and seems negative and sullen.
Personality disorders result from a complex interaction of inherited traits and life experience, not from a single cause. For example, some cases of antisocial personality disorder may result from a combination of a genetic predisposition to impulsiveness and violence, very inconsistent or erratic parenting, and a harsh environment that discourages feelings of empathy and warmth but rewards exploitation and aggressiveness. Borderline personality disorder may result from a genetic predisposition to impulsiveness and emotional instability combined with parental neglect, intense marital conflicts between parents, and repeated episodes of severe emotional or sexual abuse (see Child Abuse). Dependent personality disorder may result from genetically based anxiety, an inhibited temperament, and overly protective, clinging, or neglectful parenting.
The pervasive and chronic nature of personality disorders makes them difficult to treat. People with these disorders often fail to recognize that their personality has contributed to their social, occupational, and personal problems. They may not think they have any real problems despite a history of drug abuse, failed relationships, and irregular employment. Thus, therapists must first focus on helping the person understand and become aware of the significance of their personality traits.
People with personality disorders sometimes feel that they can never change their dysfunctional behaviour because they have always acted the same way. Although personality change is exceedingly difficult, sometimes people can change the most dysfunctional aspects of their feelings and behaviour.
Therapists use a variety of methods to treat personality disorders, depending on the specific disorder. For example, cognitive and behavioural techniques, such as role playing and logical argument, may help alter a person’s irrational perceptions and assumptions about himself or herself. Certain psychoactive drugs may help control feelings of anxiety, depression, or severe distortions of thought. Psychotherapy may help people to understand the impact of experiences and relationships during childhood.
Psychotherapy is usually ineffective for people with antisocial personality disorder because these individuals tend to be manipulative, unreliable, and dishonest with the therapist. Therefore, most mental health professionals favour removing people with this disorder from their current living situation and placing them in a residential treatment centre. Such residential programs strictly supervise patients’ behaviour and impose rigid, consistent rules and responsibilities. These programs appear to help some people, but it is unclear how long their beneficial effects last.
Therapists treating people with borderline personality disorder sometimes use a technique called dialectical behaviour therapy. In this type of therapy, the therapist initially focuses on reducing suicidal tendencies and other behaviours that disrupt treatment. The therapist then helps the person develop skills to cope with anger and self-destructive impulses. In addition, the person learns to achieve personal strength through an acceptance of the many disappointments and interpersonal conflicts that are a natural part of life
Psychoactive Drugs, chemical substances that alter mood, behaviour, perception, or mental functioning. Throughout history, many cultures have found ways to alter consciousness through the ingestion of substances. In current professional practice, psychoactive substances known as psychotropic drugs have been developed to treat patients with severe mental illness.
Psychoactive substances exert their effects by modifying biochemical or physiological processes in the brain. The message system of nerve cells, or neurons, relies on both electrical and chemical transmission. Neurons rarely touch each other; the microscopic gap between one neuron and the next, called the synapse, is bridged by chemicals called neuroregulators, or neurotransmitters. Psychoactive drugs act by altering neurotransmitter function. The drugs can be divided into six major pharmacological classes based on their desired behavioural or psychological effect: alcohol, sedative-hypnotics, narcotic analgesics, stimulant-euphoriants, hallucinogens, and psychotropic agents.
Alcohol has always been the most widely used psychoactive substance. In most countries it is the only psychoactive drug legally available without prescription. Pleasant relaxation is commonly the desired effect, but intoxication impairs judgment and motor performance. When used chronically, alcohol can be toxic to liver and brain cells and can be physiologically addicting, producing dangerous withdrawal syndromes. See Alcoholism.
Sedative-hypnotics, such as the barbiturates and diazepam (widely known under the brand name Valium), include brain depressants, which are used medically to help people sleep (sleeping pills), and antianxiety agents, which are used to calm people without inducing sleep. Sedative-hypnotics are used illegally to produce relaxation, tranquillity, and euphoria. Overdoses of sedative-hypnotics can be fatal; all can be physiologically addicting, and some can cause a life-threatening withdrawal syndrome.
Narcotic analgesics—opiates (see Opium) such as morphine and heroin—are prescribed to produce analgesia. Because the relief of pain is one of the primary tasks of medical treatment, opiates have been among the most important and valuable drugs in medicine. Illegal use of narcotic analgesics involves injecting these substances, particularly heroin, into the veins to produce euphoria. Opiates are physiologically addicting and can produce a quite unpleasant withdrawal syndrome.
Stimulant-euphoriants, such as amphetamines, are prescribed by physicians to suppress the appetite and to treat children often diagnosed as hyperactive (see Hyperactivity). Although amphetamines stimulate adults, they have a paradoxically calming effect on certain children who have short attention spans and are hyperactive. Cocaine is used medically as a local anesthetic. Amphetamines and cocaine are used illegally to produce alertness and euphoria, to prevent drowsiness, and to improve performance in physical and mental tasks such as athletic events and college examinations.
Hallucinogens - psychedelic drugs such as LSD (see Lysergic Acid Diethylamide), mescaline, and PCP (see Phencyclidine)—thus far have little medical use. They are taken illegally to alter perception and thinking patterns. Marijuana is a weak hallucinogen that may be medically useful in suppressing the nausea caused by cancer treatments and possibly in reducing eye pressure in certain severe glaucomas.
Psychotropic drugs have been in use since the early 1950s. Antipsychotic drugs decrease the symptoms of schizophrenia, allowing many schizophrenic patients to leave the hospital and rejoin community life. Antidepressant drugs help the majority of patients with severe depression recover from their disorder. Lithium salts eliminate or diminish the episodes of mania and depression experienced by manic-depressive patients.
Lithium, in its gross effect, is a mood stabilizer and derived as a silvery white, chemically reactive metallic element that is the lightest in weight of all metals. In group 1 (or Ia) of the periodic table (see Periodic Law), lithium is one of the alkali metals. The atomic number of lithium is 3.
Discovery of the element is generally credited to Johann A. Arfvedson in 1817. Chemically, lithium resembles sodium in its behaviour. Lithium is obtained by the electrolysis of a mixture of fused lithium and potassium chloride. It tarnishes instantaneously and corrodes rapidly upon exposure to air; when it is stored it must be immersed in a liquid such as naphtha. Lithium ranks 35th in order of abundance of the elements in Earth’s crust. It does not occur in nature in the free state but only in compounds, which are widely distributed. The metal is used as a deoxidizer and to remove unwanted gases during the manufacture of nonferrous castings. Lithium vapour is used to prevent carbon dioxide and oxygen from forming scale in furnaces in heat-treating steel. Important compounds of lithium include the hydroxide, used for bonding carbon dioxide in the ventilator systems of spacecraft and submarines; and the hydride, used to inflate lifeboats, and its heavy hydrogen (deuterium) equivalent, used in making the hydrogen bomb. Lithium carbonate, a common mineral, is used in the treatment of bipolar disorder and some forms of depression.
Lithium melts at about 181°C (about 358°F), boils at about 1342°C (about 2448°F), and has a specific gravity of 0.53. The atomic weight of lithium
Hysteria may arise in the types of mental illness, in which emotionally laden mental conflicts appear as physical symptoms, called conversion reactions, or as severe mental dissociation. In modern psychological classification, hysteria is known as somatization disorder or conversion disorder, depending on the specific symptoms displayed. Psychiatric diagnosis of hysteria depends on recognition of a mental conflict and of the unconscious connections between conflict and symptoms. The term mass hysteria is applied to situations in which a large group of people exhibit the same kinds of physical symptoms with no organic cause. For example, one incident of mass hysteria reported in 1977 involved 57 members of a high school marching band who experienced headache, nausea, dizziness, and fainting after a football game. After a fruitless search for organic causes, researchers concluded that a heat reaction among a few band members had spread by emotional suggestion to other members of the band. The term collective stress reaction is now preferred for these situations.
French neurologist Jean Martin Charcot shows colleagues a female patient with hysteria at La Salpêtrière, a Paris hospital. Charcot gained renown throughout Europe for his method of treating hysteria and other ‘nervous disorders’ through hypnosis. Charcot’s belief that hysteria had psychological rather than physical origins influenced Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud, who studied under Charcot.
Under the stress of mental conflict, anyone may react temporarily with physical symptoms. In conversion reactions, mental conflicts are unconsciously converted to symptoms that appear to be physical, but no organic cause is found. Common symptoms of conversion reactions include muscular paralysis, blindness, deafness, and tremors.
Patients with conversion reactions may have periods of intense emotion and defective power of self-observation. In such a mental condition, patients may interact with others in a bizarre way. Extreme symptoms of dissociation are shown in disassociative fugue, in which a person forgets his or her identity and unexpectedly wanders away from home.
The ancient Greeks accounted for the instability and mobility of physical symptoms and of attacks of emotional disturbance in women, when these were otherwise unaccountable, by a theory that the womb somehow became transplanted to different positions. This ‘wandering of the uterus’ theory gave the name hysteria (Greek hystera, ‘uterus’) to disease phenomena characterized by highly emotional behaviour. During the Middle Ages hysteria was attributed to demonic possession and to witchcraft, which led to persecution.
As the sciences of anatomy and physiology developed in the 19th century, a tendency to interpret all mental phenomena in terms of diseased structure of the brain became apparent in medical circles. At the end of the 19th century, however, the French neurologist Jean Martin Charcot demonstrated that morbid ideas could produce physical manifestations. Subsequently his pupil, the French psychologist Pierre Janet, formulated a description of hysteria as a psychological disorder. Later Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud began to develop the theory that hysterical symptoms are the result of conflict between the social and ethical standards of an individual and an unsuccessfully repressed wish.
Modern treatment of hysteria consists of some form of psychotherapy and, in some cases, prolonged forms of analytic psychotherapy, or of psychoanalysis. For cases of acute hysteria associated with anxiety, tranquillizing medication may also be necessary.
Somatoform disorders are characterized by the presence of physical symptoms that cannot be explained by a medical condition or another mental illness. Thus, physicians often judge that such symptoms result from psychological conflicts or distress. For example, in conversion disorder, also called hysteria, a person may experience blindness, deafness, or seizures, but a physician cannot find anything wrong with the person. People with another somatoform disorder, hypochondriasis (see Hypochondria), constantly fear that they will develop a serious disease and misinterpret minor physical symptoms as evidence of illness. The term somatoform comes from the Greek word soma, meaning ‘body.’
Franz Anton Mesmer (1734-1815) an Austrian physician is known for inducing a trancelike state, called mesmerism, as a curative agent. Mesmer was born near Konstanz, Germany, and educated at Vienna University. About 1772 he asserted the existence of a power, similar to magnetism, that exercises an extraordinary influence on the human body. This power he called animal magnetism, and in 1775 he published an account of his discovery, claiming that it had medicinal value. Mesmer successfully used his new system, which was a type of hypnotism, to cure patients. His technique received some support among members of the medical profession. In 1785 the French government was induced to appoint an investigative commission composed of physicians and scientists, but the committee's report was unfavorable to Mesmer's theory. Mesmer subsequently fell into disrepute and spent the rest of his life in obscurity. Since Mesmer's day the subject has been elevated from the domain of charlatanism to that of scientific research. The mesmeric trance is today identified as hypnosis, and its value in the management of certain medical conditions has been widely recognized.
Much of much, is that hypnosis has some unduly influence over some altered state of consciousness and heightened responsiveness to suggestion; it may be induced in normal persons by a variety of methods and has been used occasionally in medical and psychiatric treatment. Most frequently hypnosis is brought about through the actions of an operator, the hypnotist, who engages the attention of a subject and assigns certain tasks to him or her while uttering monotonous, repetitive verbal commands; such tasks may include muscle relaxation, eye fixation, and arm levitation. Hypnosis also may be self-induced, by trained relaxation, concentration on one's own breathing, or by a variety of monotonous practices and rituals that are found in many mystical, philosophical, and religious systems.
Hypnosis results in the gradual assumption by the subject of a state of consciousness in which attention is withdrawn from the outside world and is concentrated on mental, sensory, and physiological experiences. When a hypnotist induces a trance, a close relationship or rapport develops between operator and subject. The responses of subjects in the trance state, and the phenomena or behaviour they manifest objectively, are the product of their motivational set; that is, behaviour reflects what is being sought from the experience.
Most people can be easily hypnotized, but the depth of the trance varies widely. A profound trance is characterized by a forgetting of trance events and by an ability to respond automatically to posthypnotic suggestions that are not too anxiety-provoking. The depth of trance achievable is a relatively fixed characteristic, dependent on the emotional condition of the subject and on the skill of the hypnotist. Only 20 percent of subjects are capable of entering somnambulistic states through the usual methods of induction. Medically, this percentage is not significant, since therapeutic effects occur even in a light trance.
Hypnosis can produce a deeper contact with one's emotional life, resulting in some lifting of repressions and exposure of buried fears and conflicts. This effect potentially lends itself to medical and educational use, but it also lends itself to misinterpretation. Thus, the revival through hypnosis of early, forgotten memories may be fused with fantasies. Research into hypnotically induced memories in recent years has in fact stressed their uncertain reliability. For this reason a number of state court systems in the US have placed increasing constraints on the use of evidence hypnotically obtained from witnesses, although most states still permit its introduction in court.
Hypnosis has been used to treat a variety of physiological and behavioural problems. It can alleviate back pain and pain resulting from burns and cancer. It has been used by some obstetricians as the sole analgesia for normal childbirth. Hypnosis is sometimes also employed to treat physical problems with a possible psychological component, such as Raynaud's syndrome (a circulatory disease) and faecal incontinence in children. Researchers have demonstrated that the benefit of hypnosis is greater than the effect of a placebo and probably results from changing the focus of attention. Few physicians, however, include hypnosis as part of their practice.
Some behavioural difficulties, such as cigarette smoking, overeating, and insomnia, are also amenable to resolution through hypnosis. Nonetheless, most psychiatrists think that fundamental psychiatric illness is better treated with the patient in a normal state of consciousness.
The Swiss psychiatrist, who founded the analytical school of psychology, Jung broadened Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytical approach, interpreting mental and emotional disturbances as an attempt to find personal and spiritual wholeness.
Born on July 26, 1875, in Kesswil, Switzerland, the son of a Protestant clergyman, Jung developed during his lonely childhood an inclination for dreaming and fantasy that greatly influenced his adult work. After graduating in medicine in 1902 from the universities of Basel and Zürich, with a wide background in biology, zoology, paleontology, and archaeology, he began his work on word association, in which a patient's responses to stimulus words revealed what Jung called ‘complexes’—a term that has since become universal. These studies brought him international renown and led him to a close collaboration with Freud. With the publication of Psychology of the Unconscious (1912; trans. 1916), however, Jung declared his independence from Freud's narrowly sexual interpretation of the libido by showing the close parallels between ancient myths and psychotic fantasies and by explaining human motivation in terms of a larger creative energy. He gave up the presidency of the International Psychoanalytic Society and co-founded a movement called analytical psychology.
During his remaining 50 years Jung developed his theories, drawing on a wide knowledge of mythology and history; travels to diverse cultures in New Mexico, India, and Kenya; and especially the dreams and fantasies of his childhood. In 1921 he published a major work, Psychological Types (trans. 1923), in which he dealt with the relationship between the conscious and unconscious and proposed the now well-known personality types, extrovert and introvert. He later made a distinction between the personal unconscious, or the repressed feelings and thoughts developed during an individual's life, and the collective unconscious, or those inherited feelings, thoughts, and memories shared by all humanity. The collective unconscious, according to Jung, is made up of what he called ‘archetypes,’ or primordial images. These correspond to such experiences as confronting death or choosing a mate and manifest themselves symbolically in religions, myths, fairy tales, and fantasies.
Jung's therapeutic approach aimed at reconciling the diverse states of personality, which he saw divided not only into the opposites of introvert and extrovert, but also into those of sensing and intuiting, and of feeling and thinking. By understanding how the personal unconscious integrates with the collective unconscious, Jung theorized, a patient can achieve a state of individuation, or wholeness of self.
Jung wrote voluminously, especially on analytical methods and the relationships between psychotherapy and religious belief. He died on June 6, 1961, in Küsnacht.
Alfred Adler (1870-1937), an Austrian psychologist and psychiatrist, born in Vienna, and educated at Vienna University. After leaving the university he studied and was associated with Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. In 1911 Adler left the orthodox psychoanalytic school to found a neo-Freudian school of psychoanalysis. After 1926 he was a visiting professor at Columbia University, and in 1935 he and his family moved to the United States.
In his analysis of individual development, Adler stressed the sense of inferiority, rather than sexual drives, as the motivating force in human life. According to Adler, conscious or subconscious feelings of inferiority (to which he gave the name inferiority complex), combined with compensatory defence mechanisms, are the basic causes of psychopathological behaviour. The function of the psychoanalyst, furthermore, is to discover and rationalize such feelings and break down the compensatory, neurotic will for power that they engender in the patient. Adler's works include The Theory and Practice of Individual Psychology (1918) and The Pattern of Life (1930).
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), German philosopher, poet, and classical philologist, who was one of the most provocative and influential thinkers of the 19th century. Nietzsche founded his morality on what he saw as the most basic human drive, the will to power. Nietzsche criticized Christianity and other philosophers’ moral systems as ‘slave moralities’ because, in his view, they chained all members of society with universal rules of ethics. Nietzsche offered, in contrast, a ‘master morality’ that prized the creative influence of powerful individuals who transcended the common rules of society.
One of the most controversial works of 19th-century philosophy, Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883-1885) articulated German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s theory of the Übermensch, a term translated as ‘Superman’ or ‘Overman.’ The Superman was an individual who overcame what Nietzsche termed the ‘slave morality’ of traditional values, and lived according to his own morality. Nietzsche also advanced his idea that ‘God is dead,’ or that traditional morality was no longer relevant in people’s lives. In this passage, the sage Zarathustra came down from the mountain where he had spent the last ten years alone to preach to the people.
Nietzsche was born in Röcken, Prussia. His father, a Lutheran minister, died when Nietzsche was five, and Nietzsche was raised by his mother in a home that included his grandmother, two aunts, and a sister. He studied classical philology at the universities of Bonn and Leipzig and was appointed professor of classical philology at the University of Basel at the age of 24. Ill health (he was plagued throughout his life by poor eyesight and migraine headaches) forced his retirement in 1879. Ten years later he suffered a mental breakdown from which he never recovered. He died in Weimar in 1900.
In addition to the influence of Greek culture, particularly the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, Nietzsche was influenced by German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, by the theory of evolution, and by his friendship with German composer Richard Wagner.
Nietzsche’s first major work, Die Geburt der Tragedies aus dem Geiste de Musik (The Birth of Tragedy), appeared in 1872. His most prolific period as an author was the 1880s. During the decade he wrote Also sprach Zarathustra (Parts I-III, 1883-1884; Part IV, 1885; translated as Thus Spake Zarathustra); Jenseits von Gut und Böse (1886; Beyond Good and Evil); Zur Genealogie de Moral (1887; On the Genealogy of Morals); Der Antichrist (1888; The Antichrist); and Ecce Homo (completed 1888, published 1908). Nietzsche’s last major work, The Will to Power (Der Wille zur Macht), was published in 1901.
One of Nietzsche’s fundamental contentions was that traditional values (represented primarily by Christianity) had lost their power in the lives of individuals. He expressed this in his proclamation ‘God is dead.’ He was convinced that traditional values represented a ‘slave morality,’ a morality created by weak and resentful individuals who encouraged such behaviour as gentleness and kindness because the behaviour served their interests. Nietzsche claimed that new values could be created to replace the traditional ones, and his discussion of the possibility led to his concept of the overman or superman.
According to Nietzsche, the masses (whom he termed the herd or mob) conform to tradition, whereas his ideal overman is secure, independent, and highly individualistic. The overman feels deeply, but his passions are rationally controlled. Concentrating on the real world, rather than on the rewards of the next world promised by religion, the overman affirms life, including the suffering and pain that accompany human existence. Nietzsche’s overman is a creator of values, a creator of a ‘master morality’ that reflects the strength and independence of one who is liberated from all values, except those that he deems valid.
Nietzsche maintained that all human behaviour is motivated by the will to power. In its positive sense, the will to power is not simply power over others, but the power over oneself that is necessary for creativity. Such power is manifested in the overman's independence, creativity, and originality. Although Nietzsche explicitly denied that any overmen had yet arisen, he mentions several individuals who could serve as models. Among these models he lists Jesus, Greek philosopher Socrates, Florentine thinker Leonardo da Vinci, Italian artist Michelangelo, English playwright William Shakespeare, German author Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Roman ruler Julius Caesar, and French emperor Napoleon I.
The concept of the overman has often been interpreted as one that postulates a master-slave society and has been identified with totalitarian philosophies. Many scholars deny the connection and attribute it to misinterpretation of Nietzsche's work.
An acclaimed poet, Nietzsche exerted much influence on German literature, as well as on French literature and theology. His concepts have been discussed and elaborated upon by such individuals as German philosophers Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger, and German Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, German American theologian Paul Tillich, and French writers Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre. After World War II (1939-1945), American theologians Thomas J.J. Altizer and Paul Van Buren seized upon Nietzsche's proclamation ‘God is dead’ in their attempt to make Christianity relevant to its believers in the 1960s and 1970s.
Those aforementioned all at some time were imparting of knowledge or power as they were affiliated with Sigmund Freud, who was born in Freiberg (now Pųķbor, Czech Republic), on May 6, 1856, and educated at Vienna University. When he was three years old his family, fleeing from the anti-Semitic riots then raging in Freiberg, moved to Leipzig. Shortly thereafter, the family settled in Vienna, where Freud remained for most of his life.
Although Freud’s ambition from childhood had been a career in law, he decided to become a medical student shortly before he entered Vienna University in 1873. Inspired by the scientific investigations of the German poet Goethe, Freud was driven by an intense desire to study natural science and to solve some of the challenging problems confronting contemporary scientists.
In his third year at the university Freud began research work on the central nervous system in the physiological laboratory under the direction of the German physician Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke. Neurological research was so engrossing that Freud neglected the prescribed courses and as a result remained in medical school three years longer than was required normally to qualify as a physician. In 1881, after completing a year of compulsory military service, he received his medical degree. Unwilling to give up his experimental work, however, he remained at the university as a demonstrator in the physiological laboratory. In 1883, at Brücke’s urging, he reluctantly abandoned theoretical research to gain practical experience.
Freud spent three years at the General Hospital of Vienna, devoting himself successively to psychiatry, dermatology, and nervous diseases. In 1885, following his appointment as a lecturer in neuropathology at Vienna University, he left his post at the hospital. Later the same year he was awarded a government grant enabling him to spend 19 weeks in Paris as a student of the French neurologist Jean Charcot. Charcot, who was the director of the clinic at the mental hospital, the Salpêtrière, was then treating nervous disorders by the use of hypnotic suggestion. Freud’s studies under Charcot, which entered largely on hysteria, influenced him greatly in channeling his interests to psychopathology.
In 1886 Freud established a private practice in Vienna specializing in nervous disease. He met with violent opposition from the Viennese medical profession because of his strong support of Charcot’s unorthodox views on hysteria and hypnotherapy. The resentment he incurred was to delay any acceptance of his subsequent findings on the origin of neurosis.
In 1909 pioneers of the growing psychoanalytic movement assembled at Clark University to hear lectures by Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. The group included, top row, left to right, A.A. Brill, Ernest Jones, Sandor Ferenczi, and bottom row, Freud, Clark University President C. Stanley Hall, and Swiss psychiatrist Carl G. Jung. The visit, the only one Freud made to the United States, broadened the influence and popularity of psychoanalysis.
Freud’s first published work, On Aphasia, appeared in 1891; it was a study of the neurological disorder in which the ability to pronounce words or to name common objects is lost as a result of organic brain disease. His final work in neurology, an article, ‘Infantile Cerebral Paralysis,’ was written in 1897 for an Encyclopédie only at the insistence of the editor, since by this time Freud was occupied largely with psychological rather than physiological explanations for mental illnesses. His subsequent writings were devoted entirely to that field, which he had named psychoanalysis in 1896.
Freud’s new orientation was heralded by his collaborative work on hysteria with the Viennese physician Josef Breuer. The work was presented in 1893 in a preliminary paper and two years later in an expanded form under the title Studies on Hysteria. In this work the symptoms of hysteria were ascribed to manifestations of undischarged emotional energy associated with forgotten psychic traumas. The therapeutic procedure involved the use of a hypnotic state in which the patient was led to recall and reenact the traumatic experience, thus discharging by catharsis the emotions causing the symptoms. The publication of this work marked the beginning of psychoanalytic theory formulated on the basis of clinical observations.
During the period from 1895 to 1900 Freud developed many of the concepts that were later incorporated into psychoanalytic practice and doctrine. Soon after publishing the studies on hysteria he abandoned the use of hypnosis as a cathartic procedure and substituted the investigation of the patient’s spontaneous flow of thoughts, called free association, to reveal the unconscious mental processes at the root of the neurotic disturbance.
In his clinical observations Freud found evidence for the mental mechanisms of repression and resistance. He described repression as a device operating unconsciously to make the memory of painful or threatening events inaccessible to the conscious mind. Resistance is defined as the unconscious defence against awareness of repressed experiences in order to avoid the resulting anxiety. He traced the operation of unconscious processes, using the free associations of the patient to guide him in the interpretation of dreams and slips of speech. Dream analysis led to his discoveries of infantile sexuality and of the so-called Oedipus complex, which constitutes the erotic attachment of the child for the parent of the opposite sex, together with hostile feelings toward the other parent. In these years he also developed the theory of transference, the process by which emotional attitudes, established originally toward parental figures in childhood, are transferred in later life to others. The end of this period was marked by the appearance of Freud’s most important work, The Interpretation of Dreams (1899). Here Freud analysed many of his own dreams recorded in the 3-year period of his self-analysis, begun in 1897. This work expounds all the fundamental concepts underlying psychoanalytic technique and doctrine.
In 1902 Freud was appointed a full professor at Vienna University. This honour was granted not in recognition of his contributions but as a result of the efforts of a highly influential patient. The medical world still regarded his work with hostility, and his next writings, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1904) and Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory (1905), only increased this antagonism. As a result Freud continued to work virtually alone in what he termed ‘splendid isolation.’
By 1906, however, a small number of pupils and followers had gathered around Freud, including the Austrian psychiatrists William Stekel and Alfred Adler, the Austrian psychologist Otto Rank, the American psychiatrist Abraham Brill, and the Swiss psychiatrists Eugen Bleuler and Carl Jung. Other notable associates, who joined the circle in 1908, were the Hungarian psychiatrist Sándor Ferenczi and the British psychiatrist Ernest Jones.
Austrian doctor Sigmund Freud spent many hours refining his theories in this study of his home in Vienna, Austria. Freud pioneered the use of clinical observation to treat mental disease. The publication of The Interpretation of Dreams in 1899 detailed his technique of isolating the source of psychological problems by examining a patient’s spontaneous stream of thought.
Increasing recognition of the psychoanalytic movement made possible the formation in 1910 of a worldwide organization called the International Psychoanalytic Association. As the movement spread, gaining new adherents through Europe and the US, Freud was troubled by the dissension that arose among members of his original circle. Most disturbing were the defections from the group of Adler and Jung, each of whom developed a different theoretical basis for disagreement with Freud’s emphasis on the sexual origin of neurosis. Freud met these setbacks by developing further his basic concepts and by elaborating his own views in many publications and lectures.
After the onset of World War I Freud devoted little time to clinical observation and concentrated on the application of his theories to the interpretation of religion, mythology, art, and literature. In 1923 he was stricken with cancer of the jaw, which necessitated constant, painful treatment in addition to many surgical operations. Despite his physical suffering he continued his literary activity for the next 16 years, writing mostly on cultural and philosophical problems.
When the Germans occupied Austria in 1938, Freud, a Jew, was persuaded by friends to escape with his family to England. He died in London on September 23, 1939.
Freud created an entirely new approach to the understanding of human personality by his demonstration of the existence and force of the unconscious. In addition, he founded a new medical discipline and formulated basic therapeutic procedures that in modified form are applied widely in the present-day treatment of neuroses and psychoses. Although never accorded full recognition during his lifetime, Freud is generally acknowledged as one of the great creative minds of modern times.
Among his other works are Totem and Taboo (1913), Ego and the Id (1923), New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933), and Moses and Monotheism (1939).
Nonetheless, what is spoken between philosophies one might come to realize of Existentialism, for which is accredited as a philosophical movement or tendency, emphasizing individual existence, freedom, and choice, that influenced many diverse writers in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Because of the diversity of positions associated with existentialism, the term is impossible to define precisely. Certain themes common to virtually all existentialist writers can, however, be identified. The term itself suggests one major theme: the stress on concrete individual existence and, consequently, on subjectivity, individual freedom, and choice.
Most philosophers since Plato have held that the highest ethical good is the same for everyone; insofar as one approaches moral perfection, one resembles other morally perfect individuals. The 19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, who was the first writer to call himself existential, reacted against this tradition by insisting that the highest good for the individual is to find his or her own unique vocation. As he wrote in his journal, ‘I must find a truth that is true for me . . . the idea for which I can live or die.’ Other existentialist writers have echoed Kierkegaard's belief that one must choose one's own way without the aid of universal, objective standards. Against the traditional view that moral choice involves an objective judgment of right and wrong, existentialists have argued that no objective, rational basis can be found for moral decisions. The 19th-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche further contended that the individual must decide which situations are to count as moral situations.
All existentialists have followed Kierkegaard in stressing the importance of passionate individual action in deciding questions of both morality and truth. They have insisted, accordingly, that personal experience and acting on one's own convictions are essential in arriving at the truth. Thus, the understanding of a situation by someone involved in that situation is superior to that of a detached, objective observer. This emphasis on the perspective of the individual agent has also made existentialists suspicious of systematic reasoning. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and other existentialist writers have been deliberately unsystematic in the exposition of their philosophies, preferring to express themselves in aphorisms, dialogues, parables, and other literary forms. Despite their antirationalist position, however, most existentialists cannot be said to be irrationalists in the sense of denying all validity to rational thought. They have held that rational clarity is desirable wherever possible, but that the most important questions in life are not accessible to reason or science. Furthermore, they have argued that even science is not as rational as is commonly supposed. Nietzsche, for instance, asserted that the scientific assumption of an orderly universe is for the most part a useful fiction.
Perhaps the most prominent theme in existentialist writing is that of choice. Humanity's primary distinction, in the view of most existentialists, is the freedom to choose. Existentialists have held that human beings do not have a fixed nature, or essence, as other animals and plants do; each human being makes choices that create his or her own nature. In the formulation of the 20th-century French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, existence precedes essence. Choice is therefore central to human existence, and it is inescapable; even the refusal to choose is a choice. Freedom of choice entails commitment and responsibility. Because individuals are free to choose their own path, existentialists have argued, they must accept the risk and responsibility of following their commitment wherever it leads.
Kierkegaard held that it is spiritually crucial to recognize that one experiences not only a fear of specific objects but also a feeling of general apprehension, which he called dread. He interpreted it as God's way of calling each individual to make a commitment to a personally valid way of life. The word anxiety (German Angst) has a similarly crucial role in the work of the 20th-century German philosopher Martin Heidegger; anxiety leads to the individual's confrontation with nothingness and with the impossibility of finding ultimate justification for the choices he or she must make. In the philosophy of Sartre, the word nausea is used for the individual's recognition of the pure contingency of the universe, and the word anguish is used for the recognition of the total freedom of choice that confronts the individual at every moment.
Existentialism as a distinct philosophical and literary movement belongs to the 19th and 20th centuries, but elements of existentialism can be found in the thought (and life) of Socrates, in the Bible, and in the work of many premodern philosophers and writers.
The first to anticipate the major concerns of modern existentialism was the 17th-century French philosopher Blaise Pascal. Pascal rejected the rigorous rationalism of his contemporary René Descartes, asserting, in his Pensées (1670), that a systematic philosophy that presumes to explain God and humanity is a form of pride. Like later existentialist writers, he saw human life in terms of paradoxes: The human self, which combines mind and body, is itself a paradox and contradiction.
Nineteenth-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard played a major role in the development of existentialist thought. Kierkegaard criticized the popular systematic method of rational philosophy advocated by German Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He emphasized the absurdity inherent in human life and questioned how any systematic philosophy could apply to the ambiguous human condition. In Kierkegaard’s deliberately unsystematic works, he explained that each individual should attempt an intense examination of his or her own existence.
Kierkegaard, generally regarded as the founder of modern existentialism, reacted against the systematic absolute idealism of the 19th-century German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who claimed to have worked out a total rational understanding of humanity and history. Kierkegaard, on the contrary, stressed the ambiguity and absurdity of the human situation. The individual's response to this situation must be to live a totally committed life, and this commitment can only be understood by the individual who has made it. The individual therefore must always be prepared to defy the norms of society for the sake of the higher authority of a personally valid way of life. Kierkegaard ultimately advocated a ‘leap of faith’ into a Christian way of life, which, although incomprehensible and full of risk, was the only commitment he believed could save the individual from despair.
Danish religious philosopher Søren Kierkegaard rejected the all-encompassing, analytical philosophical systems of such 19th-century thinkers as German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel. Instead, Kierkegaard focussed on the choices the individual must make in all aspects of his or her life, especially the choice to maintain religious faith. In Fear and Trembling (1846; trans. 1941), Kierkegaard explored the concept of faith through an examination of the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac, in which God demanded that Abraham demonstrate his faith by sacrificing his son.
One of the most controversial works of 19th-century philosophy, Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883-1885) articulated German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s theory of the Übermensch, a term translated as ‘Superman’ or ‘Overman.’ The Superman was an individual who overcame what Nietzsche termed the ‘slave morality’ of traditional values, and lived according to his own morality. Nietzsche also advanced his idea that ‘God is dead,’ or that traditional morality was no longer relevant in people’s lives. In this passage, the sage Zarathustra came down from the mountain where he had spent the last ten years alone to preach to the people.
Nietzsche, who was not acquainted with the work of Kierkegaard, influenced subsequent existentialist thought through his criticism of traditional metaphysical and moral assumptions and through his espousal of tragic pessimism and the life-affirming individual will that opposes itself to the moral conformity of the majority. In contrast to Kierkegaard, whose attack on conventional morality led him to advocate a radically individualistic Christianity, Nietzsche proclaimed the ‘death of God’ and went on to reject the entire Judeo-Christian moral tradition in favour of a heroic pagan ideal.
The modern philosophy movements of phenomenology and existentialism have been greatly influenced by the thought of German philosopher Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, humankind has fallen into a crisis by taking a narrow, technological approach to the world and by ignoring the larger question of existence. People, if they wish to live authentically, must broaden their perspectives. Instead of taking their existence for granted, people should view themselves as part of Being (Heidegger's term for that which underlies all existence).
Heidegger, like Pascal and Kierkegaard, reacted against an attempt to put philosophy on a conclusive rationalistic basis—in this case the phenomenology of the 20th-century German philosopher Edmund Husserl. Heidegger argued that humanity finds itself in an incomprehensible, indifferent world. Human beings can never hope to understand why they are here; instead, each individual must choose a goal and follow it with passionate conviction, aware of the certainty of death and the ultimate meaninglessness of one's life. Heidegger contributed to existentialist thought an original emphasis on being and ontology as well as on language.
Twentieth-century French intellectual Jean-Paul Sartre helped to develop existential philosophy through his writings, novels, and plays. Much of Sartre’s work focuses on the dilemma of choice faced by free individuals and on the challenge of creating meaning by acting responsibly in an indifferent world. In stating that ‘man is condemned to be free,’ Sartre reminds us of the responsibility that accompanies human decisions.
Sartre first gave the term existentialism general currency by using it for his own philosophy and by becoming the leading figure of a distinct movement in France that became internationally influential after World War II. Sartre's philosophy is explicitly atheistic and pessimistic; he declared that human beings require a rational basis for their lives but are unable to achieve one, and thus human life is a ‘futile passion.’ Sartre nevertheless insisted that his existentialism is a form of humanism, and he strongly emphasized human freedom, choice, and responsibility. He eventually tried to reconcile these existentialist concepts with a Marxist analysis of society and history.
Although existentialist thought encompasses the uncompromising atheism of Nietzsche and Sartre and the agnosticism of Heidegger, its origin in the intensely religious philosophies of Pascal and Kierkegaard foreshadowed its profound influence on 20th-century theology. The 20th-century German philosopher Karl Jaspers, although he rejected explicit religious doctrines, influenced contemporary theology through his preoccupation with transcendence and the limits of human experience. The German Protestant theologians Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann, the French Roman Catholic theologian Gabriel Marcel, the Russian Orthodox philosopher Nikolay Berdyayev, and the German Jewish philosopher Martin Buber inherited many of Kierkegaard's concerns, especially that a personal sense of authenticity and commitment is essential to religious faith.
Renowned as one of the most important writers in world history, 19th-century Russian author Fyodor Dostoyevsky wrote psychologically intense novels that probed the motivations and moral justifications for his characters’ actions. Dostoyevsky commonly addressed themes such as the struggle between good and evil within the human soul and the idea of salvation through suffering. The Brothers Karamazov (1879-1880), generally considered Dostoyevsky’s best work, interlaces religious exploration with the story of a family’s violent quarrels over a woman and a disputed in her
Twentieth-century writer and philosopher Albert Camus examined what he considered the tragic inability of human beings to understand and transcend their intolerable conditions. In his work Camus presented an absurd and seemingly unreasonable world in which some people futilely struggle to find meaning and rationality while others simply refuse to care. For example, the main character of The Stranger (1942) kills a man on a beach for no reason and accepts his arrest and punishment with dispassion. In contrast, in The Plague (1947), Camus introduces characters who act with courage in the face of absurdity.
A number of existentialist philosophers used literary forms to convey their thought, and existentialism has been as vital and as extensive a movement in literature as in philosophy. The 19th-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky is probably the greatest existentialist literary figure. In Notes from the Underground (1864), the alienated antihero rages against the optimistic assumptions of rationalist humanism. The view of human nature that emerges in this and other novels of Dostoyevsky is that it is unpredictable and perversely self-destructive; only Christian love can save humanity from itself, but such love cannot be understood philosophically. As the character Alyosha says in The Brothers Karamazov (1879-80), ‘We must love life more than the meaning of it.’
The opening lines of Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Notes from Underground (1864)—‘I am a sick man.… I am a spiteful man’—are among the most famous in 19th-century literature. Published five years after his release from prison and involuntary military service in Siberia, Notes from Underground is a sign of Dostoyevsky’s rejection of the radical social thinking he had embraced in his youth. The unnamed narrator is antagonistic in tone, questioning the reader’s sense of morality as well as the foundations of rational thinking. In this excerpt from the beginning of the novel, the narrator describes himself, derisively referring to himself as an ‘overly conscious’ intellectual.
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In the 20th century, the novels of the Austrian Jewish writer Franz Kafka, such as The Trial (1925; trans. 1937) and The Castle (1926; trans. 1930), present isolated men confronting vast, elusive, menacing bureaucracies; Kafka's themes of anxiety, guilt, and solitude reflect the influence of Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, and Nietzsche. The influence of Nietzsche is also discernible in the novels of the French writers André Malraux and in the plays of Sartre. The work of the French writer Albert Camus is usually associated with existentialism because of the prominence in it of such themes as the apparent absurdity and futility of life, the indifference of the universe, and the necessity of engagement in a just cause. Existentialist themes are also reflected in the theatre of the absurd, notably in the plays of Samuel Beckett and Eugène Ionesco. In the United States, the influence of existentialism on literature has been more indirect and diffuse, but traces of Kierkegaard's thought can be found in the novels of Walker Percy and John Updike, and various existentialist themes are apparent in the work of such diverse writers as Norman Mailer, John Barth, and Arthur Miller.
In the treatise Being and Nothingness, French writer Jean-Paul Sartre presents his existential philosophical framework. He reasons that the essential nothingness of human existence leaves individuals to take sole responsibility for their own actions. Shunning the morality and constraints of society, individuals must embrace personal responsibility to craft a world for themselves. Along with focussing on the importance of exercising individual responsibility, Sartre stresses that the understanding of freedom of choice is the only means of authenticating human existence. A novelist and playwright as well as a philosopher, Sartre will become a leader of the modern existentialist movement.
The more we are understood, and concede to holism as an inescapable condition of our physical existence, according to theory, each individual of the system in a certain sense, at any-one time, exists simultaneously in every part of the space occupied by the system. Its physical reality must be described as to continuous functions in space. The material point, therefore, can hardly be anticipated any more than the basic concept of theory
A human being is part of the whole, and he experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separate from the rest - a kind of optical illusion of his consciousness. This delusion is kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty. Nobody could achieve this completely, but the striving for such achievement is in itself a part of the liberation and a foundation for inner security.
The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it seems pointless, just as life is merely a disease of matter, and, so, I think, any attempts to preserve this view not only require metaphysical leaps that result in unacceptable levels of ambiguity. They also fail to meet the requirement that testability is necessary to confirm the validity of all theoretical undertakings.
From its start, the languages of biblical literature were equally valid sources of communion with the eternal and immutable truths exiting in the mind of God, yet the extant documents alone were consisted with more than a million words in his own hand, and some of his speculations seem quite bizarre by contemporary standards, least of mention, they deem of a sacred union with which on the appearance of an unexamined article of faith, expanding our worship upon some altar of an unknown god.
Our inherent consciousness, as the corpses of times generations were to evolve, having distributively confirmed a striking unity, as unified consciousness can take more than one form, it is, nonetheless that when we are consciously aware that we are capably communicable of a conscious content, in a dialectic awareness of several conscious states that seem alternatively assembled.
As no assumption can be taken for granted, and no thoughtful conclusion should be lightly dismissed as fallacious in studying the phenomenon of consciousness. Nonetheless, in which of exercising intellectual humanity and caution we must try to move ahead to reach some positive conclusion upon its topic.
Our consciousness shows us of a striking unity, as unified consciousness can take more than one form, it is, nonetheless that when we are consciously aware that we are capably communicable of a conscious content, in a dialectic awareness of several conscious states that seem alternatively assembled. Mental states have related us interconnectively as given among us. Because, I am aware not of 'A' and the separability of 'B' and independence of 'C', but am dialectically aware of 'A-and-B-and-C', simultaneously, or better, as all parts of the content of a single conscious state. Since from the time of Kant, persuading with reason that sets itself the good use the faculty arising to engage the attaining knowledge to be considered the name designated as this phenomenon imposes and responds to definite qualities as the ‘unity of consciousness’.
Historically, the notion of the unity of consciousness has played a very large role in thought about the mind. Of this point in fact, it figured centrally in most influential arguments about the mind from the time of Descartes to the 20th century. In the early part of the 20th century, the notion largely disappeared for a time. Analytic philosophers began to pay attention to it again only in the 1960s. We unstretchingly distribute some arranging affirmation that this history subsisted up til the nineteen-hundreds. At that point, we should delineate the unity of consciousness more carefully and examine some evidence from neuropsychology because both are necessary to understand the recent work on the issue.
Descartes would assert that if the partialities existent to the parts have not constructed the constituents parts that decide of its partiality, it cannot contain matter, presumably because, as he saw it, anything material has parts. He then goes on to say that this would be enough to prove dualism by itself, had he not already proved it elsewhere. Recognizing where it is that I cannot distinguish any parts, as accumulatively collected through Unified consciousness is that, it may, have converged of itself.
Directly of another, moderately compound argument based on unified consciousness. The conclusion will be that any system of components could never achieve unified consciousness acting in concert. William James' well-known version of the argument starts as follows: Take a sentence of a dozen words, take twelve men, and to each word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will, no where will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence.
James generalizes this observation to all conscious states. To get dualism out of this, we need to add the premise, that if whatever makes up the pursuing situations that mind is considered the supreme reality and have the ultimate means. Tenably to assert the creation from a speculative assumption that bestows to its beginning that makes inherent descendabilities the value of existence for embracing the mind of matter. A variable takes the corresponding definitive criteria of possibilities in value accorded with reality, and would have distributed the relational states that consciousness expresses over some group of components in some relevant way. Still, this thought experiment is meant to show that they cannot so distribute conscious states. Therefore, the conscious mind is not made out of matter, recounting the argument that James is attending the use of the Unity Argument. Clearly, the idea that our consciousness of, here, the parts of a sentence are unified is at the centre of the Unity Argument. Like the first, this argument goes all the way back to Descartes. Versions of it can be found in thinkers otherwise as different from one another as Leibniz, Reid, and James. The Unity Argument continued to be persuasively influential into the 20th century. That the argument was considered a powerful reason for concluding that the mind is not the body is illustrated in a backhanded way by Kant's treatment of it (as he found it in Descartes and Leibniz, not James, of course).
Kant did not think that we could explain anything about the nature of the mind, including whether or not it is made out of matter. To make the case for this view, he had to show that all existing arguments that the mind is not material do not work. He sets out to do just of something that is or should be perceived as real nor present to the senses the image so formed can confront and deal with reality by using the derivative powers of mind, as in the Critique of Pure Reason on the Paralogisms of Pure Reason (1781) (paralogisms are faulty inferences about the nature of the mind). The Unity Argument is the target of a major part of that chapter; if one is going to show that we cannot know what the mind is like, we must dispose of the Unity Argument, which purports to show that the mind is not made out of matter. Kant's argument that the Unity Argument does not support dualism is simple. He urges that the idea of unified consciousness being achieved by something that has no parts or components be no less mysterious than its being achieved by a system of components acting together. Remarkably enough, although no philosopher has ever met this challenge of Kant's and no account exists of what an immaterial mind not made out of parts might be like, philosophers continued to rely on the Unity Argument until well into the 20th century. It may be a bit difficult for us to capture this now but the idea that unified consciousness could not be realized by any system of components, and for an even stronger reason any system of material components, had a strong intuitive appeal for a long time.
Again, the historical notion in the unity of consciousness has had an interesting history in philosophy and psychology. Taking Descartes to be the first major philosopher of the modern period, the unity of consciousness was central to the study of the mind for the whole of the modern period until the 20th century. The notion figured centrally in the work of Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Reid, Kant, Brennan, James, even in most of the major precursors of contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology. It played a particularly important role in Kant's work.
A couple of examples will illustrate the role that the notion of the unity of consciousness played in this long literature. Consider a classical argument for dualism (the view that the mind is not the body, in fact, not made out of matter at all). It starts like this: When I consider the mind, which is say, myself because I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire.
Descartes, asserts that if the mind is not made up of parts, it cannot be made of matter, presumably because, as he saw it, anything material has parts. He then goes on to say that this would be enough to prove dualism by itself, had he not already proved it elsewhere. Recognizing where it is that I cannot distinguish any parts, because on account that unified consciousness has initiated upon me.
James generalizes this observation to all conscious states. To get dualism out of this, we need to add a premise: That if the mind were made out of matter, conscious states would have to be distributed over some group of components in some relevant way. Nonetheless, this thought experiment is meant to show that conscious states cannot be so distributed. Therefore, the conscious mind is not made out of matter. Calling the argument that James is using here the Unity Argument. Clearly, the idea that our consciousness of or for itself, the parts of a sentence that are unified are at the centre of the Unity Argument. Like the first, this argument goes all the way back to Descartes. Versions of it can be found in thinkers otherwise as different from one another as Leibniz, Reid, and James. The Unity Argument continued to be influential into the 20th century. That the argument was considered a powerful reason for concluding that the mind is not the body is illustrated in a backhanded way by Kant's treatment of it (as he found it in Descartes and Leibniz, not James, of course).
Kant did not think that we could explain anything about the nature of the mind, including whether or not it is made out of matter. To make the case for this view, he had to show that all existing arguments that the mind is not material do not work and he set out to do just this in the chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason on the Paralogisms of Pure Reason (1781) (paralogisms are faulty inferences about the nature of the mind). Kant's argument that the Unity Argument does not support dualism is simple. He urges that the idea of unified consciousness being achieved by something that has no parts or components be no less mysterious than its being achieved by a system of components acting together. Remarkably enough, though no philosopher has ever met this challenge of Kant's and no account exists of what an immaterial mind not made out of parts might be like, philosophers continued to rely on the Unity Argument til the 20th century. It may be a bit difficult for us to capture this now but the idea that unified consciousness could not be realized by any system of components, and for an even stronger reason any system of material components, had a strong intuitive appeal for a long time.
The notion that consciousness is unified was also central to one of Kant's own famous arguments, his ‘transcendental deduction of the categories’. In this argument, boiled down to its essentials, Kant claims that to restriction of the various objects of experience together into a single unified conscious representation of the world, something that he simply assumed that we could do, we could probably apply certain concepts to the items in question. In particular we have to apply concepts from each of four fundamental categories of concept: Quantitative, qualitative, relational, and what he called ‘modal’ concepts. Modal conceptual concern of whether an item might exist, does exist, or must exist. Thus, the four kinds of concept are concepts for how many units, what features, what relations to other objects, and what existence statuses are represented in an experience.
It was relational concept that most interested Kant and of relational concepts, he thought the concept of cause-and-effect to be by far the most important. Kant wanted to show that natural science (which for him meant primarily physics) was genuine knowledge (he thought that Hume's sceptical treatment of cause and effect relations challenged this status). He believed that if he could prove that we must tie items in our experience together causally if we are to have a unified awareness of them, he would have put physics back on ‘the secure path upon the paradigms of science’. The details of his argument have exercised philosophers for more than two hundred years. We will not go into them here, but the argument illustrates how central the notion of the unity of consciousness was in Kant's thinking about the mind and its relation to the world.
Although the unity of consciousness had been at the centre of pre-20th century research on the mind, early in the 20th century the notion almost disappeared. Logical atomism in philosophy and behaviourism in psychology were both unsympathetic to the notion. Logical atomism focussed on the atomic elements of cognition (sense data, simple propositional judgments, etc.), rather than on how these elements are tied together to form a mind. Behaviourism urged that we focus on behaviour, the mind being construed either as a myth or of something that we cannot and do not need to study in a science of the human persons. This attitude extended to consciousness, of course. The philosopher Daniel Dennett summarizes the attitude prevalent at the time this way: Consciousness was the last bastion of occult properties, epiphenomena, immeasurable subjective states - in short, the one area of mind best left to the philosophers. Let them make fools of themselves trying to corral the quicksilver of ‘phenomenology’ into a respectable theory.
Theory itself, is consistent with fact or reality, not false or incorrect, but truthful, it is sincerely felt or expressed unforeignly to the essential and exact confronting of rules and senses a governing standard, as stapled or fitted in sensing the definitive criteria of narrowedly particularized possibilities in value as taken by a variable accord with reality. To position of something, as to make it balanced, level or square, that we may think of a proper alignment as something, in so, that one is certain, like trust, another derivation of the same appears on the name is etymologically, or ‘strong seers’. Conformity of fact or actuality of a statement been or accepted as true to an original or standard set theory of which is considered the supreme reality and to have the ultimate meaning, and value of existence. Nonetheless, a compound position, such as a conjunction or negation, whose they the truth-values always determined by the truth-values of the component thesis.
Moreover, science, unswerving exactly to positions of something very well hidden, its nature in so that to make it believed, is quickly and imposes on sensing and responding to the definitive qualities or state of being actual or true, such that as a person, an entity, or an event, that might be gainfully to employ the aggregate of things as possessing actuality, existence, or essence. In other words, in that which objectively and in fact do seem as to be about reality, in fact, the satisfying factions of instinctual needs through awareness of and adjustment to environmental demands. Thus, the act of realizing or the condition of being realized is first, and utmost the resulting infraction of realizing.
Nonetheless, a declaration made to explain or justify action, or its believing desire upon which it is to act, by which the conviction underlying fact or cause, that provide logical sense for a premise or occurrence for logical, rational. According to the act/object analysis of experience, every experience with content involves an object of experience to which an act has related the subject of awareness (the event of experiencing that object). This is meant to apply not only to perceptions, which have material objects (whatever is perceived), also to experiences like hallucinations and dream experiences, which do not. Such experiences nonetheless, appear to represent something, and their objects are supposed to be whatever it is that they represent. Act/object theories may differ on the nature of objects of experience, which have been treated as properties. Meinongian objects (which may not exist or have any form of being), and, more commonly. Private mental entities with sensory qualities. (The term ‘sense-data’ is now usually applied to the later, but has also been used as a general term for objects of sense experiences). Act/object theorists may also differ on the relationship between objects of experience and objects of perception, as for representative realism, objects of perception (of which e are ‘indirectly aware’) are always distinct from objects of experience (of which we are ‘directly aware’). Meinongians, however, can simply treat objects of perception as existing objects of experience
The act/object analysis faces several problems concerning the status of objects of experience. Currently the most common view is that the question of whether two subjects are experiencing the same thing (as opposed to having exactly similar experiences) appears to have an answer only on the assumption that the experiences concerned are perceptions with material objects. Nevertheless, as to the act/object analysis the question must have an answer even when this condition is not satisfied. (The answer is always negative on the sense-datum theory. It could be positive on other versions of the act/object analysis, depending on the facts of the case.)
Reassuringly, the phenomenological argument is not, on reflection, convincing, for granting that any experience appears to present us with an object without accepting that it actually does is easy enough. The semantic argument seemingly relational structure of attributions of experience is a challenge dealt within connection with the adverbial theory. Apparent reference to quantification over objects of experience can be handled b analysing them as reference to experiences themselves tacitly typed according to content.
Analytic mental states have long since been lost in reason. Yet, the premise usually the minor premises, of an argument, use the faculty of reason that arises to engage in dialogue or deliberation. That is, of complete dialectic awareness. To determining or conclude by logical thinking out a solution to the problem, would therefore persuade or dissuade someone with reason that posits of itself with the good sense or justification of reasonability. In which, good causes are simply justifiably to be considered as to think. By which humans seek or attain knowledge or truth. Mere reason is insufficient to convince ‘us’ of its veracity. Still, intuitively there is perceptively welcomed by way of comprehension, as the truth or fact, without the use of the rational process, as one comes to assessing someone’s character, it sublimely configures one consideration, and often with resulting comprehensions, in which it is assessing situations or circumstances and draw sound conclusions into the reign of judgement.
Governing by or being according to reason or sound thinking, in that a reasonable solution to the problem, may as well, in being without bounds of common sense and arriving to some reasonable and fair use of reason, especially to form conclusions, inferences or judgements. In that, all evidential altercates of a confronting argument within the usage of thinking or thought out response to issuing the furthering argumentation to fit or join in the sum parts that are composite to the intellectual faculties, by which case human understanding or the attemptive grasp to its thought, are the resulting liberty encroaching men of zeal, well-meaningly, but without understanding.
Being or occurring in fact or actualizes as having a verifiable existence, real objects, a real illness and, . . . Really true and actual and not imaginary, alleged, or ideal, as people and not ghosts, from which are we to find on practical matters and concerns of experiencing the real world. The surrounding surfaces, might we, as, perhaps attest to this for the first time. Being no less than what they state, we have not taken its free pretence, or affections for a real experience, highly as many may encounter real trouble. This, nonetheless, projects of an existing objectivity in which the world whatever subjectivity or convention of thought or language is or have valuing representation, reckoned by actual power, in that of relating to, or being an image formed by light or another identifiable simulation, that converge in space, the stationary or fixed properties, such as a thing or whole having actual existence. All of which, are accorded a truly factual experience into which the actual attestations have brought to you by the afforded efforts of the imagination.
In a similar fashion, is that, to certain ‘principles of the imagination’ are what explains our beliefs in a world of enduring objects. Experience alone cannot produce that belief, everything we directly perceive in ‘momentary and fleeting’. Whatever our experience is like, no reasoning could be assured of the existence of something independent of our impressions which continues too careful’ and exist when they cease. The series of our constant ly changing sense impressions present us with observable features which Hume calls ‘constancy’ and ‘coherence’, and these naturally operate on the mind in such way as eventually to produce ‘the opinion of a continued and distinct existence’. The explanation is complicated, but it is meant to appeal only to psychological mechanisms which can be discovered by ‘careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from [the mindis] different circumstance’s and situation’.
It is to believe, that not only in bodies, but also in persons, or selves, which continue to exist through time. This belief too can be explained only by the operation of certain ‘principles of the imagination’. We never directly perceive anything we can call ourselves: The most we can be aware of in ourselves are our constantly changing, momentary perceptions, not the mind or self which has them. For Hume, nothing really binds the different perceptions together, we are led into the ‘fiction’ that they for a unity only because of the way in which the thoughts of such series of perceptions work upon our minds. ‘The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance: . . . .There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propensity we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitutes the mind’.
Hume is often described as a sceptic in epistemology, largely because of his rejection of the role of reason, as traditionally understood, in the genesis of our fundamental beliefs. That rejection, although allied to the scepticism of antiquity, is only one part of an otherwise positive general theory of human nature which would explain how and why we think and believe and do all the things we do.
Nevertheless, the Kantian epistemological distinction between as thing as it is in itself, and that thing as appearance, or as it is for us. For Kant the thing in itself is the thing as it is intrinsically, that is, the character of the thing as pat from any relation that it happens to stand. The thing for us, or as an appearance, on the one hand, is the thing insofar as it stands in relation to our cognitive faculties and other objects. ‘Now a thing in itself cannot be known through mere relations: And we may therefor conclude that since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, that this sense of containing representation, keeps the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner properties the object in itself’. Kant applies this distinction to the subject’s cognition of itself. Since the subject can know itself only insofar as it can intuit itself, and it can intuit itself only with temporal relations, and thus as it is related to its own self, it represents itself ‘as it appears to itself, not as it is’. Thus, the distinction between what the subject is in itself and what it is for itself arises in Kant insofar as the distinction between what is applied and the subject’s own knowledge of itself.
Hegel begins the transition of the epistemological distinction between what the subject is in itself and what it is for itself into an ontological distinction. Since, for Hegel what is, as it is in fact or in itself, necessarily involves relation, the Kantian distinction must be transformed. Taking his cue from the fact, even for Kant, what the subject is in fact or in itself involve a relation to itself, or self-consciousness. Hegel suggests that the cognition of an entity as for such relations or self- relations do not preclude knowledge of the thing itself. Rather, what an entity intrinsically, or in itself, is best understood for the potentiality of that thing to enter specific explicit relations with itself. Just as for consciousness to be explicitly itself is for it to be for itself by being in relation to itself (i.e., to be explicitly self-conscious), the for-itself of any entity is that entity insofar as it is actually related to itself. The distinction between the entity in itself and the entity for itself may thus take to apply to every entity, and no only to the subject. For example, the seed of a plant is that plant in itself or implicitly, while the mature plant that involves actual relations among the plant’s various organs is the plant ‘for itself’. In Hegel, then, the in itself/for itself distinction becomes universalized, in that it is applied to all entities, and not merely to conscious entities. In addition, the distinction takes on an ontological dimension. While the seed and the mature plant are the same entities, the being in itself of the plant, or the plant as potential adult, is ontologically distinct from the being for itself of the plant, or the actual existing mature organism. At which turn, the distinction retains an epistemological dimension in Hegel, although it import is quite different from that of the Kantian distinction. To know a thing it is necessary to know both the actual, explicit self-relations that are the thing (for being in itself of the thing) and the inherent simple principle of these relations, or the being in itself of the thing, real knowledge, for Hegel, thus consists in a knowledge of the thing as it is in and for itself.
Sartre’s distinction between being in itself and being for itself, which is an entirely ontological distinction with minimal epistemological import, is descended from the Hegelian distinction. Sartre distinguishes between what it is for consciousness to be, i.e., being for itself, and the being of the transcendent being intended by consciousness, i.e., being in itself. Being in itself is marked by the total absence of relation, either with itself or with another. On the other hand, what it is for consciousness to be, being for it self, is marked by self-relation. Sartre posits a ‘pre-reflective Cogito’, such that every consciousness of ‘x’ necessarily involves a ‘non-positional’ consciousness of the consciousness of ‘x’. While in Kant every subject is both in itself, i.e., as it is apart from its relations, and for itself insofar as it is related to itself by appearing to itself, and in Hegel every entity can be considered as both in itself and for itself, in Sartre, to be self related for itself is the distinctive oncological mark of consciousness, while to lack relations or to be in itself is the distinctive ontological mark of non-conscious entities.
Ideally, in theory imagination, a concept of reason that is transcendent but nonempirical as to think os conception of and ideal thought, that potentially or actual exists in the mind as a product exclusive to the mental act. In the philosophy of Plato, an archetype of which a corresponding being in phenomenal reality is an imperfect replica, that also, Hegel’s absolute truth, as the conception and ultimate product of reason (the absolute meaning a mental image of something remembered).
Conceivably, in the imagination the formation of a mental image of something that is or should be perceived as real nor present to the senses. Nevertheless, the image so formed can confront and deal with the reality by using the creative powers of the mind. That is characteristically well removed from reality, but all powers of fantasy over reason are a degree of insanity/still, fancy as they have given a product of the imagination free reins, that is in command of the fantasy while it is exactly the mark of the neurotic that his very own fantasy possesses him.
The totality of all things possessing actuality, existence or essence that exists objectively and in fact based on real occurrences that exist or known to have existed, a real occurrence, an event, i.e., had to prove the facts of the case, as something believed to be true or real, determining by evidence or truth as to do. However, the usage in the sense ‘allegation of fact’, and the reasoning are wrong of the ‘facts’ and ‘substantive facts’, as we may never know the ‘facts’ of the case’. These usages may occasion qualms’ among critics who insist that facts can only be true, but the usages are often useful for emphasis. Therefore, we have related to, or used the discovery or determinations of fast or accurate information in the discovery of facts, then evidence has determined the comprising events or truth is much as ado about their owing actuality. Its opposition forming the literature that treats real people or events as if they were fictional or uses real people or events as essential elements in an otherwise fictional rendition, i.e., of, relating to, produced by, or characterized by internal dissension, as given to or promoting internal dissension. So, then, it is produced artificially than by a natural process, especially the lacking authenticity or genuine factitious values of another than what is or should be.
Essentially, a set of statements or principles devised to explain a group of facts or phenomena, especially one that has been repeatedly tested or is widely accepted and can be used to make predictions about natural phenomena. Having the consistency of explanatory statements, accepted principles, and methods of analysis, finds to a set of theorems that form a systematic view of a branch in mathematics or extends upon the paradigms of science, the belief or principal that guides action or assists comprehension or judgements, usually by an ascription based on limited information or knowledge, as a conjecture, tenably to assert the creation from a speculative assumption that bestows to its beginning. Theoretically, of, relating to, or based on conjecture, its philosophy is such to accord, i.e., the restriction to theory, not practical theoretical physics, as given to speculative theorizing. Also, the given idea, because of which formidable combinations awaiting upon the inception of an idea, demonstrated as true or is assumed to be shown. In mathematics its containment lies of the proposition that has been or is to be proved from explicit assumption and is primarily with theoretical assessments or hypothetical theorizing than practical considerations the measures its quality value.
Looking back a century, one can see a striking degree of homogeneity among the philosophers of the early twentieth century about the topics central to their concerns. More inertly taken to place, is the apparent obscurity and abstruseness of the concerns, which seem at first glance to be removed from the great debates of previous centuries, between ‘realism’ and ‘idealist’, say, of ‘rationalists’ and ‘empiricist’.
Thus, no matter what the current debate or discussion, the central issue is often without conceptual and contentual representations, that if one is without concept, is without idea, such that in one foul swoop would ingest the mere truth that lies to the underlying paradoxes of why is there something instead of nothing? Whatever it is that makes, what would otherwise be mere utterances and inscriptions into instruments of communication and understanding. This philosophical problem is to demystify this overblowing emptiness, and to relate to what we know of ourselves and the world.
Contributions to this study include the theory of ‘speech arts’, and the investigation of communicable communications, especially the relationship between words and ideas, and words and the world. It is, nonetheless, that which and utterance or sentence expresses, the proposition or claim made about the world. By extension, the content of a predicate that any expression that is capable of connecting with one or more singular terms to make a sentence, the expressed condition that the entities referred to may satisfy, in which case the resulting sentence will be true. Consequently we may think of a predicate as a function from things to sentences or even to truth-values, or other sub-sentential components that contribute to sentences that contain it. The nature of content is the central concern of the philosophy of language.
What some person expresses of a sentence often depends on the environment in which he or she is placed. For example, the disease that may be referred to by a term like ‘arthritis’ or the kind of tree referred as a criterial definition of an ‘oak’, of which, horticulturally I know next to nothing. This raises the possibility of imaging two persons in comparatively different environments, but in which everything appears the same to each of them. The wide content of their thoughts and saying will be different if the situation surrounding them is appropriately different, ‘situation’ may here include the actual objects they perceive, or the chemical or physical kinds of objects in the world they inhabit, or the history of their words, or the decisions of authorities on what counts as an example of some terms thy use. The narrow content is that part of their thought that remains identical, through the identity of the way things appear, no matter these differences of surroundings. Partisans of wide . . . ‘as, something called broadly, content may doubt whether any content is in this sense narrow, partisans of narrow content believe that it is the fundamental notion, with wide content being of narrow content plus context.
All and all, assuming their rationality has characterized people is common, and the most evident display of our rationality is capable to think. This is the rehearsal in the mind of what to say, or what to do. Not all thinking is verbal, since chess players, composers, and painters all think, and there is no deductive reason that their deliberations should take any more verbal a form than their actions. It is permanently tempting to conceive of this activity as for the presence in the mind of elements of some language, or other medium that represents aspects of the world and its surrounding surface structures. Nevertheless, they have attacked the model, notably by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), whose influential application of these ideas was in the philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein explores the role that report of introspection, or sensations, or intentions, or beliefs actually play our social lives, to undermine the Cartesian picture that functionally describes the goings-on in an inner theatre of which the subject is the lone spectator. Passages that have subsequentially become known as the ‘rule following’ considerations and the ‘private language argument’ are among the fundamental topics of modern philosophy of language and mind, although their precise interpretation is endlessly controversial.
Effectively, the hypotheses especially associated with Jerry Fodor (1935-), whom is known for the ‘resolute realism’, about the nature of mental functioning, that occurs in a language different from one’s ordinary native language, but underlying and explaining our competence with it. The idea is a development of the notion of an innate universal grammar (Chomsky), in as such, that we agree that since a computer programs are linguistically complex sets of instructions were the relative executions by which explains of surface behaviour or the adequacy of the computerized programming installations, if it were definably amendable and, advisably corrective, in that most are disconcerting of many that are ultimately a reason for ‘us’ of thinking intuitively and without the indulgence of retrospective preferences, but an ethical majority in defending of its moral line that is already confronting ‘us’. That these programs may or may not improve to conditions that are lastly to enhance of the right a type of existence posted exactly to position of something for its nature in so that make it believed, and imposes on seizing the defensive quality value amounts in humanities lesser extensions that embrace one’s riff of necessity to humanities’ suspension to express in the determined qualities.
As of an ordinary language-learning and competence, the hypothesis has not found universal favour, as only ordinary representational powers that by invoking the image of the learning person’s capabilities are apparently whom the abilities for translating are contending of an innate language whose own powers are mysteriously a biological given. Perhaps, the view that everyday attributions of intentionality, beliefs, and meaning to other persons act by means of a tactic use of a theory that enables one to construct these interpretations as s of their doings. We have commonly held the view along with ‘functionalism’, according to which psychological states are theoretical entities, identified by the network of their causes and effects. The theory-theory has different implications, depending upon which feature of theories is being stressed. We may think of theories as capable of formalization, as yielding predictions and, as achieved by a process of theorizing, as answering to empirical evidence that is in principle describable without them, as liable to be overturned by newer and better theories, and so on.
The main problem with seeing our understanding of others as the outcome of a piece of theorizing is the nonexistence of a medium in which we can couch this theory, as the child learns simultaneously the minds of others and the meaning of terms in its native language, is not gained by the tactic use of a ‘theory’, enabling ‘us’ to imply what thoughts or intentions explain their actions, but by realizing the situation ‘in their shoes’ or from their point of view, and by that understanding what they experienced and theory, and therefore expressed. We achieve understanding others when we can ourselves deliberate as they did, and hear their words as if they are our own. The suggestion is a modern development usually associated in the ‘Verstehen’ traditions of Dilthey (1833-1911), Weber (1864-1920) and Collingwood (1889-1943).
We may call any process of drawing a conclusion from a set of premises a process of reasoning. If the conclusion concerns what to do, the process is called practical reasoning, otherwise pure or theoretical reasoning. Evidently, such processes may be good or bad, if they are good, the premises support or even entail the conclusion drawn, and if they are bad, the premises offer no support to the conclusion. Formal logic studies the cases in which conclusions are validly drawn from premises, but little human reasoning is overly of the forms logicians identify. Partly, we are concerned to draw conclusions that ‘go beyond’ our premises, in the way that conclusions of logically valid arguments do not for the process of using evidence to reach a wider conclusion. However, such anticipatory pessimism about the prospects of conformation theory, denying that we can assess the results of abduction as to probability.
Some inciting historians feel that there were four contributions to the theory of probability that overshadowed all the rest. The first was the work of Jacob Bernoulli, and the second De Moivre’s, Doctrine of Chances, the third dealt with Bayes’ Inverse Probability, and the fourth was the outstanding work by LaPlace. In fact, it was LaPlace himself who gave the classic ‘definition’ of probability - if an event can result in ‘n’ equally likely outcomes, then the probability of such an event ‘E’ is the ratio of the number of outcomes favourable to ‘E’ to the total number of outcomes.
A process of reasoning in which a conclusion is drawn from a set of premises usually confined to cases in which the conclusions are supposed in following from the premises, i.e., the inference is logically valid, in that of deductibility in a logically defined syntactic premise but without there being to any reference to the intended interpretation of its theory. Moreover, as we reason we use the indefinite lore or commonsense set of presuppositions about what it is likely or not a task of an automated reasoning project, which is to mimic this causal use of knowledge of the way of the world in computer programs.
Some ‘theories’ usually emerge as a component position, such as those presented by truth-values determined by truth values of a component thesis, in so doing, the imaginative formation of the metal act is or should be perpetuated of the form or actual existence in the mind for being real nor as it presents itself to the senses as for being non-real, supposed truths that are not organized, making the theory difficult to survey or study as a whole. The axiomatic method is an idea for organizing a theory, one in which tries to select from among the supposed truths a small number from which they can see all others to be deductively inferable. This makes the theory moderately tractable since, in a sense, we have contained all truths in those few. In a theory so organized, we have called the few truths from which we have deductively inferred all others ‘axioms’. David Hilbert (1862-1943) had argued that, just as algebraic and differential equations, which we were used to study mathematical and physical processes, could they be made mathematical objects, so axiomatic theories, like algebraic and differential equations, which are means to representing physical processes and mathematical structures could be of investigation.
According to theory, the philosophy of science, is a generalization or set referring to unobservable entities, e.g., atoms, genes, quarks, unconscious wishes. The ideal gas law, for example, refers only to such observables as pressure, temperature, and volume, the ‘molecular-kinetic theory’ refers to molecules and their properties, . . . although an older usage suggests the lack of adequate evidence in support of it (merely a theory), current philosophical usage does in fact follow in the tradition (as in Leibniz, 1704), as many philosophers had the conviction that all truths, or all truths about a particular domain, followed from as few than for being the greater of governing principles, These self-aggrandizing principles, taken to be either metaphysically prior or epistemologically prior or both. In the first sense, they we took to be entities of such a nature that what exists s ‘caused’ by them. When we took the principles as epistemologically prior, that is, as ‘axioms’, we took them to be either epistemologically privileged, e.g., self-evident, not needing to be demonstrated, or again, included ‘or’, to such that all truths so indeed follow from them, by deductive inferences. Gödel (1984) showed in the spirit of Hilbert, treating axiomatic theories as themselves mathematical objects that mathematics, and even a small part of mathematics, elementary number theory, could not be axiomatized, that more precisely, any class of axioms that is such that we could effectively decide, of any proposition, whether or not it was in that class, would be too small to capture in of the truths.
The notion of truth occurs with remarkable frequency in our reflections on language, thought and action. We are inclined to suppose, for example, that truth is the proper aim of scientific inquiry, that true beliefs help to achieve our goals, that to understand a sentence is to know which circumstances would make it true, that reliable preservation of truth as one argues of valid reasoning, that moral pronouncements should not be regarded as objectively true, and so on. To assess the plausibility of such theses, and to refine them and to explain why they hold (if they do), we require some view of what truth be a theory that would account for its properties and its relations to other matters. Thus, there can be little prospect of understanding our most important faculties in the sentence of a good theory of truth.
The most influential idea in the theory of meaning in the past hundred years is the thesis that the meaning of an indicative sentence is given by its truth-conditions. On this conception, to understand a sentence is to know of its truth-condition. The conception was first clearly formulated by Frége, was developed in a distinctive way by the early Wittgenstein, and is a leading idea of Davidson. The conception has remained so central that those who offer opposing theories characteristically define their position by reference to it.
The conception of meaning as truth-conditions needs not and should not be advanced for being a complete account of meaning. For instance, one who understands a language must have some idea of the range of speech acts conventionally acted by the various types of sentences in the language, and must have some idea of the significance of various kinds of speech acts. The claim of the theorist of truth-conditions should be targeted on the notion of content: If two indicative sentences differ in what they strictly and literally say, then this difference is fully accounted for by the difference in their truth-conditions.
The meaning of a complex expression depends on the meaning of its constituent. This is simply a conscionable statement of what it is for an expression to be semantically complex. It is one initial attraction of the conception of meaning as truth-conditions that it permits a smooth and satisfying account of the way in which the meaning of a complex expression is function of meaning of its constituents. On the truth-conditional conception, to give the meaning of an expression is to state the contribution it makes to the truth-conditions of a sentence in which it occurs. For singular terms - proper names, indexicals, and certain pronouns - this is done by stating the reference of the term in question. For predicates, it is done either by stating the conditions under which the predicate is true of arbitrary objects, or by stating the conditions under which arbitrary atomic sentences containing it is true. The meaning of a sentence-forming operator is given by stating its contribution to the truth-conditions of a complete sentence, as a function of the semantic values of the sentences on which it operates.
Among the many challenges facing the theorist of truth conditions, two are particularly salient and fundamental. First, the theorist has to answer the charge of triviality or vacuity. Second, the theorist must offer an account of what it is for a person’s language to be truly described by a semantic theory containing a given semantic axiom.
We can take the charge of triviality first, since the content of a claim that the sentence ‘Paris is beautiful’ is true and amounts to no more than the claim that Paris is beautiful, we can trivially describe understanding a sentence, if we wish, as knowing its truth-conditions, but this gives us no substantive account of understanding whatsoever. Something other than the grasp of truth conditions must provide the substantive account. The charge rests upon what has been called the redundancy theory of truth, the theory that, is somewhat more discriminatory as applying or favouring in their treatment, much as to an inequitable, impartial as swell as to extricate by merely disencumber and disinvolve liberties. Horwich calls the minimal theory of true. The minimal theory states that the concept of truth is exhausted by the fact that it conforms to the equivalence principle, the principle that for any proposition ‘p’. It is true that ‘p’ if and only if ‘p’. Many different philosophical theories of truth will, with suitable qualifications, accept that equivalence principle. The distinguishing feature of the minimal theory is its claim that the equivalence principle exhausts the notion of truth. It is now widely accepted, both by opponents and supporters of truth conditional theories of meaning, that it is inconsistent to accept both the minimal theory of truth and a truth conditional account of meaning. In the claim that the sentence, ‘Paris is beautiful’ is true that Paris is beautiful, it is circular to try to explain the sentence’s meaning under its truth conditions. The minimal theory of truth has been endorsed by Ramsey, Ayer, the later Wittgenstein, Quine, Srawson, Horwich, and -confusingly and inconsistently if this is correct- Frége himself. But is the minimal theory correct?
The minimal theory treats instances of the equivalence principle as definitional truth for a given sentence. But in fact it seems that each instance of the equivalence principle can itself be explained. The truth from which such a condition would occur as:
‘London is beautiful’ is true if and only if London is beautiful.
This would be a pseudo-explanation if the fact that ‘London’ refers to London consists in part in the fact that ‘London is beautiful’ has the truth-condition it does. But that is very implausible: It is, after all, possible to align itself with the name, ‘London’ without understanding the predicate ‘is beautiful’.
The defender of the minimalist theory is likely to say that if a sentence ‘S’ of a foreign language is best translated by our sentencer ‘p’, then the foreign sentence ‘S’ is true if and only if ‘p’. Now the best translation of a sentence must preserve the concepts expressed in the sentence. Constraints involving a general notion of truth are pervasive in a plausible philosophical theory of concepts. It is, for example, a condition of adequacy on an individuating account of any concept that there exits what is called a ‘Determination Theory’ for the account - that is, a specification of how the account contributes to fixing the semantic value of that concept. The notion of a concept’s semantic value is the notion of something that makes a certain contribution to the truth conditions of thoughts in which the concept occurs. But this is to presuppose, than to elucidate, a general notion of truth.
It is also plausible that there are general constraints on the form in Determination Theories, constraints that involve truth which is not derivable from the minimalist’s conception. Supposed that concepts are individuated by their possession condition. One such plausible general constraint is then the requirement that when a thinker forms beliefs involving a concept according to its possession condition, a semantic value belief are assigned to the concept so that the belief is true. Some general principles involving truth can indeed, as Horwich has emphasized, be derived from the equivalence schema using minimal logical apparatus. Consider, for instance, the principle that ‘Paris is beautiful and London is beautiful’ is true if and only if ‘Paris is beautiful’ is true and ‘London is beautiful’ is true. This follows logically from the three instances of the equivalence principle: ‘Paris is beautiful and London is beautiful’ is true if and only if Paris is beautiful and London is beautiful: ‘Paris is beautiful’ is true if and only if Paris is beautiful: And ‘London is beautiful’ is true if and only if London is beautiful. But no logical manipulations of the equivalence schema will allow the derivation of that general constraint governing possession conditions, truth and the assignment of semantic values. That constraint can, of course, be regarded as a further elaboration of the idea that truth is one of the aims of judgement.
What is it for a person’s language to be correctly describable by a semantic theory containing a particular axiom? This question may be addressed at two depths of generality. At the shallower level, the question may take for granted the person’s possession of the concept of conjunction, and be concerned with what has to be true for the axiom to describe his language correctly. At a deeper level, an answer should not duck the issue of what it is to possess the concept. The answers to both questions are of great interest. When a person mans conjunction by ‘and’, he could not formulate the axiom. Even if he can formulate it, his ability to formulate it is not the casual basis of his capacity to hear sentences containing the word ‘and’ as meaning something involving conjunction by sentences he utters containing the word ‘and’. Is it then right to regard a truth theory as part of an unconscious psychological computation, and to regard understanding a sentence involving a particular way of deriving a theorem from a truth theory at some level of unconscious processing? One problem with this is that it is quite implausible that everyone who speaks the same language has to use the same algorithms for computing the meaning of a sentence. In the past thirteen years, a conception has evolved according to which an axiom is true of a person’s language only if there is a common component in the explanation of his understanding of each sentence containing the word ‘and’, a common component that explains why each such sentence is understood as meaning something involving conjunction (Davies, 1987). What conception can also be elaborated in computational terms? It is to suggest for an axiom to be true of a person’s language is for the unconscious mechanisms that produce understanding to draw n the information that a sentence of the form ‘A’ and ‘B’ are true if and only if ‘A’ is true and ‘B’ is true (Peacocke, 1986). Many different algorithms may equally draw on this information. The psychological reality of a semantic theory thus involves, in Marr’s (1982) classification, something intermediate between his level one, the function computed, and his level two, the algorithm by which it is computed. Thus, its conception of the psychological reality of a semantic theory can be applied to syntactic and phonological theories. Theories in semantics, syntax and phonology are not themselves required to specifically particular algorithms that the language user employs. The identification of the particular computational methods employed is a task for psychology. But semantic, syntactic and phonological theorists are answerable to psychological data, and are potentially refutable by them - for these linguistic theories do make commitments to the information drawn upon by mechanisms in the language user.
This answer to the question of what it is for an axiom to be true of a person’s language clearly takes for granted the person’s possession of the concept expressed by the word translated by the axiom. In this example, the information drawn upon is those sentences of the form ‘A’ and ‘B’ are true if and only if ‘A’ is true and ‘B’ is true. This informational content employs, as I, to am adequate, the concept of conjunction used in stating the meaning of sentences containing ‘and’. So the computational answer we have returned needs further elaboration if we are to address the deeper question, which does not want to take for granted possession of the concepts expressed in the language. It is at this point is the theory of linguistic understanding to draw upon a theory of concepts. This is only part of what is involved in the required dovetailing. Given what we have already said about the uniform explanation of the understanding of the various occurrences of a given weird, we should also add that there is a uniform (unconscious, computational) explanation of the language user’s willingness to make the corresponding transition involving the sentence ‘A’ and ‘B’.
Our thinking, and our perceptions of the world about us, is limited by the nature of the language that our culture employs, instead of language possessing, as had previously been widely assumed, much less significant, purely instrumental, function in our living. Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language that has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The consideration is that the ‘real world’ is, largely, unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group, we see and hear and otherwise we experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.
Such a thing, however, has been notoriously elusive. The ancient idea that truth is some sort of ‘correspondence with reality’ has still never been articulated satisfactorily, and the nature of the alleged ‘correspondence’ and the alleged ‘reality’ remain objectionably obscure. Yet the familiar alternative suggestions that true beliefs are those that are ‘mutually coherent’, or ‘pragmatically useful’, or ‘verifiable in suitable conditions’ has each been confronted with persuasive counterexamples. A twentieth-century departure from these traditional analyses is the view that truth is not a property at all that the syntactic form of the predicate, ‘is true’, distorts its really semantic character, which is not to describe propositions but to endorse them. However, this radical approach is also faced with difficulties and suggests, quasi counter intuitively, that truth cannot have the vital theoretical role in semantics, epistemology and elsewhere that we are naturally inclined to give it. Thus, truth threatens to remain one of the most enigmatic of notions: An explicit account of it can seem essential yet beyond our reach. However, recent work provides some grounds for optimism.
We have based a theory in philosophy of science, is a generalization or set as concerning observable entities, i.e., atoms, quarks, unconscious wish, and so on. The ideal gas law, for example, refers only to such observables as pressure, temperature, and volume, the molecular-kinetic theory refers top molecules and their properties, although an older usage suggests the lack of adequate evidence in support of it (merely a theory), progressive toward its sage; the usage does not carry that connotation. Einstein’s special; Theory of relativity, for example, is considered extremely well founded.
These are two main views on the nature of theories. According to the ‘received view’ theories are partially interpreted axiomatic systems, according to the semantic view, a theory is a collection of models (Suppe, 1974). Under which, some theories usually emerge as exemplifying or occurring in fact, from which are we to find on practical matters and concern of experiencing the real world, nonetheless, that it of supposed truths that are not neatly organized, making the theory difficult to survey or study as a whole. The axiomatic method is an ideal for organizing a theory (Hilbert, 1970), one tries to select from among the supposed truths a small number from which all the others can be seen to be deductively inferable. This makes the theory more tractable since, in a sense, they contain all truth’s in those few. In a theory so organized, they call the few truths from which they deductively infer all others ‘axioms’. David Hilbert (1862-1943) had argued that, just as algebraic and differential equations, which were used to study mathematical and physical processes, could they be made mathematical objects, so we could make axiomatic theories, like algebraic and differential equations, which are means of representing physical processes and mathematical structures, objects of mathematical investigation.
Many philosophers had the conviction that all truths, or all truths about a particular domain, followed from a few principles. These principles were taken to be either metaphysically prior or epistemologically prior or both. In the first sense, we took them to be entities of such a nature that what exists is ‘caused’ by them. When we took the principles as epistemologically prior, that is, as ‘axioms’, we took them to be either epistemologically privileged, i.e., self-evident, not needing to be demonstrated, or again, inclusive ‘or’, to be such that all truths do indeed follow from them, by means of deductive inferences. Gödel (1984) showed in the spirit of Hilbert, treating axiomatic theories as themselves mathematical objects that mathematics, and even a small part. Of mathematics, elementary number theory, could not be axiomatized, that, more precisely, any class of axioms that is such that we could effectively decide, of any proposition, whether or not it was in that class, would be too small to capture all of the truths.
The notion of truth occurs with remarkable frequency in our reflections on language, thought, and action. We are inclined to suppose, for example, that truth is the proper aim of scientific inquiry, that true beliefs help ‘us’ to achieve our goals, that to understand a sentence is to know which circumstances would make it true, that reliable preservation of truth as one argues from premises to a conclusion is the mark of valid reasoning, that we should not regard moral pronouncements as objectively true, and so on. To assess the plausible of such theses, and to refine them and to explain why they hold (if they do), we require some view of what truth be a theory that would account for its properties and its relations to other matters. Thus, there can be little prospect of understanding our most important faculties lacking a good theory of truth.
The nature of the alleged ‘correspondence’ and the alleged ‘reality remains objectivably obscures’. Yet, the familiar alternative suggests, ~ that true beliefs are those that are ‘mutually coherent’, or ‘pragmatically useful’, or ‘they establish by induction of each to a confronted verifiability in some suitable conditions with persuasive counterexamples. A twentieth-century departure from these traditional analyses is the view that truth is not a property at all ~. That the syntactic form of the predicate, ‘is true’, distorts its really semantic character, which is not to describe propositions but to endorse them. Nevertheless, they have also faced this radical approach with difficulties and suggest, a counter intuitively, that truth cannot have the vital theoretical role in semantics, epistemology and elsewhere that we are naturally inclined to give it. Thus, truth threatens to remain one of the most enigmatic of notions, and an explicit account of it can seem essential yet, beyond our reach. However, recent work provides some grounds for optimism.
The belief that snow is white owes its truth to a certain feature of the external world, namely, to the fact that snow is white. Similarly, the belief that dogs bark is true because of the fact that dogs bark. This trivial observation leads to what is perhaps the most natural and popular account of truth, the ‘correspondence theory’, according to which a belief (statement, a sentence, propositions, etc.) as true just in case there exists a fact corresponding to it (Wittgenstein, 1922). This thesis is unexceptionably for finding out whether one should account of truth are that it is clearly compared with the correspondence theory, and that it succeeds in connecting truth with verification. However, if it is to provide a rigorous, substantial and complete theory of truth ~. If it is to be more than merely a picturesque way of asserting all equivalences to the form:
The belief that ‘p’ is ‘true p’.
Then we must supplement it with accounts of what facts are, and what it is for a belief to correspond to a fact, and these are the problems on which the correspondence theory of truth has foundered. For one thing, it is far form clear that reducing ‘the belief achieves any significant gain in understanding that ‘snow is white is true’ to ‘the facts that ‘snow is white’ exists’: For these expressions seem equally resistant to analysis and too close in meaning for one to provide an illuminating account of the other. In addition, the general relationship that holds in particular between the belief that snow is white and the simple fact is, that snow is white, between the belief that dogs bark and the fact that dogs bark, and so on, is very hard to identify. The best attempt to date is Wittgenstein’s (1922) so-called ‘picture theory’, under which an elementary proposition is a configuration of terms, with whatever stare of affairs it reported, as an atomic fact is a configuration of simple objects, an atomic fact corresponds to an elementary proposition (and makes it true) when their configurations are identical and when the terms in the proposition for it to the similarly-placed objects in the fact, and the truth value of each complex proposition the truth values of the elementary ones have entailed. However, even if this account is correct as far as it goes, it would need to be completed with plausible theories of ‘logical configuration’, ‘elementary proposition’, ‘reference’ and ‘entailment’, none of which is easy to come by way of the central characteristic of truth. One that any adequate theory must explain is that when a proposition satisfies its ‘conditions of proof or verification’, then it is regarded as true. To the extent that the property of corresponding with reality is mysterious, we are going to find it impossible to see what we take to verify a proposition should indicate the possession of that property. Therefore, a tempting alternative to the correspondence theory an alternative that eschews obscure, metaphysical concept which explains quite straightforwardly why Verifiability implies, truth is simply to identify truth with verifiability (Peirce, 1932). This idea can take on variously formed. One version involves the further assumption that verification is ‘holistic’, i.e., that of a belief is justified (i.e., turn over evidence of the truth) when it is part of an entire system of beliefs that are consistent and ‘harmonious’ (Bradley, 1914 and Hempel, 1935). We have known this as the ‘coherence theory of truth’. Another version involves the assumption associated with each proposition, some specific procedure for finding out whether one should on sensing and responding to the definitive qualities or stare of being actual or true, such that a person, an entity, or an event, that is actually might be gainfully to employ the totality of things existent of possessing actuality or essence. On this account, to say that a proposition is true is to sa that the appropriate procedure would verify (Dummett, 1979, and Putnam, 1981). From mathematics this amounts to the identification of truth with probability.
The attractions of the verificationist account of truth are that it is refreshingly clear compared with the correspondence theory, and that it succeeds in connecting truth with verification. The trouble is that the bond it postulates between these notions is implausibly strong. We do indeed take verification to indicate truth, but also we recognize the possibility that a proposition may be false in spite of there being impeccable reasons to believe it, and that a proposition may be true although we are not able to discover that it is. Verifiability and ruth are no doubt highly correlated, but surely not the same thing.
A well-known account of truth is known as ‘pragmatism’ (James, 1909 and Papineau, 1987). As we have just seen, the verificationist selects a prominent property of truth and considers it the essence of truth. Similarly, the pragmatist focuses on another important characteristic namely, that true belief is a good basis for action and takes this to be the very nature of truth. We have said that true assumptions were, by definition, those that provoke actions with desirable results. Again, we have an account with a single attractive explanatory feature, but again, it postulates between truth and its alleged analysand then, utility is implausibly close. Granted, true belief tends to foster success, but it happens regularly that actions based on true beliefs lead to disaster, while false assumptions, by pure chance, produce wonderful results.
One of the few uncontroversial facts about truth is that the proposition that snow is white if and only if snow is white, the proposition that lying is wrong is true if and only if lying is wrong, and so on. Traditional theories acknowledge this fact but regard it as insufficient and, as we have seen, inflate it with some further principle of the form, ‘x is true’ if and only if ‘x’ has property ‘p’ (such as corresponding to reality, Verifiability, or being suitable as a basis for action), which is supposed to specify what truth is. Some radical alternatives to the traditional theories result from denying the need for any such further specification (Ramsey, 1927, Strawson, 1950 and Quine, 1990). For example, ne might suppose that the basic theory of truth contains nothing more that equivalences of the form, ‘The proposition that ‘p’ is true if and only if ‘p’ (Horwich, 1990).
This sort of proposal is best presented with an account of the ‘raison de étre’ of our notion of truth, namely that it enables ‘us ’ to express attitudes toward these propositions we can designate but not explicitly formulate. Suppose, for example, they tell you that Einstein’s last words expressed a claim about physics, an area in which you think he was very reliable. Suppose that, unknown to you, his claim was the proposition whose quantum mechanics are wrong. What conclusion can you draw? Exactly which proposition becomes the appropriate object of your belief? Surely not that quantum mechanics are wrong, because you are not aware that is what he said. What we have needed is something equivalent to the infante conjunction:
If what Einstein said was that E = mc2, then E = mc2,
and if that he said as that Quantum mechanics were
wrong, then Quantum mechanics are wrong
. . . . And so on?
That is, a proposition, ‘K’ with the following properties, that from ‘K’ and any further premises of the form. ‘Einstein’s claim was the proposition that p’ you can infer p’. Whatever it is. Now suppose, as the deflationist says, that our understanding of the truth predicate consists in the stimulative decision to accept any instance of the schema. ‘The proposition that ‘p; is true if and only if ‘p’, then we have solved your problem. For ‘K’ is the proposition, ‘Einstein’s claim is true ’, it will have precisely the inferential power that we have needed. From it and ‘Einstein’s claim is the proposition that quantum mechanics are wrong’, you can use Leibniz’s law to infer ‘The proposition that quantum mechanic is wrong is true, which given the relevant axiom of the deflationary theory, allows you to derive ‘Quantum mechanics is wrong’. Thus, one point in favour of the deflationary theory is that it squares with a plausible story about the function of our notion of truth, in that its axioms explain that function without the need for further analysis of ‘what truth ‘is’.
Not all variants of deflationism have this virtue, according to the redundancy performative theory of truth, implicate a pair of sentences, ‘The proposition that ‘p’ is true’ and plain ‘p’s’, has the same meaning and expresses the same statement as one and another, so it is a syntactic illusion to think that p is true’ attributes any sort of property to a proposition (Ramsey, 1927 and Strawson, 1950). Nonetheless, it becomes hard to explain why we are entitled to infer ‘The proposition that quantum mechanics are wrong is true’ form ‘Einstein’s claim is the proposition that quantum mechanics are wrong. ‘Einstein’s claim is true’. For if truth is not property, then we can no longer account for the inference by invoking the law that if ‘x’, appears identical with ‘Y’ then any property of ‘x’ is a property of ‘Y’, and vice versa. Thus the redundancy/performative theory, by identifying rather than merely correlating the contents of ‘The proposition that ‘p’ is true’ and ‘p’, precludes the prospect of a good explanation of one on truth’s most significant and useful characteristics. So restricting our claim to the ineffectually weak, accedes of a favourable Equivalence schematic: The proposition that ‘p’ is true is and is only ‘p’.
Support for deflationism depends upon the possibility of showing that its axiom instances of the equivalence schema unsupplements by any further analysis, will suffice to explain all the central facts about truth, for example, that the verification of a proposition indicates its truth, and that true beliefs have a practical value. The first of these facts follows trivially from the deflationary axioms, for given a deductive assimilation to knowledge of the equivalence of ‘p’ and ‘The proposition that ‘p is true’, any reason to believe that ‘p’ becomes an equally good reason to believe that the preposition that ‘p’ is true. We can also explain the second fact as to the deflationary axioms, but not quite so easily. Consider, to begin with, beliefs of the form:
(B) If I perform the act ‘A’, then my desires will be fulfilled.
Notice that the psychological role of such a belief is, roughly, to cause the performance of ‘A’. In other words, gave that I do have belief (B), then typically.
I will perform the act ‘A’
Notice also that when the belief is true then, given the deflationary axioms, the performance of ‘A’ will in fact lead to the fulfilment of one’s desires, i.e.,
If (B) is true, then if I perform ‘A’, my desires will be fulfilled
Therefore:
If (B) is true, then my desires will be fulfilled
So valuing the truth of beliefs of that form is quite reasonable. Nevertheless, inference derives such beliefs from other beliefs and can be expected to be true if those other beliefs are true. So valuing the truth of any belief that might be used in such an inference is reasonable.
To the extent that they can give such deflationary accounts of all the acts involving truth, then the collection will meet the explanatory demands on a theory of truth of all statements like, ‘The proposition that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white, and we will undermine the sense that we need some deep analysis of truth.
Nonetheless, there are several strongly felt objections to deflationism. One reason for dissatisfaction is that the theory has many axioms, and therefore cannot be completely written down. It can be described as the theory whose axioms are the propositions of the fore ‘p if and only if it is true that p’, but not explicitly formulated. This alleged defect has led some philosophers to develop theories that show, first, how the truth of any proposition derives from the referential properties of its constituents, and second, how the referential properties of primitive constituents are determined (Tarski, 1943 and Davidson, 1969). However, assuming that all propositions including belief attributions remain controversial, law of nature and counterfactual conditionals depends for their truth values on what their constituents refer to. Moreover, there is no immediate prospect of a decent, finite theory of reference, so that it is far form clear that the infinite, that we can avoid list-like character of deflationism.
Another source of dissatisfaction with this theory is that certain instances of the equivalence schema are clearly false. Consider.
(a) THE PROPOSITION EXPRESSED BY THE SENTENCE
IN CAPITAL LETTERS IN NOT TRUE.
Substituting this into the schema one gets a version of the ‘liar’ paradox: Specifically: (b) The proposition that the proposition expressed by the
sentence in capital letters is not true is true if and only
if the proposition expressed by the sentence in capital
letters are not true,
From which a contradiction is easily derivable. (Given (b), the supposition that (a) is true implies that (a) is not true, and the supposition that it is not true that it is.) Consequently, not every instance of the equivalence schema can be included in the theory of truth, but it is no simple matter to specify the ones to be excluded. In ‘Naming and Necessity’ (1980), Kripler gave the classical modern treatment of the topic reference, both clarifying the distinction between names and definite descriptions, and opening the door to many subsequent attempts to understand the notion of reference in terms and an original episode of attaching a name to a subject. Of course, deflationism is far from alone in having to confront this problem.
A third objection to the version of the deflationary theory presented here concerns its reliance on ‘propositions’ as the basic vehicles of truth. It is widely felt that the notion of the proposition is defective and that we should not employ it in semantics. If this point of view is accepted then the natural deflationary reaction is to attempt a reformation that would appeal only to sentences, for example:
‘p’ is true if and only if p.
Nevertheless, this so-called ‘disquotational theory of truth’ (Quine, 1990) has trouble over indexicals, demonstratives and other terms whose referents vary with the context of use. It is not true, for example, that every instance of ‘I am hungry’ is true and only if ‘I am hungry’. There is no simple way of modifying the disquotational schema to accommodate this problem. A possible way of these difficulties is to resist the critique of propositions. Such entities may exhibit an unwelcome degree of indeterminancy, and might defy reduction to familiar items, however, they do offer a plausible account of belief, as relations to propositions, and, in ordinary language at least, we indeed take them to be the primary bearers of truth. To believe a proposition is too old for it to be true. The philosophical problem includes discovering whether belief differs from other varieties of assent, such as ‘acceptance’, discovering to what extent degrees of belief are possible, understanding the ways in which belief is controlled by rational and irrational factors, and discovering its links with other properties, such as the possession of conceptual or linguistic skills. This last set of problems includes the question of whether they have properly said that prelinguistic infants or animals have beliefs.
Additionally, it is commonly supposed that problems about the nature of truth are intimately bound up with questions as to the accessibility and autonomy of facts in various domains: Questions about whether we can know the facts, and whether they can exist independently of our capacity to discover them (Dummett, 1978, and Putnam, 1981). One might reason, for example, that if ‘t is true’ means’ nothing more than ‘t will be verified’, then certain forms of scepticism, specifically, those that doubt the correctness of our methods of verification, that will be precluded, and that the facts will have been revealed as dependent on human practices. Alternatively, we might say that if truth were an inexplicable, primitive, non-epistemic property, then the fact that ‘t’ is true would be completely independent of ‘us’. Moreover, we could, there, have no reason to assume that the propositions we believe actually have tis property, so scepticism would be unavoidable. In a similar vein, we might think that as special, and perhaps undesirable features of the deflationary approach, is that we have deprived truth of such metaphysical or epistemological implications.
On closer scrutiny, however, it is far from clear that there exists ‘any’ account of truth with consequences regarding the accessibility or autonomy of non-semantic matters. For although we may expect an account of truth to have such implications for facts of the from ‘t is true’, we cannot assume without further argument that the same conclusions will apply to the fact ’t’. For it cannot be assumed that ‘t’ and ‘t are true’ nor, are they equivalent to one and another, explained ‘true’, from which is being employed. Of course, if we have distinguishable truth in the way that the deflationist proposes, then the equivalence holds by definition. However, if reference to some metaphysical or epistemological characteristic has defined truth, then we throw the equivalence schema into doubt, pending some demonstration that the true predicate, in the sense assumed, it will be satisfied insofar, as there are thought to be epistemological problems hanging over ‘t’ that does not threaten ‘t is true’, giving the needed demonstration will be difficult. Similarly, if we so define ‘truth’ that the fact, ‘t’ is felt to be more, or less, independent of human practices than the fact that ‘t is true’, then again, it is unclear that the equivalence schema will hold. It seems. Therefore, that the attempt to base epistemological or metaphysical conclusions on a theory of truth must fail because in any such attempt we will simultaneously rely on and undermine the equivalence schema.
The most influential idea in the theory of meaning in the past hundred yeas is the thesis that meaning of an indicative sentence is given by its truth-conditions. On this conception, to understand a judgment of conviction, as given the responsibility of a sentence, is to know its truth-conditions. The conception was first clearly formulated by Frége (1848-1925), was developed in a distinctive way by the early Wittgenstein (1889-1951), and is a leading idea of Davidson (1917-). The conception has remained so central that those who offer opposing theories characteristically define their position by reference to it.
The conception of meaning as truth-conditions needs not and should not be advanced as a complete account of meaning. For instance, one who understands a language must have some idea of the range of speech acts conventionally performed by the various types of a sentence in the language, and must have some idea of the significance of various kinds of speech acts. We should moderately target the claim of the theorist of truth-conditions on the notion of content: If two indicative sentences differ in what they strictly and literally say, then the difference accounts for this difference in their truth-conditions. Most basic to truth-conditions is simply of a statement that is the condition the world must meet if the statement is to be true. To know this condition is equivalent to knowing the meaning of the statement. Although this sounds as if it gives a solid anchorage for meaning, some security disappears when it turns out that repeating the very same statement can only define the truth condition, as a truth condition of ‘snow is white’ is that snow is white, the truth condition of ‘Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded’ is the Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded. It is disputed wether. This element of running-on-the-spot disqualifies truth conditions from playing the central role in a substantive theory of meaning. The view has sometimes opposed truth-conditional theories of meaning that to know the meaning of a statement is to be able to use it in a network of inferences.
Whatever it is that makes, what would otherwise be mere sounds and inscriptions into instruments of communication and understanding. The philosophical problem is to demystify this power, and to relate it to what we know of ourselves and the world. Contributions to the study include the theory of ‘speech acts’ and the investigation of communication and the relationship between words and ideas and the world and surrounding surfaces, by which some persons express by a sentence often vary with the environment in which he or she is placed. For example, the disease I refer to by a term like ‘arthritis’ or the kind of tree I call an ‘oak’ will be defined by criteria of which I know next to nothing. The raises the possibility of imagining two persons in moderate differently environmental, but in which everything appears the same to each of them, but between them they define a space of philosophical problems. They are the essential components of understanding nd any intelligible proposition that is true can be understood. Such that which an utterance or sentence expresses, the proposition or claim made about the world may by extension, the content of a predicated or other sub-sentential component is what it contributes to the content of sentences that contain it. The nature of content is the cental concern of the philosophy of language.
In particularly, the problems of indeterminancy of translation, inscrutability of reference, language, predication, reference, rule following, semantics, translation, and the topics referring to subordinate headings associated with ‘logic’. The loss of confidence in determinate meaning (from each individualized decoding is another individual encoding) is an element common both to postmodern uncertainties in the theory of criticism, and to the analytic tradition that follows writers such as Quine (1908-). Still it may be asked, why should we suppose that we should account fundamental epistemic notions for in behavioural terms what grounds are there for assuming ‘p knows p’ is a matter of the status of its statement between some subject and some object, between nature and its mirror? The answer is that the only alternative might be to take knowledge of inner states as premises from which we have normally inferred our knowledge of other things, and without which we have normally inferred our knowledge of other things, and without which knowledge would be ungrounded. However, it is not really coherent, and does not in the last analysis make sense, to suggest that human knowledge have foundations or grounds. We should remember that to say that truth and knowledge ‘can only be judged by the standards of our own day’ which is not to say, that it is less important, or ‘more ‘cut off from the world’, that we had supposed. It is just to say, that nothing counts as justification, unless by reference to what we already accept, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language to find some test other than coherence. The characterlogical characteristic is that the professional philosophers have thought it might be otherwise, since the body has haunted only them of epistemological scepticism.
What Quine opposes as ‘residual Platonism’ is not so much the hypostasising of nonphysical entities as the notion of ‘correspondence’ with things as the final court of appeal for evaluating present practices. Unfortunately, Quine, for all that it is incompatible with its basic insights, substitutes for this correspondence to physical entities, and specially to the basic entities, whatever they turn out to be, of physical science. Nevertheless, when we have purified their doctrines, they converge on a single claim ~, that no account of knowledge can depend on the assumption of some privileged relations to reality. Their work brings out why an account of knowledge can amount only to a description of human behaviour.
What, then, is to be said of these ‘inner states’, and of the direct reports of them that have played so important a role in traditional epistemology? For a person to feel is nothing else than for him to be able to make a certain type of non-inferential report, to attribute feelings to infants is to acknowledge in them latent abilities of this innate kind. Non-conceptual, non-linguistic ‘knowledge’ of what feelings or sensations is like is attributively to beings from potential membership of our community. We comment upon infants and the more attractive animals with having feelings based on that spontaneous sympathy that we extend to anything humanoid, in contrast with the mere response to stimuli, attributed to photoelectric cells and to animals about which no one feels sentimentally. Assuming moral prohibition against hurting infants is consequently wrong and the better-looking animals are that those moral prohibitions grounded’ in their possession of feelings. The relation of dependence is really the other way round. Similarly, we could not be mistaken in assuming a four-year-old child has knowledge, but no one-year-old, any more than we could be mistaken in taking the word of a statute that eighteen-year-old can marry freely but seventeen-year-old cannot. There is no more ‘ontological ground’ for the distinction that may suit ‘us’ to make in the former case than in the later. Again, such a question as ‘Are robots’ conscious?’ Calling for a decision on our part whether or not to treat robots as members of our linguistic community. All this is a piece with the insight brought intro philosophy by Hegel (1770-1831), that the individual apart from his society is just another animal.
Willard van Orman Quine, the most influential American philosopher of the latter half of the 20th century, when after the wartime period in naval intelligence, punctuating the rest of his career with extensive foreign lecturing and travel. Quine’s early work was on mathematical logic, and issued in ‘A System of Logistic’ (1934), ‘Mathematical Logic’ (1940), and ‘Methods of Logic’ (1950), whereby it was with the collection of papers from a ‘Logical Point of View’ (1953) that his philosophical importance became widely recognized. Quine’s work dominated concern with problems of convention, meaning, and synonymy cemented by ‘Word and Object’ (1960), in which the indeterminancy of radical translation first takes centre-stage. In this and many subsequent writings Quine takes a bleak view of the nature of the language with which we ascribe thoughts and beliefs to ourselves and others. These ‘intentional idioms’ resist smooth incorporation into the scientific world view, and Quine responds with scepticism toward them, not quite endorsing ‘eliminativism’, but regarding them as second-rate idioms, unsuitable for describing strict and literal facts. For similar reasons he has consistently expressed suspicion of the logical and philosophical propriety of appeal to logical possibilities and possible worlds. The languages that are properly behaved and suitable for literal and true descriptions of the world happen to those within the fields that draw upon mathematics and science. We must take the entities to which our best theories refer with full seriousness in our ontologies, although an empiricist. Quine thus supposes that science requires the abstract objects of set theory, and therefore exist. In the theory of knowledge Quine associated with a ‘holistic view’ of verification, conceiving of a body of knowledge as for a web touching experience at the periphery, but with each point connected by a network of relations to other points.
They have also known Quine for the view that we should naturalize, or conduct epistemology in a scientific spirit, with the object of investigation being the relationship, in human beings, between the inputs of experience and the outputs of belief. Although we have attacked Quine’s approaches to the major problems of philosophy as betraying undue ‘scientism’ and sometimes ‘behaviourism’, the clarity of his vision and the scope of his writing made him the major focus of Anglo-American work of the past forty years in logic, semantics, and epistemology. And the works cited his writings’ cover ‘The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays’ (1966), ‘Ontological Relativity and Other Essays’ (1969), ‘Philosophy of Logic’ (1970), ‘The Roots of Reference’ (1974) and ‘The Time of My Life: An Autobiography’ (1985).
Coherence is a major player in the theatre of knowledge. There are cogence theories of belief, truth and justification, as these are to combine themselves in the various ways to yield theories of knowledge coherence theories of belief are concerned with the content of beliefs. Consider a belief you now have, the beliefs that you are reading a page in a book, in so, that what makes that belief the belief that it is? What makes it the belief that you are reading a page in a book than the belief that you have a creature of some sort in the garden?
One answer is that the belief has a coherent place or role in a system of beliefs, perception or the having the perceptivity that has its influence on beliefs. As, you respond to sensory stimuli by believing that you are reading a page in a book than believing that you have some sorted creature in the garden. Belief has an influence on action, or its belief is a desire to act, if belief will differentiate the differences between them, that its belief is a desire or if you were to believe that you are reading a page than if you believed in something about a creature. Sortal perceptivals hold accountably the perceptivity and action that are indeterminate to its content if its belief is the action as if stimulated by its inner and latent coherence in that of your belief, however. The same stimuli may produce various beliefs and various beliefs may produce the same action. The role that gives the belief the content it has is the role it plays upon a network of relations to other beliefs, some latently causal than others that relate to the role in inference and implication. For example, I infer different things from believing that I am reading a page in a book than from any other belief, justly as I infer about other beliefs form.
The input of perceptibility and the output of an action supplement the central role of the systematic relations the belief has to other beliefs, but the systematic relations give the belief the specific contentual representation it has. They are the fundamental source of the content of belief. That is how coherence comes in. A belief has the representational content by which it does because of the way in which it coheres within a system of beliefs (Rosenberg, 1988). We might distinguish weak coherence theories of the content of beliefs from stronger coherence theories. Weak coherence theories affirm that coherence is one determinant of the representation given that the contents are of belief. Strong coherence theories of the content of belief affirm that coherence is the sole determinant of the contentual representations of belief.
When we turn from belief to justification, we confront a similar group of coherence theories. What makes one belief justified and another not? Again, there is a distinction between weak and strong theoretic principles that govern its theory of coherence. Weak theories tell ‘us’ that the way in which a belief coheres with a background system of beliefs is one determinant of justification, other typical determinants being perception, memory, and intuitively strong theories, or dominant projections are in coherence to justification as solely a matter of how a belief coheres with a system of latent hierarchal beliefs. There is, nonetheless, another distinction that cuts across the distinction between weak and strong coherence theories between positive and negative coherence theory (Pollock, 1986). A positive coherence theory tells ‘us’ that if a belief coheres with a background system of belief, then the belief is justifiable. A negative coherence theory tells ‘us’ that if a belief fails to cohere with a background system of beliefs, then the belief is not justifiable. We might put this by saying that, according to the positivity of a coherence theory, coherence has the power to produce justification, while according to its being adhered by negativity, the coherence theory has only the power to nullify justification.
Least of mention, a strong coherence theory of justification is a formidable combination by which a positive and a negative theory tell ‘us’ that a belief is justifiable if and only if it coheres with a background system of inter-connectivity of beliefs. Coherence theories of justification and knowledge have most often been rejected for being unable to deal with an accountable justification toward the perceptivity upon the projection of knowledge (Audi, 1988, and Pollock, 1986), and, therefore, considering a perceptual example that will serve as a kind of crucial test will be most appropriate. Suppose that a person, call her Julie, and works with a scientific instrumentation that has a gauging measure upon temperatures of liquids in a container. The gauge is marked in degrees, she looks at the gauge and sees that the reading is 105 degrees. What is she justifiably to believe, and why? Is she, for example, justified in believing that the liquid in the container is 105 degrees? Clearly, that depends on her background beliefs. A weak coherence theorist might argue that, though her belief that she sees the shape 105 is immediately justified as direct sensory evidence without appeal to a background system, the belief that the location in the container is 105 degrees results from coherence with a background system of latent beliefs that affirm to the shaping perceptivity that its 105 as visually read to be 105 degrees on the gauge that measures the temperature of the liquid in the container. This, nonetheless, of a weak coherence view that combines coherence with direct perceptivity as its evidence, in that the foundation of justification, is to account for the justification of our beliefs.
A strong coherence theory would go beyond the claim of the weak coherence theory to affirm that the justification of all beliefs, including the belief that one sees the shaping to sensory data that holds accountable a measure of 105, or even the more cautious belief that one sees a shape, resulting from the perceptivals of coherence theory, in that it coheres with a background system. One may argue for this strong coherence theory in several different ways. One line or medium through which to appeal to the coherence theory of contentual representations. If the content of the perceptual belief results from the relations of the belief to other beliefs in a network system of beliefs, then one may notably argue that justification thoroughly rests upon the resultants’ findings in relation to the belief been no other than the beliefs of a furthering network system of coordinate beliefs. In face value, the argument for the strong coherence theory is that without any assumptive grasp for reason, in that the coherence theories of content are directed of beliefs and are supposing causes that only produce of a consequent, of which we already expect. Consider the very cautious belief that I see a shape. How could the justification for that perceptual belief be an existent result that they characterize of its material coherence with a background system of beliefs? What might the background system of expression that ‘we’ would justify that belief? Our background system contains a simple and primal theory about our relationship to the world and surrounding surfaces that we perceive as it is or should be believed. To come to the specific point at issue, we believe that we can tell a shape when we see one, completely differentiated its form as perceived to sensory data, that we are to trust of ourselves about such simple matters as wether we see a shape before ‘us’ or not, as in the acceptance of opening to nature the inter-connectivity between belief and the progression through which we acquire from past experiential conditions of application, and not beyond deception. Moreover, when Julie sees the believing desire to act upon what either coheres with a weak or strong coherence of theory, she shows that its belief, as a measurable quality or entity of 105, has the essence in as much as there is much more of a structured distinction of circumstance, which is not of those that are deceptive about whether she sees that shape or sincerely does not see of its shaping distinction, however. Light is good, and the numeral shapes are large, readily discernible and so forth. These are beliefs that Julie has single handedly authenticated reasons for justification. Her successive malignance to sensory access to data involved is justifiably a subsequent belief, in that with those beliefs, and so she is justified and creditable.
The philosophical problems include discovering whether belief differs from other varieties of assent, such as ‘acceptance’ discovering to what extent degrees of belief is possible, understanding the ways in which belief is controlled by rational and irrational factors, and discovering its links with other properties, such as the possession of conceptual or linguistic skills. This last set of problems includes the question of whether we have properly said that prelinguistic infants or animals have beliefs.
Thus, we might think of coherence as inference to the best explanation based on a background system of beliefs, since we are not aware of such inferences for the most part, we must interpret the inferences as unconscious inferences, as information processing, based on or accessing the background system that proves most convincing of acquiring its act and used from the motivational force that its underlying and hidden desire are to do so.
Inference to the best explanation, can justify beliefs about the external world, the past, theoretical entities in science, and even the future. Consider belief about the external world and assume that we know what we do about the external world through our knowledge of our subjective and fleeting sensations. It seems obvious that we cannot deduce any truths about the existence of physical objects from truths describing the character of our sensations. But neither can we observe a correlation between sensations and something other than sensations since by hypothesis all we ever have to rely on ultimately is knowledge of our sensation. Nevertheless, we may be abler to posit physical objects as the best explanation for the character and order of our sensations. In this way, various hypotheses about the past might best explain present memory, theoretical postulates in physics might best explain phenomena in the macro-world, and it is even possible that our access to the future is through universal laws formulated to explain past observations. But what is the form of an inference to the best explanation?
It is natural to desire a better characterization of inference, but attempts to do so by constructing a fuller psychological explanation fail to comprehend the grounds on which inferences will be objectively valid -a point elaborately made by Frége. And attempts to understand the nature of inference better though the device of the representation of inference by formal-logical calculations or derivations. (1) Leave us puzzled about the relation of formal-logical derivations to the informal inferences they are supposed to represent or reconstruct, and (2) leaves us worried about the sense of such formal derivations. Are these derivations inferences? And are not informal inferences needed to apply the rules governing the constructions of formal derivation (inferring that this operation is an application of that formal rule?). It is usual to find it said that, an inference is a (perhaps very complex) act of thought by virtue of which act (1) I pass from a set of one or more propositions or statements to a proposition or statement and (2) it appears that the latter are true if the former is or are. This psychological characterization has had to encounter the literature under more or less inessential variations. And attempts to understand the nature of inference through the device of the representation of inference by formal-logical calculations or derivations better. Are such that these derivation’s inferences? And aren’t informal inferences needed to apply the rules governing the constructions of formal derivations (inferring that this operation in an application of that formal rule)? These are concerns cultivated by, for example, Wittgenstein.
Coming up with an adequate characterization of inference -and even working out what would count as an adequate characterization is a hard and hardly near a solved philosophical problem.
Let us suppose that there is some property ‘A’ pertaining to an observational or experimental situation, and that out of several of observed instances of ‘A’, some fraction m/n (possibly equal to 1) has also been instances of some logically independent property ‘B’. Suppose further that the background circumstances not specified in these descriptions have been varied to a substantial degree and that there is no collateral information available concerning the frequency of ‘B’s’ among ‘A’s’ or concerning causal or nomological connections between instances of ‘A’ and instances of ‘B’.
In this situation, an enumerative or instantial inductive inference would move from the premise that m/n of observed ‘A’s’ are ‘B’s’ to the conclusion that approximately m/n of all ‘A’s’ are ‘B’s’. (The usual probability qualification will be assumed to apply to the inference, than being part of the conclusion.) The class of ‘A’s’ should be taken to include not only unobserved ‘A’s’ and future ‘A’s, bu also possible or hypothetical ‘A’s’. (An alternative conclusion would concern the probability or likelihood of succeeding observations, ‘A’ being a ‘B’.
The traditional or Humean problem of induction, often called simply the problem of induction, is the problem of whether and why inferences that fit this schema should be considered rationally acceptable or justified from an epistemic or cognitive standpoint, i.e., whether and why reasoning in this way is likely to lead to true claims about the world. Is there any sort of argument or rationale that can be offered for thinking that conclusions reached in this way are likely to be true if the corresponding premiss is true-or, even that their chances of truth are significantly enhanced?
Once, again, this issue deals explicitly with cases where all observed ‘A’s’ are ‘B’s’ and where ‘A’ is claimed to be the cause of ‘B’, but his argument applies just as well to the more general case. Hume’s conclusion is entirely negative and sceptical as inductive inferences are not rationally justified, but are instead, there result of an essentially a-rational process, custom or habit. Hume challenges the proponents of induction to supply a cogent line of reasoning that leads from an inductive premise to the corresponding conclusion and offers an extremely influential argument as a dilemma (sometimes called ‘Hume’s fork’) to show that there can be no such reasoning. Such reasoning would, he argues, have to be either deductively demonstrative reasoning concerning relations of ideas or ‘experimental’ (i.e., empirical) reasoning concerning matters of fact or existence. It cannot be the former, because all demonstrative reasoning relies on the avoidance of contradiction, and it is not as contradiction to suppose that ‘the course of nature may change’, that an order observed in the past will not continue in the future, and it cannot be the latter, since any empirical argument would appeal to the success of such reasoning in previous experience, and the justifiability of generalizing from previous experience is precisely what is at issue - so that any such appeal would be question-begging. Hence concludes. There can be no such reasoning.
When one present such an inference in ordinary discourse it often seems to have the following form:
(1) O is the case.
(2) If ‘E’ had been the case O is what we would expect.
(3) ‘E’ was the case.
This is the argument form that Peirce called hypothesis or abduction. That is of saying, which we typically derive prediction from hypotheses and establish whether they are satisfied, that only an account of induction leaves unanswered two prior questions: How do we arrive at the hypotheses in the first place? And on what basis do we decide which hypotheses are worth testing? These questions concern the logic of discovery or, in Charles S. Peirce’s terminology, abduction. Many empiricist philosophers have denied that there is a logic (as opposed to a psychology) of discovery. Peirce, and followers such as N.R. Hanson, insisted that there is a logic of abduction.
The logic of abduction thus investigates the norms employed in deciding whether a hypothesis is worth testing a given stage of inquiry, and the norms influencing how we should retain the key insights of rejected theories in formulating their successors.
Again, to consider a very simple example, we might upon coming across one’s footprints on a beach, reason to the conclusion that a person walked along the beach recently by noting walking along the beach one would expect to find just such footprints.
But is abduction a legitimate form of reasoning? Obviously, if the conditionals in (2) read as a material conditional such arguments would be hopelessly bad. Since the proposition that ‘E’ materially implies O is entailed by O, there would always be many competing inferences to the best explanation and non of them seem to lend even self-evident support to its conclusion. The conditionals we employ in ordinary discourse, however, are seldom, if ever, material conditionals. The vast majority of ‘I. Then . . . ‘ statements may not be truth-functionally complex. Rather, they seem to assert a connection of some sort between the states of affairs referred to in the antecedent (after the ‘if’) and in the consequent (after the ‘if’) and in the consequent (after the ‘if’). Perhaps the argument for more plausibility, if the conditional is read in this more natural way. But consider an alterative footprints explanation:
(1) There are footprints on the beach.
(2) If cows wearing boots had walked along the beach recently one would expect to find such footprints.
Therefore, there is a high probability that:
(3) Cows wearing boots walked along the beach recently.
This inference has precisely the same form as the earlier inference the conclusion that people walked along the beach recently and its premisses are just as true, but we would have no doubt concerning both the conclusion and the inference as simply silly. If we are to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate reasoning to the best explanation, it seems that we need a more sophisticated model of the argument form. It seems that in reasoning to an explanation we need criteria for choosing between alternative explanations. If reasoning to the best explanation is to constitute a genuine alternative to inductive reasoning, it is important that these criteria not be implicit premisses that will convert our argument into an inductive argument. Thus, for example, if of this reason we conclude that people rather than cows walked along the beach are only that we are implicitly relying on the premiss that footprints of this sort are usually produced by people, then it is certainly tempting to suppose that our inference to the best explanation was really a disguised inductive inference of the form:
(1) Most footprints are produced by people.
(2) Here are footprints.
Therefore probably
(3) These footprints were produced by people.
If we follow the suggestion made above, we might construe the form of reasoning to the best explanation as follows:
(1) O (a description of some phenomenon).
(2) Of the set of available and competing explanation
E1, E2 . . . En capable of explaining O, E1 is the best according to the correct criteria for choosing among potential explanations.
Therefore probably,
(3) E1.
The model of explanation must be filled, of course, we need to know what the relevant criteria are for choosing among alternative explanations. Perhaps, the ingle most common virtue of explanation cited by philosophers is simplicity. Sometimes simplicity may be understood as for the number of things or events that explanation commits one to. Sometimes the crucial question concerns the number of kinds of things that theory commits one to.
Explanations are also sometimes taken to be more plausible the more explanatory ‘power’ they have. This power is usually defined as the number of a thing or more likely, the number of kinds of things, that they can explain. Thus, Newtonian mechanics were so attractive, the argument goes, partly because of the range of phenomena the theory could explain.
The familiarity of an explanation for the resemblance to already accepted kinds of explanation, in addition that now and again are implicated as a reason for preferring that explanation be for no less than the familiar kinds of explanation. So, if one provides a kind of evolutionary explanation for the disappearance of one’s organ in a creature, should look more favourably on a similar sort of explanation for the disappearance of another organ.
Alternative qualifications may use criterions’ in choosing among varying explanations, and there are many other candidates. But in evaluation the claim that inference to the best explanation constitutes a legitimate and independent argument form, one must explore the argument form, one need explore the question of whether it is a contingent fact that, at least, most phenomenon’s explanations and that explanations that satisfy a given criterion, simplicity, for example, is more likely to be correct. Here it might be pleasant (for scientists and writers of textbooks) if the reasoning to the explanation relies very much criteria. It seems that one cannot without circularity of reasoning to be of explanation to discover that reliance on such criteria is safe. But if one has some independent was of discovering that simple, powerful, familiar explanations are more often correct, then why should we think that reasoning to the best explanation is an independent source of information about the world? Why should we not conclude that it would be more perspicuous to represent reasoning this way?
(1) Most phenomena have the simplest, most powerful,
Familiar explanations available.
(2) Here is an observed phenomenon, and E1 is the simplest, most powerful, familiar explanation available.
Therefore, probably,
(3) This is to be explained by E1.
But the above is simply an instance of familiar inductive reasoning.
One might object to such an account on the grounds that not all justifiable inferences are self-explanatory, and more generally, the account of coherence may, at best, is ably successful to competitions that are based on background systems (BonJour, 1985, and Lehrer, 1990). The belief that one sees a shape competes with the claim that one does not, with the claim that one is deceived, and other sceptical objections. The background system of beliefs informs one that one is acceptingly trustworthy and enables one to meet the objections. A belief coheres with a background system just in case it enables one to meet the sceptical objections and in the way justifies one in the belief. This is a standard strong coherence theory of justification (Lehrer, 1990).
Illustrating the relationship between positive and negative coherence theories for the standard coherence theory is easy. If some objection to a belief cannot be met as the background system of beliefs of a person, then the person is not justified in that belief. So, to return to Julie, suppose that she has been told that a warning light has been installed on her gauge to tell her when it is not functioning properly and that when the red light is on, the gauge is malfunctioning. Suppose that when she sees the reading of 105, she also sees that the red light is on. Imagine, finally, that this is the first time the red light has been on, and, after years of working with the gauge, Julie, who has always placed her trust in the gauge, believes what the gauge tells her, that the liquid in the container is at 105 degrees. Though she believes what she reads is at 105 degrees is not a justified belief because it fails to cohere with her background belief that the gauge is malfunctioning. Thus, the negative coherence theory tells ‘us’ that she is not justified in her belief about the temperature of the contents in the container. By contrast, when we have not illuminated the red light and the background system of Julie that tells her that under such conditions that gauge is a trustworthy indicator of the temperature of the liquid in the container, then she is justified. The positive coherence theory tells ‘us’ that she is justified in her belief because her belief coheres with her background system of Julie lets it be known that she, under such conditions gauges a trustworthy indicant of temperature characterized or identified in respect of the liquid in the container, then she is justified. The positive coherence theory tells ‘us’ that she is justified in her belief because her belief coheres with her background system continues as a trustworthy system.
The foregoing sketch and illustration of coherence theories of justification have a common feature, namely, that they are what we have called inter-naturalistic theories of justification what makes of such a view are the absence of any requirement that the person for whom the belief is justified have any cognitive access to the relation of reliability in question. Lacking such access, such a person will usually, have no reason for thinking the belief is true or likely to be authenticated, but will, on such an account, is nonetheless to appear epistemologically justified in accepting it. Thus, such a view arguably marks a major break from the modern epistemological traditions, which identifies epistemic justification with having a reason, perhaps even a conclusive reason, for thinking that the belief is true. An epistemologist working within this tradition is likely to feel that the externalist, than offering a competing account of the same concept of epistemic justification with which the traditional epistemologist is concerned, has simply changed the subject.
They are theories affirming that coherence is a matter of internal relations between beliefs and that justification is a matter of coherence. If, then, justification is solely a matter of internal relations between beliefs, we are left with the possibility that the internal relations might fail to correspond with any external reality. How, one might have an objection, can a completely internal subjective notion of justification bridge the gap between mere true belief, which might be no more than a lucky guess, and knowledge, which we must ground in some connection between internal subjective conditions and external objective realities?
The answer is that it cannot and that we have required something more than justified true belief for knowledge. This result has, however, been established quite apart from consideration of coherence theories of justification. What we have required maybe put by saying that the justification that one must be undefeated by errors in the background system of beliefs. Justification is undefeated by errors just in case any correction of such errors in the background system of belief would sustain the justification of the belief based on the corrected system. So knowledge, on this sort of positivity is acclaimed by the coherence theory, which is the true belief that coheres with the background belief system and corrected versions of that system. In short, knowledge is true belief plus justification resulting from coherence and undefeated by error (Lehrer, 1990). The connection between internal subjective conditions of belief and external objectivity are from which reality’s result from the required correctness of our beliefs about the relations between those conditions and realities. In the example of Trust, she believes that her internal subjectivity to conditions of sensory data in which we have connected the experience and perceptual beliefs with the external objectivity in which reality is the temperature of the liquid in the container in a trustworthy manner. This background belief is essential to the justification of her belief that the temperature of the liquid in the container is 105 degrees, and the correctness of that background belief is essential to the justification remaining undefeated. So our background system of beliefs contains a simple theory about our relation to the external world that justifies certain of our beliefs that cohere with that system. For instance, such justification to convert to knowledge, that theory must be sufficiently free from error so that they have sustained the coherence in corrected versions of our background system of beliefs. The correctness of the simple background theory provides the connection between the internal condition and external reality.
Coherence is a major participant in the theatre of knowledge that coherence theories of belief, truth and justification are combined in ways to yield theories of knowledge. Coherence theories of belief are concerned with the content of beliefs, justly as a belief you now have, the beliefs that you are reading a page in a book, making that belief the belief that it is? Particularly, is the belief from which a coherent system of beliefs has an influence on beliefs. Belief has an influence on action. You will act differently if you believe that you are reading a page than if you believe something about whatever bring to a possibility. Perception and action undermine the content of belief, however. The same stimuli may produce various beliefs and various beliefs may produce the same action. The role that gives the belief the content it has is the role it plays within a network of relations to other beliefs, the role in reference and implication, for example, I infer different things from believing that I am reading a page in a book than from any other belief, just as I infer that belief from different things than I infer other beliefs from, but the systematic relations give the belief the specific content it has.
The coherence theory of truth arises naturally out of a problem raised by the coherence theory of justification. The problem is that anyone seeking to determine whether she has knowledge is confined to the search for coherence among her beliefs. The sensory experiences have been deadening til their representation has been exemplified as some perceptual belief. Beliefs are the engines that pull the train of justification. Nevertheless, what assurance do we have that our justification is based on true beliefs? What justification do we have that any of our justifications are undefeated? The fear that we might have none, that our beliefs might be the artifacts of some deceptive demon or scientist, leads to the quest to reduce truth to some form, perhaps an idealized form, of justification (Rescher, 1973, and Rosenberg, 1980). That would close the threatening sceptical gap between justification and truth. Suppose that a belief is true if and only if it is justifiable of some person. For such a person there would be no gap between justification and truth or between justification and undefeated justification. Truth would be coherence with some ideal background system of beliefs, perhaps one expressing a consensus among systems or some consensus among belief systems or some convergence toward a consensus. Such a view is theoretically attractive for the reduction it promises, but it appears open to profound objectification. One is that there is a consensus that we can all be wrong about at least some matters, for example, about the origins of the universe. If there is a consensus that we can all be wrong about something, then the consensual belief system rejects the equation of truth with the consensus. Consequently, the equation of truth with coherence with a consensual belief system is itself incoherently.
Coherence theories of the content of our beliefs and the justification of our beliefs themselves cohere with our background systems but coherence theories of truth do not. A defender of coherentism must accept the logical gap between justified belief and truth, but may believe that our capacities suffice to close the gap to yield knowledge. That view is, at any rate, a coherent one.
What makes a belief justified and what makes a true belief knowledge? Thinking that whether a belief deserves one of these appraisals is non-synthetically depending on what causal subject to has the belief. In recent decades several epistemologists have pursed this plausible idea with a variety of specific proposals. Some causal theories of knowledge have it that a true belief that ‘p’ is knowledge just in case it has the right sort of causal connection to the fact that ‘p’. Such a criterion can be applied only to cases where the fact that ‘p’ is a sort that can reach causal relations, this seems to exclude mathematically and other necessary facts and perhaps any fact expressed by a universal generalization, and proponents of this sort of criterion have usually of this sort of criterion have usually supposed that it is limited to perceptual knowledge of particular facts about the subject’s environment.
For example, Armstrong (1973) proposed that a belief of the form. This (perceived) object is ‘F’ is (non-inferential) knowledge if and only if the belief is a completely reliable sign that the perceived object is ‘F’, that is, the fact that the object is ‘F’ contributed to causing the belief and its doing so depended on properties of the believer such that the laws of nature dictated that, for any subject ‘x’ is to occur, and so thus a perceived object of ‘y’, if ‘x’ undergoing those properties is for ‘us’ to believe that ‘y’ is ‘F’, then ‘y’ is ‘F’. Dretske, (1981) offers a similar account, as to the belief’s being caused by a signal received by the perceiver that carries the information that the object is ‘F’.
This sort of condition fails, however, to be sufficient for non-inferential perceptual knowledge because it is compatible with the belief’s being unjustified, and an unjustifiable belief cannot be knowledge. For example, suppose that your mechanisms for colour perception are working well, but you have been given good reason to think otherwise, to think, say, that the substantive primary colours that are perceivable, that things look chartreuse to you and chartreuse things look magenta. If you fail to heed these reasons you have for thinking that your colour perception or sensory data is a directional way for us in believing of a thing that looks magenta, in that for you it is magenta, your belief will fail to be justified and will therefore fail to be knowledge, although the thing’s being magenta in such a way causes it as to be a completely reliable sign, or to carry the information, in that the thing is blush-coloured.
One could fend off this sort of counterexample by simply adding to the causal condition the requirement that the belief be justified, buy this enriched condition would still be insufficient. Suppose, for example, that in nearly all people, but not in you, as it happens, causes the aforementioned aberrations are colour perceptions. The experimenter tells you that you have taken such a drug but then says, ‘now wait, the pill you took was just a placebo’, suppose further, that this last thing the experimenter tells you is false. Her telling you that it was a false statement, and, again, telling you this gives you justification for believing of a thing that looks a subtractive primary colour to you that it is a sensorial primary colour, in that the fact you were to expect that the experimenters last statements were false, making it the case that your true belief is not knowledgeably correct, thought as though to satisfy its causal condition.
Goldman (1986) has proposed an importantly different causal criterion namely, that a true belief is knowledge, if it is produced by a type of process that is ‘globally’ and ‘locally’ reliable. Causing true beliefs is sufficiently high is globally reliable if its propensity. Local reliability deals with whether the process would have produced a similar but false belief in certain counterfactual situations alternative to the actual situation. This way of marking off true beliefs that are knowledge does not require the fact believed to be casually related to the belief, and so it could in principle apply to knowledge of any kind of truth.
Goldman requires that global reliability of the belief-producing process for the justification of a belief, he requires it also for knowledge because they require justification for knowledge, in what requires for knowledge but does not require for justification, which is locally reliable. His idea is that a justified true belief is knowledge if the type of process that produced it would not have produced it in any relevant counterfactual situation in which it is false. Noting that other concepts exhibit the same logical structure can motivate the relevant alternative account of knowledge. Two examples of this are the concept ‘flat’ and the concept ‘empty’ (Dretske, 1981). Both seem absolute concepts-a space is empty only if it does not contain anything and a surface is flat only if it does not have any bumps. However, the absolute character of these concepts is relative to a standard. For ‘flat’, there is a standard for what counts as a bump and for ‘empty’, there is a standard for what counts as a thing. To be flat is to be free of any relevant bumps and to be empty is to be devoid of all relevant things.
What makes an alternative situation relevant? Goldman does not try to formulate examples of what he takes to be relevantly alternate, but suggests of one. Suppose, that a parent takes a child’s temperature with a thermometer that the parent selected at random from several lying in the medicine cabinet. Only the particular thermometer chosen was in good working order, it correctly shows the child’s temperature to be normal, but if it had been abnormal then any of the other thermometers would have erroneously shown it to be normal. A globally reliable process has caused the parent’s actual true belief but, because it was ‘just luck’ that the parent happened to select a good thermometer, ‘we would not say that the parent knows that the child’s temperature is normal’. Goldman gives yet another example:
Suppose Sam spots Judy across the street and correctly believes
That it is Judy. If it did so occur that it was Judy’s twin sister,
Trudy, he would be mistaken her for Judy? Does Sam?
Know that it is Judy? As long as there is a serious possibility
That the person across the street might have been Trudy. Rather,
Than Judy. . . . We would deny that Sam knows.
(Goldman, 1986)
Goldman suggests that the reason for denying knowledge in the thermometer example, be that it was ‘just luck’ that the parent did not pick a non-working thermometer and in the twin’s example, the reason is that there was ‘a serious possibility’ that might have been that Sam could probably have mistaken for. This suggests the following criterion of relevance: An alternate situation, whereby, that the same belief is produced in the same way but is false, it is relevantly just in case at some point before the actual belief was to its cause, by which a chance that the actual belief was to have caused, in that the chance of that situation’s having come about was instead of the actual situation was too converged, nonetheless, by the chemical components that constitute its inter-actual exchange by which endorphin excitation was to influence and so give to the excitability of neuronal transmitters that deliver messages, inturn, the excited endorphins gave ‘change’ to ‘chance’, thus it was, in that what was interpreted by the sensory data and unduly persuaded by innate capabilities that at times are latently hidden within the mind, Or the brain, giving to its chosen chance of luck.
This avoids the sorts of counterexamples we gave for the causal criteria as we discussed earlier, but it is vulnerable to one or ones of a different sort. Suppose you were to stand on the mainland looking over the water at an island, on which are several structures that look (from at least some point of view) as would ne of an actualized point or station of position. You happen to be looking at one of any point, in fact a barn and your belief to that effect are justified, given how it looks to you and the fact that you have exclusively of no reason to think nor believe otherwise. Nevertheless, suppose that most the barn-looking structures on the island are not real barns but fakes. Finally, suppose that from any viewpoint on the mainland all of the island’s fake barns are obscured by trees and that circumstances made it very unlikely that you would have to a viewpoint not on the mainland. Here, it seems, your justified true belief that you are looking at a barn is not knowledge, although there was not a serious chance that there would have developed an alternative situation, wherefore you are similarly caused to have a false belief that you are looking at a barn.
That example shows that the ‘local reliability’ of the belief-producing process, on the ‘serous chance’ explication of what makes an alternative relevance, yet its view-point upon which we are in showing that non-locality is in addition to sustain of some probable course of the possibility for ‘us’ to believe in. Within the experience condition of application, the relationship with the sensory-data, as having a world-view that can encompass both the hidden and manifest aspects of nature would comprise of the mind, or brain that provides the excitation of neuronal ions, giving to sensory perception an accountable assessment of data and reason-sensitivity allowing a comprehensive world-view, integrating the various aspects of the universe into one magnificent whole, a whole in which we played an organic and central role. One-hundred years ago its question would have been by a Newtonian ‘clockwork universe’, a theoretical account of a probable ‘I’ universe that is completely mechanical. The laws of nature have predetermined everything that happens and by the state of the universe in the distant past. The freedom one feels regarding ones actions, even about the movement of one’s body, is an illusory infraction and the world-view expresses as the Newtonian one, is completely coherent.
Nevertheless, the human mind abhors a vacuum. When an explicit, coherent world-view is absent, it functions based on a tactic one. A tactic world-view is not subject to a critical evaluation, and it can easily harbour inconsistencies. Indeed, our tactic set of beliefs about the nature of reality consists of contradictory bits and pieces. The dominant component is a leftover from another period, the Newtonian ‘clock universe’ still lingers as we cling to this old and tired model because we know of nothing else that can take its place. Our condition is the condition of a culture that is in the throes of a paradigm shift. A major paradigm shift is complex and difficult because a paradigm holds ‘us captive: We see reality through it, as through coloured glasses, but we do not know that, we are convinced that we see reality as it is. Hence the appearance of a new and different paradigm is often incomprehensible. To someone raised believing that the Earth is flat, the suggestion that the Earth is spherically preposterous: If the Earth were spherical, would not the poor antipodes fall ‘down’ into the sky?
Yet, as we face a new millennium, we are forced to face this challenge. The fate of the planet is in question, and it was brought to its present precarious condition largely because of our trust in the Newtonian paradigm. As Newtonian world-view has to go, and, if one looks carefully, we can discern the main feature of the new, emergent paradigm. The search for these features is what was the influence of a fading paradigm. All paradigms include subterranean realms of tactic assumptions, the influence of which outlasts the adherence to the paradigm itself.
The first line of exploration suggests the ‘weird’ aspects of the quantum theory, with fertile grounds for our feeling of which should disappear in inconsistencies with the prevailing world-view. This feeling is in replacing by the new one, i.e., opinion or information assailing availability by means of ones parts of relating to the mind or spirit, which if in the event one believes that the Earth is flat, the story of Magellan’s travels is quite puzzling: How travelling due west is possible for a ship and, without changing direct. Arrive at its place of departure? Obviously, when the belief replaces the flat-Earth paradigm that Earth is spherical, we have instantly resolved the puzzle.
The founders of Relativity and quantum mechanics were deeply engaging but incomplete, in that none of them attempted to construct a philosophical system, however, that the mystery at the heart of the quantum theory called for a revolution in philosophical outlooks. During which time, the 1920's, when quantum mechanics reached maturity, began the construction of a full-blooded philosophical system that we based not only on science but on nonscientific modes of knowledge as well. As, the disappearing influences drawn upon the paradigm go well beyond its explicit claim. We believe, as the scenists and philosophers did, that when we wish to find out the truth about the universe, we can ignore nonscientific nodes of processing human experiences, poetry, literature, art, music are all wonderful, but, in relation to the quest for knowledge of the universe, they are irrelevant. Yet, it was Alfred North Whitehead who pointed out the fallacy of this speculative assumption. In this, within other aspects of thinking of some reality in which are the building blocks of reality are not material atoms but ‘throbs of experience’. Whitehead formulated his system in the late 1920s, and yet, as far as I know, the founders of quantum mechanics were unaware of it. It was not until 1963 that J.M. Burgers pointed out that its philosophy accounts very well for the main features of the quanta, especially the ‘weird ones’, enabling as in some aspects of reality is ‘higher’ or ’deeper’ than others, and if so, what is the structure of such hierarchical divisions? What of our place in the universe? Finally, what is the relationship between the great aspiration within the lost realms of nature? An attempt to endow ‘us’ with a cosmological meaning in such a universe seems totally absurd, and, yet, this very universe is just a paradigm, not the truth. When you reach its end, you may be willing to join the alternate view as accorded to which, surprisingly bestow ‘us’ with what we have restored, although in a post-postmodern context.
Subjective matter’s has regulated the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics, as to emphasis the connections between what I believe, in that investigations of such inter-connectivity are anticipatorially the hesitations that are an exclusion held within the western traditions, however, the philosophical thinking, from Plato to Platinous had in some aspects an interpretative cognitive process of presenting her in expression of a consensus of the physical community. Some have shared and by expressive objections to other aspects (sometimes vehemently) by others. Still other aspects express my own views and convictions, as turning about to be more difficult that anticipated, discovering that a conversational mode would be helpful, but, their conversations with each other and with me in hoping that all will be not only illuminating but finding to its read may approve in them, whose dreams are dreams among others than themselves.
These examples make it seem likely that, if there is a criterion for what makes an alternative situation relevant that will save Goldman’s claim about reliability and the acceptance of knowledge, it will not be simple.
The interesting thesis that counts asa causal theory of justification, in the meaning of ‘causal theory’ intend of the belief that is justified just in case it was produced by a type of process that is ‘globally’ reliable, that is, its propensity to produce true beliefs-that can be defined to some favourable approximations, as the proportion of the belief it produces, or would produce where it used as much as opportunity allows, that is true ~. Is sufficiently that a belief acquires favourable epistemic status by having some kind of reliable linkage to the truth? We have advanced variations of this view for both knowledge and justified belief. The first formulations of dependably an accounting measure of knowing came in the accompaniment of F.P. Ramsey 1903-30, who made important contributions to mathematical logic, probability theory, the philosophy of science and economics. Instead of saying that quarks have such-and-such properties, the Ramsey sentence says the theoretical are alternatively something that has those properties. If we have repeated the process for all of the theoretical terms, the sentence gives the ‘topic-neutral’ structure of the theory, but removes any implication that we know what the term so treated have as a meaning. It leaves open the possibility of identifying the theoretical item with whatever. It is that best fits the description provided, thus, substituting the term by a variable, Ramsey, was one of the first thinkers to accept a ‘redundancy theory of truth’, which he combined its radical views of the function of many kinds of the proposition. Neither generalizations, nor causal propositions, not those treating probabilities or ethics, described facts, but each has a different specific function in our intellectual commentators on the early works of Wittgenstein, and his continuing friendship with the latter liked to Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge and to philosophy in 1929.
The most sustained and influential application of these ideas were in the philosophy of mind, or brain, as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) whom Ramsey persuaded that remained work for him to do, the way of an undoubtedly charismatic figure of 20th-century philosophy, living and writing with a power and intensity that frequently overwhelmed his contemporaries and readers, being a kind of picture or model has centred the early period on the ‘picture theory of meaning’ according to which sentence represents a state of affairs of it. Containing elements corresponding to those of the state of affairs and structure or form that mirrors that a structure of the state of affairs that it represents. We have reduced to all logic complexity that of the ‘propositional calculus, and all propositions are ‘truth-functions of atomic or basic propositions.
In the layer period the emphasis shafts dramatically to the actions of people and the role linguistic activities play in their lives. Thus, whereas in the ‘Tractatus’ language is placed in a static, formal relationship with the world, in the later work Wittgenstein emphasis its use through standardized social activities of ordering, advising, requesting, measuring, counting, excising concerns for each other, and so on. These different activities are thought of as so many ‘language games’ that together make or a form of life. Philosophy typically ignores this diversity, and in generalizing and abstracting distorts the real nature of its subject-matter. Besides the ‘Tractatus’ and the investigations, collections of Wittgenstein’s work published posthumously include ‘Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics’ (1956), ‘Notebooks’ (1914-1916) ( 1961), ‘Pholosophische Bemerkungen’ (1964), ‘Zettel’ (1967), and ‘On Certainty’ (1969).
Clearly, there are many forms of reliabilism. Just as there are many forms of ‘foundationalism’ and ‘coherence’. How is reliabilism related to these other two theories of justification? We usually regard it as a rival, and this is aptly so, in as far as foundationalism and coherentism traditionally focussed on purely evidential relations than psychological processes, but we might also offer reliabilism as a deeper-level theory, subsuming some of the precepts of either foundationalism or coherentism. Foundationalism says that there are ‘basic’ beliefs, which acquire justification without dependence on inference, reliabilism might rationalize this indicating that reliable non-inferential processes have formed the basic beliefs. Coherence stresses the primary of systematicity in all doxastic decision-making. Reliabilism might rationalize this by pointing to increases in reliability that accrue from systematicity consequently, reliabilism could complement Foundationalism and coherence than completed with them.
These examples make it seem likely that, if there is a criterion for what makes an alternate situation relevant that will save Goldman’s claim about local reliability and knowledge. Will did not be simple. The interesting thesis that counts as a causal theory of justification, in the making of ‘causal theory’ intended for the belief as it is justified in case it was produced by a type of process that is ‘globally’ reliable, that is, its propensity to produce true beliefs that can be defined, to an acceptable approximation, as the proportion of the beliefs it produces, or would produce where it used as much as opportunity allows, that is true is sufficiently relializable. We have advanced variations of this view for both knowledge and justified belief, its first formulation of a reliability account of knowing appeared in the notation from F.P. Ramsey (1903-30). The theory of probability, he was the first to show how a ‘personalist theory’ could be developed, based on a precise behavioural notion of preference and expectation. In the philosophy of language. Much of Ramsey’s work was directed at saving classical mathematics from ‘intuitionism’, or what he called the ‘Bolshevik menace of Brouwer and Weyl. In the theory of probability he was the first to show how we could develop some personalists theory, as based on precise behavioural notation of preference and expectation. In the philosophy of language, Ramsey was one of the first thankers, which he combined with radical views of the function of many kinds of a proposition. Neither generalizations, nor causal propositions, nor those treating probability or ethics, describe facts, but each has a different specific function in our intellectual economy. Ramsey was one of the earliest commentators on the early work of Wittgenstein, and his continuing friendship that led to Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge and to philosophy in 1929.
Ramsey’s sentence theory is the sentence generated by taking all the sentences affirmed in a scientific theory that use some term, e.g., ‘quark’. Replacing the term by a variable, and existentially quantifying into the result. Instead of saying that quarks have such-and-such properties, the Ramsey sentence says that there is something that has those properties. If we repeat the process for all of a group of the theoretical terms, the sentence gives the ‘topic-neutral’ structure of the theory, but removes any implication that we know what the term so treated prove competent. It leaves open the possibility of identifying the theoretical item with whatever, but it is that best fits the description provided. Virtually, all theories of knowledge. Of course, share an externalist component in requiring truth as a condition for known in. Reliabilism goes further, however, in trying to capture additional conditions for knowledge by ways of a nomic, counterfactual or other ‘external’ relations between belief and truth. Closely allied to the nomic sufficiency account of knowledge, primarily dur to Dretshe (1971, 1981), A.I. Goldman (1976, 1986) and R. Nozick (1981). The core of this approach is that x’s belief that ‘p’ qualifies as knowledge just in case ‘x’ believes ‘p’, because of reasons that would not obtain unless ‘p’ was true, or because of a process or method that would not yield belief in ‘p’ if ‘p’ were not true. An enemy example, ‘x’ would not have its current reasons for believing there is a telephone before it. Or would not come to believe this in the ways it does, thus, there is a counterfactual reliable guarantor of the belief’s bing true. Determined to and the facts of counterfactual approach say that ‘x’ knows that ‘p’ only if there is no ‘relevant alternative’ situation in which ‘p’ is false but ‘x’ would still believe that a proposition ‘p’; must be sufficient to eliminate all the alternatives to ‘p’ where an alternative to a proposition ‘p’ is a proposition incompatible with ‘p’? That in one’s justification or evidence for ‘p’ must be sufficient for one to know that every alternative to ‘p’ is false. This element of our evolving thinking, sceptical arguments have exploited about which knowledge. These arguments call our attentions to alternatives that our evidence sustains itself with no elimination. The sceptic inquires to how we know that we are not seeing a cleverly disguised mule. While we do have some evidence against the likelihood of such as deception, intuitively knowing that we are not so deceived is not strong enough for ‘us’. By pointing out alternate but hidden points of nature, in that we cannot eliminate, and others with more general application, as dreams, hallucinations, etc. The sceptic appears to show that every alternative is seldom. If ever, satisfied.
This conclusion conflicts with another strand in our thinking about knowledge, in that we know many things. Thus, there is a tension in our ordinary thinking about knowledge ~. We believe that knowledge is, in the sense indicated, an absolute concept and yet, we also believe that there are many instances of that concept.
If one finds absoluteness to be too central a component of our concept of knowledge to be relinquished, one could argue from the absolute character of knowledge to a sceptical conclusion (Unger, 1975). Most philosophers, however, have taken the other course, choosing to respond to the conflict by giving up, perhaps reluctantly, the absolute criterion. This latter response holds as sacrosanct our commonsense belief that we know many things (Pollock, 1979 and Chisholm, 1977). Each approach is subject to the criticism that it preserves one aspect of our ordinary thinking about knowledge at the expense of denying another. We can view the theory of relevant alternatives as an attempt to provide a more satisfactory response to this tension in our thinking about knowledge. It attempts to characterize knowledge in a way that preserves both our belief that knowledge is an absolute concept and our belief that we have knowledge.
Having to its recourse of knowledge, its cental questions include the origin of knowledge, the place of experience in generating knowledge, and the place of reason in doing so, the relationship between knowledge and certainty, and between knowledge and the impossibility of error, the possibility of universal scepticism, and the changing forms of knowledge that arise from new conceptualizations of the world. All these issues link with other central concerns of philosophy, such as the nature of truth and the natures of experience and meaning. Seeing epistemology is possible as dominated by two rival metaphors. One is that of a building or pyramid, built on foundations. In this conception it is the job of the philosopher to describe especially secure foundations, and to identify secure modes of construction, is that the resulting edifice can be shown to be sound. This metaphor of knowledge, and of a rationally defensible theory of confirmation and inference for construction, as that knowledge must be regarded as a structure risen upon secure, certain foundations. These are found in some formidable combinations of experience and reason, with different schools (empiricism, rationalism) emphasizing the role of one over that of the others. Foundationalism was associated with the ancient Stoics, and in the modern era with Descartes (1596-1650). Who discovered his foundations in the ‘clear and distinct’ ideas of reason? Its main opponent is coherentism, or the view that a body of propositions mas be known without a foundation in certainty, but by their interlocking strength, than as a crossword puzzle may be known to have been solved correctly even if each answer, taken individually, admits of uncertainty. Difficulties at this point led the logical passivists to abandon the notion of an epistemological foundation, and, overall, to philander with the coherence theory of truth. It is widely accepted that trying to make the connection between thought and experience through basic sentences depends on an untenable ‘myth of the given’.
Still, of the other metaphor, is that of a boat or fuselage, that has no foundation but owes its strength to the stability given by its interlocking parts. This rejects the idea of a basis in the ‘given’, favours ideas of coherence and holism, but finds it harder to ward off scepticism. In spite of these concerns, the problem, least of mention, is of defining knowledge about true beliefs plus some favoured relations between the believer and the facts that began with Plato’s view in the ‘Theaetetus’ that knowledge is true belief, and some logos.` Due of its natural epistemology, the enterprising of studying the actual formation of knowledge by human beings, without aspiring to make evidently those processes as rational, or proof against ‘scepticism’ or even apt to yield the truth. Natural epistemology would therefore blend into the psychology of learning and the study of episodes I the history of science. The scope for ‘external’ or philosophical reflection of the kind that might result in scepticism or its refutation is markedly diminished. Although the term in a modern index has distinguished exponents of the approach include Aristotle, Hume, and J.S. Mills.
The task of the philosopher of a discipline would then be to reveal the correct method and to unmask counterfeits. Although this belief lay behind much positivist philosophy of science, few philosophers at present, subscribe to it. It places too well a confidence in the possibility of a purely a prior ‘first philosophy’, or standpoint beyond that of the working practitioners, from which they can measure their best efforts as good or bad. This point of view now seems that many philosophers are acquainted with the affordance of fantasy. The more modest of tasks that we actually adopt at various historical stages of investigation into different areas with the aim not so much of criticizing but more of systematization, in the presuppositions of a particular field at a particular tie. There is still a role for local methodological disputes within the community investigators of some phenomenon, with one approach charging that another is unsound or unscientific, but logic and philosophy will not, on the modern view, provide an independent arsenal of weapons for such battles, which indeed often come to seem more like political bids for ascendancy within a discipline.
This is an approach to the theory of knowledge that sees an important connection between the growth of knowledge and biological evolution. An evolutionary epistemologist claims that the development of human knowledge processed through some natural selection process, the best example of which is Darwin’s theory of biological natural selection. There is a widespread misconception that evolution proceeds according to some plan or direct, put it has neither, and the role of chance ensures that its future course will be unpredictable. Random variations in individual organisms create tiny differences in their Darwinian fitness. Some individuals have more offsprings than others, and the characteristics that increased their fitness thereby become more prevalent in future generations. Once upon a time, at least a mutation occurred in a human population in tropical Africa that changed the haemoglobin molecule in a way that provided resistance to malaria. This enormous advantage caused the new gene to spread, with the unfortunate consequence that sickle-cell anaemia came to exist.
In the modern theory of evolution, genetic mutations provide the blind variations (blind in the sense that variations are not influenced by the effects they would have -the likelihood of a mutation is not correlated with the benefits of liabilities that mutation would confer on the organism), the environment provides the filter of selection, and reproduction provides the retention, least of mention, the example of which Darwin’s theory of biological natural selection having three major components of the model of natural selection is the variation, selection and retention. All the same, it is to achieve because those organisms with features that make the no less adapted for survival do not survive in competition with other organisms in the environment that have features which are better adapted. Evolutionary epistemology applies this blind variation and selective retention model to the growth of scientific knowledge and to human thought processes in general.
The parallel between biological evolution and conceptual (or, epistemic) evolution can be seen in either literal or analogical. On this view, called the ‘evolution of cognitive mechanisms’ program’ (EEM) by Bradie (1986) and te ‘Darwinian approach into epistemology’ by Ruse (1986), the growth of knowledge occurs through blind variation and selective retention because biological natural selection itself is the cause of epistemic variation and selection. The most plausible version of the literal view does not hold that all human beliefs are innate than that of the mental mechanisms which guide the acquisition of non-innate beliefs ae themselves innate and result of biological natural selection. Ruse (1986) defends a version of literal evolution which her links to sociology. (Bradie and Rescher, 1990)
On the analogical version of evolutionary epistemology called, the ‘evolutions of theories program’ (EET) by Bradie (1986) and the ‘Spencerian approach (after the nineteenth-century philosopher Herbert Spencer) by Ruse (1986), the development of human knowledge is governed by a process analogous to biological natural selection, than by an instance of the mechanism itself. This version of evolutionary epistemology, introduced and elaborated by Donald Campbell (1947) and a mental process of trial and error known as epistemic natural selection.
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